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1 INTRODUCTION 
Since the 1980s the strand of personnel economics has emerged from labor economics in 
order to address both the lack of economic perspectives in early human resource manage-
ment research as well as the growing need for hands-on, business-oriented insights on hu-
man resource management (HRM) (Lazear 2000a). Initially influenced by informational 
economics and further extended by ideas originating from social psychology and organiza-
tional sociology, personnel economics is nowadays a well-established and substantial part 
of labor economics research. Reviews by Prendergast (1999), Lazear (1999, 2000a) and 
Lazear and Oyer (2013) provide a comprehensive overview of the historical development 
as well as the contemporary debate within the field of personnel economics.  
Personnel economics applies (labor) economic methods such as econometrics and game 
theory to provide a detailed understanding of the functioning of a firm and its human re-
source practices. However, due to limited data availability in the early years, personnel 
economics started off with mostly theoretical considerations. Later contributions combine 
theory with empirical analyses as they are built on rich firm-based data sets. In general, 
personnel economic models and theories play by the traditional rules of economics, in par-
ticular the assumptions of rational maximizing agents, specific equilibrium analysis of la-
bor and product markets and efficiency as a result of market equilibria (Lazear 2000a, 
Lazear, Shaw 2007). Nevertheless, the main research fields of personnel economics are not 
limited to the classic HRM issues such as compensation, turnover and incentives. Instead, 
its scope of research is extended beyond traditional economic fields, including topics such 
as group norms, teamwork settings, or worker empowerment. In brief, one can summarize 
the main research interests of personnel economists to comprise incentives, worker-firm 
matching, compensation, skill development and organization of work (Lazear, Oyer 2013). 
These topics share the common thread in that personnel economics is all about enhancing 
worker productivity (Lazear, Gibbs 2009).  
In contrast to labor economics, personnel economics does not appear policy-oriented: It 
focuses exclusively on the welfare within an individual employment relationship and not 
on the overall social welfare (Lazear, Oyer 2013). In other words, personnel economics 
aims at offering practical implications for managers on how to improve operations and, 
thus, enhance the overall productivity of a given firm. As a consequence, personnel eco-
nomics research mainly focuses on those variables that managers have an actual bearing in.  
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Within the field of personnel economics, the strand of insider econometrics has evolved 
quite recently (Ichniowski, Shaw 2009). Inspired by seminal papers by Ichniowski, Shaw 
and Prennushi (1997) as well as Lazear (2000b), more and more researchers pursue the 
insider econometric approach in order to address the question whether particular manage-
ment practices raise a firm’s productivity. Productivity in insider studies is usually as-
sessed through various variables, including product quality, production line downtime, 
worker absenteeism, worker turnover and speed of order fulfillment (Ichniowski, Shaw 
2013). Moreover, researchers try to identify the underlying mechanisms and employee 
behavior that trigger these productivity effects. Both mechanisms and behavior may vary 
across workers, work groups, firms, industries, or with other environmental influences 
such as the overall set of management practices that are in operation at a given firm.  
In general, insider studies rely on micro-level (panel) datasets that originate from only one 
or a few companies or industries. This rich data allows for profound analyses of productiv-
ity effects of particular management practices that are in operation at the given firms or 
industry (e.g. Bartel, Ichniowski, Shaw 2004, Ichniowski, Shaw 2013). Insider studies are 
often assumed to be advantageous as they combine state-of-the-art empirical analyses of 
high-quality data with additional expert knowledge stemming from inside the company. 
This two-folded research strategy usually facilitates the formulation of hypotheses as well 
as the interpretation of empirical results and might reveal additional evidence that would 
have been undetected without inside knowledge (Ichniowski, Shaw 2013). In what fol-
lows, the most important contributions that particularly well demonstrate the great power 
and wide applicability of insider econometrics are briefly presented.     
In their early work, Ichniowski, Shaw and Prennushi (1997) study the impact of innovative 
HRM practices such as teamwork, incentive pay or on-the-job training on productivity. 
Using panel data from 36 steel finishing lines at US steel mills, they find substantial 
productivity gains associated with the implementation of clusters of innovative HRM prac-
tices. Later, Lazear (2000b) analyzes behavioral responses to the introduction of piece rate 
pay at a large US-based windshield installer. As the company shifts from fixed hourly pay 
to piece rate pay, he reports an increase in productivity of 44% that is related to incentive 
as well as sorting effects.  
Since then, the quantity of insider studies has increased constantly. For instance, Hamilton, 
Nickerson and Owan (2003) study the introduction of autonomous work teams and team-
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based piece rate schemes at a US garment producer. The joint adoption of teamwork and 
team incentives results in average productivity gains of 14%. In a series of papers, Bandi-
era, Barankay and Rasul (2005, 2007, 2009, 2010, and 2011) examine the productivity of 
workers and managers in a UK fruit picking farm under varying remuneration schemes. 
For instance, they find worker productivity to be at least 50% higher under piece rate re-
muneration than under relative incentives since workers appear to mitigate negative exter-
nalities of their own work – in terms of wage penalties for others – when working with 
their friends. Furthermore, the most capable workers are willing to waive about 10% of 
their potential earnings to allow for social interaction with their less capable co-workers. 
Likewise, less capable workers increase their productivity by about 10%. For managers, 
the results indicate that supervisors favor workers who they are socially connected with 
under fixed wage schemes while favoring the most productive workers when their own 
remuneration is based on the workers’ performance.  
Peer effects in the workplace are observed by Mas and Moretti (2009) based on innovative 
high-frequency data from supermarket checkout desks. They observe positive productivity 
spillovers associated with the mere presence of more productive co-workers. More recent-
ly, Bloom et al. (2013) study the productivity effects of modern management practices 
such as performance-based incentives in the context of Indian textile companies. They 
report productivity gains of 11% at those companies that introduced modern management 
practices. For a comprehensive overview of insider econometrics see the review articles by 
Lazear and Shaw (2007), Shaw (2009), Bloom and van Reenen (2011) as well as Ich-
niowski and Shaw (2013). Assessing the future of insider econometrics in the digital age, 
one might assume this approach to highly benefit from technological advances such as big 
data and high-frequency data mining. These data sources offer innovative research poten-
tials due to easy accessible computerized data that meets all requirements of high-quality 
research. Two studies of this dissertation already profit from high-frequency computerized 
data gathered via a modern GPS-based fleet management system operated by a truck haul-
ing company (chapters four and five).  
As stated above, personnel economics predominantly focuses on productivity enhancement 
with productivity being understood as the overall outcome of employee behavior. In this, it 
is widely recognized among personnel economists that human behavior is affected by both 
psychological preferences as well as environmental influences such as budgets, constraints, 
incentives or social interaction. The study of the effects of these environmental influences 
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on human behavior and, thus, worker productivity is the core of personnel economics re-
search (Lazear, Gibbs 2009). Following the tradition of insider econometrics, this disserta-
tion seeks to analyze how economic and social influences determine employee behavior in 
order to better understand the link between particular economic and social variables and 
worker productivity.
1
 Methods and instruments that may enhance worker productivity are 
discussed in each study based on the respecting findings. Throughout this thesis, produc-
tivity is assessed by means of divergent performance measures such as overall team per-
formance (chapter two),
2
 employee absenteeism (chapter three) and several objective com-
puterized performance evaluations (chapters four and five). Given the main personnel eco-
nomics research fields assessed by Lazear and Oyer (2013), the work at hand focuses on 
incentives and the organization of work in teams. 
It has long been recognized in personnel economics that moral hazard problems exist with-
in the employment relationship since it usually represents a classic principal-agent setting.
3
 
Due to information asymmetries, rent-seeking agents can be assumed to choose levels of 
effort below the ones agreed upon with the principal in order to maximize their own utili-
ty.
4
 In this situation, incentives may be introduced to align interests of principals and 
agents and, thus, overcome agency problems. A large theoretical literature has emerged on 
the necessity for and the design of incentives that motivate employees to behave in the 
very interest of the firm, e.g. Holmström and Milgrom (1991) as well as Baker (1992) on 
multitasking agents that chose to perform only those activities providing the highest incen-
tives; Milgrom (1988) and Milgrom and Roberts (1988) on agents’ rent-seeking activities 
with regard to subjective evaluations by supervisors; Lazear (1979) on deferred compensa-
tion; Fama (1980) as well as Holmström (1982) on career concerns. Comprehensive re-
views of the most relevant contributions on incentives in principal-agent settings are pro-
vided by Gibbons (1997) and Prendergast (1999).  
                                                 
1
  Chapter two depicts an exception as it follows the meta-analytic approach in analyzing correlations ob-
served in previous empirical research.  
2
  In this meta-analysis overall team performance is based on subjective performance ratings – either self-
assessed by the team or externally-assessed by managers and supervisors – as well as objective financial 
key performance indicators (KPIs) and efficiency measures such as productivity, profitability and goal 
achievement. 
3
  For a general overview of agency theory see, for instance, Oyer and Schaefer (2011). 
4
  However, not all agents are dishonest. Bloom et al. (2015) observe that working at home offices increases 
productivity although monitoring decreases. In contrast, other researchers find agents to display shirking 
behavior in various settings such as auto repairs (Schneider 20012), restaurant tipping (Azar, Yosef, Bar-
Eli 2015), or taxi transportation (Balafoutas et al. 2013). In a recent meta-analysis, Rosenbaum, Billinger 
and Stieglitz (2014) observe people to be either unconditional cheaters/non-cheaters or decide on being 
honest or dishonest according to the given environmental influences such as monitoring activities.  
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Empirical evidence on the benefits of incentives is broad and will be thoroughly discussed 
in the respective chapters. However, despite the extensive empirical support for their ad-
vantageousness, extrinsic incentives may also induce the very behavior they intend to pre-
vent. In other words, extrinsic incentives (e.g. pay for performance schemes) literally buy 
off (or crowd out) intrinsic incentives such as values or beliefs. Since these intrinsic incen-
tives are equally important in determining employees’ effort choice decisions, overall 
worker productivity may be reduced (e.g. Deci 1971, Bénabou, Tirole 2003). Empirical 
evidence on this so-called crowding-out effect will be discussed in the respective chapters.  
Apart from incentives, social peer influences can, to a large extent, explain employees’ 
effort choice decisions. In the context of teamwork, personnel economics theory suggests 
team-based productivity gains to occur mainly for two reasons. First, according to Lazear 
(1999), broad sets of complementary knowledge, skills and expertise constitute the main 
advantage of teamwork over individual work. Second, due to peer effects in terms of 
productivity spillovers high-productive employees may positively affect the productivity 
of their peers. Falk and Ichino (2006) experimentally confirmed the existence of peer ef-
fects. Empirical studies such as the above-mentioned Mas and Moretti paper (2009) on 
supermarket checkout clerks provide further evidence. However, the work at hand does not 
focus on whether or not teamwork is advantageous compared to individual work. Instead, 
the objective here is to understand the influence of composition effects on group outcomes 
with respect to work group diversity. Two opposing research traditions have emerged over 
time. On the one hand, social categorization theory (Tajfel 1982, Turner 1987) and similar-
ity-attraction paradigm (Byrne 1969, 1971) assume social interactions to be facilitated as 
well as more desirable among similar peers. Therefore, homogeneous teams seem to be 
preferable over heterogeneous teams. On the other hand, information processing perspec-
tive (Cox, Blake 1991, Cox 1993) argues that teams gain from broader sets of knowledge 
and skills. In other words, heterogeneous teams are expected to outperform homogenous 
teams. The latter argument is supported by Lazear’s considerations (1999) as stated above. 
Empirical evidence for both theoretical approaches is discussed in the respective chapters.  
The influence of incentives as well as teamwork on employee behavior and, thus, worker 
productivity are addressed in the dissertation at hand based on four separate analyses pre-
sented in chapters two to five. The theoretical background and empirical evidence are dis-
cussed in more detail there. The fundamental research question of each chapter can be stat-
ed as follows:   
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Chapter 2:  Is employee behavior and, thus, work group performance affected by work 
group composition in terms of homogeneity/heterogeneity? 
Chapter 3:  What are potential social and economic determinants of employee absence 
behavior at the team-level? 
Chapter 4:  Do employees respond to unfavorable changes in extrinsic incentive design 
by adapting their behavior in terms of effort choice and productivity? 
Chapter 5:  Do employees adjust their effort choice and productivity when being “pro-
moted” from temporary to permanent employment? 
Along these research questions, the four studies presented throughout the work at hand can 
be divided into two parts. While the first part (chapter two and three) analyzes the effect of 
social determinants within work groups (peer effects and worker heterogeneity) on work-
ers’ effort choice decisions, the second part (chapter three to five) focuses on the relation-
ship between different types of economic determinants (incentives) and workers’ effort 
choice decisions.  
Chapter two follows a classic meta-analytic approach and, therefore, is based on existing 
empirical studies. The meta-analytic approach was chosen to account for the vast amount 
of research on group diversity and the often small samples this research is built on. In or-
der not to provide just another empirical study on diversity, a systematic quantitative 
summary of existing findings is warranted. In contrast, chapters three to five build on in-
sider econometric data derived from a large European automobile manufacturer. This 
unique insider data had hitherto been unavailable for empirical analyses. All data sets used 
throughout this thesis are either compiled by the author (chapters two, four and five) or by 
company representatives according to predefined standards set by the author (chapter 
three). Exact variable definitions, continuous monitoring during data provision and thor-
ough data checks helped to guarantee high-quality data that meets all necessary require-
ments concerning reliability as well as validity.   
Since this dissertation follows a personnel economics approach, all analyses conform to its 
main assumptions and methodologies. In general, one can distinguish four major “building 
blocks” (Lazear, Shaw 2007, p. 91) of personnel economics (Lazear 2000a, Lazear, Shaw 
2007). First, both firms and employees are assumed to be rational maximizing agents. Em-
ployees seek to maximize their individual utility while firms seek to maximize their profit 
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under given economic constraints such as imperfect information or transaction costs. Per-
sonnel economics is built on the assumption that agents’ behavior is determined mainly by 
the interaction of agents and not by other influences beyond the agents’ control. As a con-
sequence, any decision-making of both employees and firms, e.g. in terms of effort choice 
decisions or the choice of particular management practices, is based on maximizing behav-
ior. Second, personnel economics models are based on equilibrium theory that assumes 
labor and product markets to be competitive since both firms and workers are considering 
the actions of other agents when making their own decisions. This notion results in a spe-
cific price-quantity equilibrium that allows predicting a model’s outcomes in the real world 
quite accurately. Third, a core of personnel economics research is the analysis of efficien-
cies resulting from these equilibria. When interacting with a profit-maximizing firm a utili-
ty-maximizing employee usually chooses a behavior that in the end will make both parties 
better off. Yet, in some situations efficiency is forfeited due to (market) inefficiencies, e.g. 
in terms of moral hazard. Here, it is the very aim of personnel economists to identify ac-
tions that help workers and firms alike to alleviate inefficiencies. Fourth, econometric and 
experimental designs are the essentials of a personnel economist’s toolbox in order to pur-
sue his research. On this account, the research methods applied in the work at hand have 
been customized to the peculiarities of each of the four studies when it comes to data and 
research focus. Throughout this thesis state-of-the-art econometric methods are applied 
including OLS regression, random- and fixed-effects models for longitudinal data, Seem-
ingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) models as introduced by Zellner (1962) as well as logit 
and probit estimations. The meta-analysis of chapter two follows the Hedges and Olkin 
(1985) meta-analysis approach while moderator analysis is based on meta-regressions as 
proposed by DerSimonian and Laird (1986). All methods allow for an in-depth analysis of 
the underlying research questions. The methodological approach will be discussed sepa-
rately in each chapter.  
This thesis is based on four separate econometric studies to be published in peer-reviewed 
academic journals in the fields of management science and personnel economics.
5
 The 
remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter two addresses the ambivalent na-
ture of work group diversity – often referred to as a “double-edged sword” (Milliken, Mar-
tins 1996, p. 403) – that is emphasized by two competing theoretical strands. On the one 
                                                 
5
  As a consequence, redundancies concerning literature, data set description and econometric methodology 
discussion may occur at some instances. 
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hand, similarity-attraction paradigm and social categorization theory suggest group hetero-
geneity to induce performance and productivity to be inferior due to sub-group formation 
(in-group vs. out-group) and work group conflict. As a consequence, homogeneous teams 
are assumed to be preferable (Tajfel 1982, Tajfel, Turner 1986, Turner 1987). On the other 
hand, the information processing perspective assumes heterogeneous teams to increase 
performance and productivity due to complementary cognitive resources, experiences and 
network ties. Hence, heterogeneous teams are expected to be advantageous in terms of 
performance and productivity (Cox, Blake 1991). There is extensive empirical evidence 
for both approaches. Applying meta-analytic research to a total of 66 individual samples 
derived from 63 primary studies on work group diversity, this paper seeks to analyze the 
broad literature on diversity in search of common statistical patterns on the advantageous-
ness of either homogeneous or heterogeneous teams. Diversity is considered along less 
task-related (age, gender, culture) and highly task-related (tenure, function, educational 
background and educational level) attributes. Furthermore, empirical tests for potential 
moderating effects of team type (top management teams, work teams, research and devel-
opment teams and mixed teams) and team size are performed. Overall, findings confirm 
the ambivalent nature of work group heterogeneity. In support of social categorization the-
ory and similarity-attraction paradigm, the results suggest negative population correlations 
of gender and age heterogeneity on team performance. Likewise, educational background 
diversity is observed to be positively related to team performance, thus, confirming argu-
ments stated by information processing perspective. Two moderating effects are observed. 
First, increasing team size moderates the influence of team diversity on performance nega-
tively for less task-related diversity attributes and positively for highly task-related attrib-
utes. Second, top management team type and research and development team type posi-
tively moderate the diversity-performance relationship regardless of the task-relatedness of 
diversity. Moreover, work team type negatively moderates the diversity-performance rela-
tionship for work teams regardless of the task-relatedness of diversity attributes.  
Chapter three depicts joint work with Bernd Frick in which a hitherto unavailable data set 
covering 160 blue-collar work units from four international manufacturing plants of a large 
European automobile manufacturer is used to analyze social and economic determinants of 
employee absenteeism. In this chapter, the understanding of absenteeism is based on the 
Steers and Rhodes (1978) process model as well as on economic theories as proposed by 
neoclassical labor supply models (e.g. Allen 1981, Dunn, Youngblood 1986) and efficien-
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cy wage theory (Shapiro, Stiglitz 1984). By means of a comprehensive review of existing 
empirical findings on absence research, a set of thirteen potential determinants of absence 
is identified that stem from social peer influences (work unit size, turnover, share of tem-
porary co-worker, share of health-impaired co-workers), economic influences / incentives 
(sick pay regulations, employment protection laws, unemployment, prosperity level), 
worker characteristics (age, gender, tenure, acute health) and working conditions (shift 
system). Absence is found to be a multifaceted phenomenon since only few statistical pat-
terns hold true for all four plants. Instead, core findings suggest results to vary significant-
ly by production site. Based on empirical analyses as well as interviews with on-site ex-
perts (i.e. HR managers, worker representatives, managers and shop floor staff), results 
suggest absence to increase with unit size and overall unit turnover. Likewise, a high share 
of temporary co-workers increases group-level absence among permanent employees. In 
contrast, the hypothesized link between absence and the share of co-workers that suffer 
any kind of permanent or temporary health-impairment could not be supported. Addition-
ally, positive relationships between absence and strict employment protection laws as well 
as favorable prosperity levels are identified. Findings with respect to the national 
(un)employment situation are inconclusive and results for national sickness benefits legis-
lation fail to reach statistical significance. Furthermore, group-level absence is observed to 
increase with the share of female employees in the team. Moreover, both involuntary and 
voluntary absence is observed to increase with age. However, results for tenure as well as 
national influenza outbreaks are inconclusive. With regard to working conditions, absence 
is observed to be higher in units that operate in two- and three-shift systems compared to 
those following the standard one-shift system.  
Employees’ behavioral responses to changes in monetary incentive design are discussed in 
chapter four, which is joint work with Bernd Frick. Built on fleet management panel data 
of an in-house hauler of a large European truck manufacturer, this paper analyzes the per-
formance of 37 commercial truck drivers on a total of 6,326 individual trips within a three-
year time frame. Performance is measured via four different sets of variables that are rec-
orded by GPS-based on-board computers: overall fuel consumption, driving behavior as 
reflected by several driving parameters, relative performance based on driving scores and, 
eventually, a computed overall performance evaluation. The organizational setting follows 
a quasi-experimental approach since the existing performance bonus system had been 
abolished by the hauler after the first two years of the three-year observation period. From 
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theory, two potential behavioral responses might be expected from employees. Classic 
contract theory assumes human beings to directly respond to extrinsic incentives in in-
creasing effort as well as reducing shirking behavior (e.g. Lazear 2000b, Gibbons 1998, 
Gibbons, Roberts 2013). However, a competing theoretical approach doubts these benefits 
of extrinsic (monetary) incentives arguing that extrinsic incentives literally “buy off” an 
employee’s intrinsic motivation and, therefore, result in decreasing overall performance 
(e.g. Deci 1971, Bénabou, Tirole 2003, 2006, Gneezy et al. 2011). Empirical and experi-
mental evidence for both approaches is discussed in the chapter. Interestingly, findings 
contradict economic theory in giving support for the crowding-out approach. Truck drivers 
are observed to display significantly lower effort and performance when incentivized ex-
trinsically by means of a performance bonus. Estimations reveal that drivers behave less 
eco-friendly and less in accordance with company standards yielding an overall lower per-
formance evaluation. This result implies that drivers’ intrinsic and social motives – e.g. 
image concerns, environmental believes – are crowded out by monetary rewards.  
As mentioned earlier, chapter five – again co-authored by Bernd Frick – analyzes behav-
ioral responses of employees who are “promoted” from temporary to permanent contracts. 
This chapter is based on the identical fleet management panel data used in chapter 4. 
Again, the organizational setting follows a quasi-experimental design since it observes 
eight commercial truck drivers on 1,299 trips whose contract status changed from tempo-
rary to permanent. Considering advantages of permanent over temporary contracts (e.g. 
better working conditions, higher pay and stricter employment protection), temporary em-
ployees may be assumed to be highly incentivized to display high effort in order to qualify 
for a permanent contract. Empirical support for this argument is discussed within the chap-
ter (e.g. Bradley et al. 2012). Findings suggest about half of the drivers to significantly 
increase fuel consumption after having signed a permanent contract with a strong initial 
effect and a long decline back to “normal” levels. This result indicates these drivers to be-
have as rational cheaters (Nagin et al. 2002). The same holds true for computerized per-
formance evaluations.   
Subsequently, chapter 6 summarizes the main results of this thesis and provides both gen-
eral conclusions as well as suggestions for future research. 
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2 WORK TEAM DIVERSITY AND THE OPTIMAL COMPOSITION OF 
TEAMS: A META-ANALYTIC APPROACH 
2.1 Introduction 
These days, organizations increasingly implement teamwork to meet the demands of sus-
tainable developments in economic, technological and societal environments (e.g. Devine 
et al. 1999). Given the growing importance of teams, management scholars have eagerly 
taken on the study of teamwork and its influence on business processes as well as employ-
ee performance (e.g. Sundstrom et al. 2000). As a consequence, teamwork research is 
nowadays established as one of the most relevant topics in management research, a posi-
tion anecdotally described by Lazear (1999) who states that “it is impossible to pick up a 
business publication these days without reading about the wonders of teamwork” (Lazear 
1999, p. C15).  
At the same time, the composition of the global workforce has changed in that worker het-
erogeneity has increased dramatically over the last decades. Multifaceted social and demo-
graphic developments may be held accountable for this phenomenon. Consider, for in-
stance, the constantly growing proportion of women participating in the labor market (e.g. 
Ali, Kulik, Metz 2011). At the same time, women increasingly advance into managerial 
ranks (e.g. Elsass, Graves 1997) and into jobs formerly known to be all-male professions 
such as medicine or law (e.g. Norgren 2010). Furthermore, the individual working life 
span has prolonged since employees enter the labor market at a younger age and stay much 
longer before becoming eligible for retirement (e.g. Grund, Westergaard-Nielsen 2008). 
Eventually, cultural and ethnic background heterogeneity is evermore increasing in line 
with global migration and human capital mobility (e.g. Artuc et al. 2015). So far, there are 
no clear indications that the ongoing social and demographic trends will slow down or 
even reverse in the near future (e.g. Deadrick, Stone 2009, Tsui, Gutek 1999).  
Given the development towards a more heterogeneous workforce, it is of growing im-
portance to understand how diversity issues affect processes and productivity within or-
ganizations and teams. According to Barsade et al. (2000), research on the “costs and ben-
efits of diversity in the workplace has been going on at a vigorous pace over the last two 
decades and more” (Barsade et al. 2000, p. 802). As a consequence, the amount of studies 
on diversity approximately doubles every five years, for instance scholars published 134 
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studies in 2003 compared to only 19 studies back in 1988 (Harrison, Klein 2007). Howev-
er, the existing research on diversity in the workplace is confusing and disappointing in a 
way that “cumulative findings about the consequences of within-unit differences have been 
weak, inconsistent, or both” (Harrison, Klein 2007, p. 1199).  
Diversity research is mainly guided by two opposing research traditions that clearly 
demonstrate the ambivalent nature of diversity that is often considered a “double-edged 
sword” (Milliken, Martins 1996, p. 403). On the one hand, a substantial body of the litera-
ture states that within teams heterogeneity may induce social categorization that in turn 
implies sub-group formation (in-group vs. out-group) and team conflict and, as a conse-
quence, result in lower team performance. Hence, homogeneity in teams is argued to be 
preferable to heterogeneity with regard to team performance. The most well-known contri-
butions to this concept are expressed in similarity-attraction paradigm as well as social 
categorization theory (e.g. Tajfel 1982, Tajfel, Turner 1986, Turner 1987). On the other 
hand, scholars suppose that team production may benefit from heterogeneous cognitive 
abilities, experiences, skills and network ties of team members. These may be comple-
ments and, therefore, constitute a broad set of resources available to the team. As a result, 
heterogeneity in teams is reasoned to be advantageous over homogeneity regarding team 
performance. These considerations are summarized in information processing perspective 
(e.g. Hoffman, Maier 1961, Cox, Blake 1991) and economic theory alike (e.g. Lazear 
1999).   
In this paper, we consider both theoretical approaches to derive our main research hypoth-
eses on the diversity-performance relationship within organizational work groups. We aim 
at contributing new insights to the wide field of diversity research by means of a compre-
hensive meta-analysis. Moreover, we test for two potential moderating effects on the di-
versity-performance relationship – team size and team type. Both have been identified as 
being influential by previous research (e.g. Stewart 2006, Horwitz, Horwitz 2007, Devine 
2002). For this purpose, we quantitatively summarize the last twenty years of empirical 
research on diversity in organizational work teams (from 1994 to 2014). Based on a thor-
ough literature review, we identify 242 empirical studies on the link between diversity and 
performance in organizational teamwork settings. Following the tradition of previous me-
ta-analyses on workgroup diversity (e.g. Bell 2007, Bell et al. 2011, De Dreu, Weingart 
2003, Horwitz, Horwitz 2007, Stewart 2006, Webber, Donahue 2001), we apply strict in-
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clusion criteria to manage the vast amount of literature. Eventually, we include a total of 
66 individual samples from 63 studies into the meta-analysis. 
Overall, our findings confirm the ambivalent nature of diversity in teams. We identified 
the impact of diversity on team performance to depend primarily on the diversity attribute 
being either highly or less task-related. On the one hand, we observe a negative relation-
ship between team performance and heterogeneity along less task-related attributes (gender 
and age). These findings largely support social category theory and similarity-attraction 
paradigm. On the other hand, we observe heterogeneity along highly task-related attributes 
(educational background) to be positively linked to team performance. This finding largely 
supports economic assumptions and information processing perspective. Furthermore, we 
observe both team size and team type to moderate the diversity-performance relationship. 
With increasing team size the influence of diversity on performance decreases for less 
task-related attributes and increases for highly task-related attributes. Concerning team 
type, we observe a positive moderating effect of top management teams (TMT) as well as 
research and development (R&D) teams on almost all diversity attributes irrespective of 
the task-relatedness. In contrast to this, work teams negatively moderate all diversity-
performance relations. All results will be discussed and interpreted in detail throughout 
this study.  
This paper proceeds as follows. Section two will discuss the diversity construct, its dimen-
sions, the most common heterogeneity measures as well as a definition of diversity as un-
derstood in this paper. Subsequently, section three will present the two competing theoreti-
cal concepts and derive the main research hypotheses of this paper. The meta-analytic pro-
cedure applied in this study will be described in section four. Eventually, section five pre-
sents the results of the meta-analysis while section six concludes and offers implications 
for practical use and future research.  
2.2 Diversity 
Despite the relevance of diversity in the recent academic discourse, there is a lack of both a 
common understanding and a unique definition of the underlying construct (e.g. Guzzo, 
Dickson 1996). This becomes even more apparent considering the high number of syno-
nyms that are used interchangeable for the umbrella term ‘diversity’ by scholars: “’disper-
sion’, ‘inequality’, ‘within-group variability’, ‘(dis)agreement’, ‘consensus’, ‘heterogenei-
ty’, ‘homogeneity’, ‘deviation’, ‘difference’, ‘distance’, ‘relational demography’, 
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‘sharedness’ and more” (Harrison, Sin 2006, p. 195). Since each separate definition is 
linked with a slightly different understanding and metric, the lack of a common diversity 
concept seems to be even more obstructive. Hence, any comparison across studies is com-
plicated and needs particular attention due to the fact that researchers do not necessarily 
mean the same phenomenon when referring to diversity.  
In general, three main inconsistencies have been identified in diversity research: the lack of 
a unique constitutive definition, the high variety within diversity variables and the incon-
sistent use of diversity measures (Harrison, Sin 2006). This paragraph addresses these in-
consistencies, first by giving a clear definition of diversity as understood throughout this 
paper, and second by discussing those measures that are most commonly used to assess 
work group heterogeneity. 
2.2.1 Definitions of Diversity 
In many cases, studies on diversity focus exclusively on how diversity affects processes 
and outcomes of the units under observation. However, a controversial examination of the 
diversity construct itself is seldom found in the literature. Thus, it comes as no surprise that 
there is no joint agreement on how diversity can be defined. Instead, literature provides a 
plethora of divergent attempts that somehow dilute the understanding of diversity (Harri-
son, Sin, 2006).  
A pioneering definition of diversity in its psychological, sociological and economic sense 
has been proposed in a seminal work by Blau (1977). According to his understanding, het-
erogeneity on a given attribute depends on its distribution: “the larger the number of 
groups and the more evenly distributed the population is divided among them, the greater 
is heterogeneity” (Blau, 1977, p. 9). However, this definition requires variables to allow 
for rank-ordering and, thus, is strictly associated with status or power hierarchy. Scholars 
ever since have broadened this narrow definition by providing more extensive diversity 
concepts (Harrison, Sin, 2006). The fundamental question remains the same: how is max-
imum diversity defined. While the idea of minimum diversity simply reflects perfect ho-
mogeneity of a group in terms of a given attribute, maximum diversity seems to have a 
two-folded dimension. On the one hand, let us assume a group with all members having 
different characteristics along a particular attribute. This group may be assessed to reach 
the maximum degree of diversity. On the other hand, consider a group that can be divided 
into two subgroups that are clearly separated along a few but extremely opposing charac-
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teristics. This group may be named maximal diverse as well. Moreover, one even might 
assume maximum diversity to appear in groups with one member clearly surpassing the 
others along a given characteristic. However, diversity literature has not put much attention 
on the clarification of these questions so far (Harrison, Klein 2007).   
In this meta-analysis, we understand diversity according to a definition recently proposed 
by Harrison and Klein (2007). Addressing the ambiguity of existing ideas on diversity, 
they distinguish between three types of group heterogeneity: separation, variety and dispar-
ity (see Figure 1.1). First, diversity as separation expresses horizontal differences in posi-
tion within a group along attributes such as attitudes, values or opinions. Second, diversity 
as variety describes divergent categories among team members on a given attribute such as 
information or educational background. Third, diversity as disparity assesses vertical dif-
ferences within a group on valued social assets such as pay or hierarchy. In general, the 
authors regard diversity as “the distribution of differences among the members of a unit 
with respect to a common attribute, X” (Harrison, Klein 2007, p. 1200).   
Figure 2.1: Diversity as Separation, Variety and Disparity 
   
Source: Harrison, Klein (2007), p. 1202. 
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2.2.2 Dimensions of Diversity 
Irrespective of its type, diversity is assumed to be attribute-specific. Put differently, a team 
is not diverse per se, but only regarding one or more clearly specified team member char-
acteristics (Harrison, Klein, 2007). Any human being is a unique combination of features 
such as age, gender, cultural background, education, organizational tenure etc. In response 
to the large number of potential diversity attributes, scholars typically apply clustering in 
order to increase structure and manageability of data. The most fundamental cluster may 
be a distinction between easily observable attributes or surface level diversity (age, sex, 
and race) and less visible attributes or deep level diversity (tenure, education and function) 
(e.g. Harrison, Price, Bell 1998, Milliken, Martins 1996). 
Another commonly used sorting of diversity attributes has been used by Polzer, Milton and 
Swann (2002) who distinguish between demographic (age, sex, race, citizenship) and func-
tional features (previous degree, previous job function, MBA concentration). A slightly 
different logic is proposed by Pelled (1996) as well as Pelled, Eisenhardt and Xin (1999): 
They classify attributes to be either task-related (education, organizational tenure, group 
tenure, functional background) or non-task related (age, gender, race). In this study, we 
follow their recommendation by differentiating between less task-related and highly task-
related diversity attributes.  
2.2.3 Measures of Diversity 
Usually, team diversity is assessed based on standardized heterogeneity measures at the 
group-level. The four most frequently used measures include the simple within-group 
standard deviation (s.d.), Blau’s (1977) index of heterogeneity, Allison’s (1978) coefficient 
of variation (CV) and Teachman’s (1980) index of heterogeneity.  
Within-group s.d. is one of the basic statistical measures to assess within-group variation 
in the distribution of a given attribute. It reaches its maximum in distributions that are bi-
modal, i.e. the sample split in half on a given attribute (Harrison, Sin 2006). The Blau 
(1977) index is one of the most widely used measures to assess diversity of categorical 
variables such as gender or age (e.g. Timmerman 2000). Maximum heterogeneity is 
reached when the proportions of all possible categories are equally distributed. Therefore, 
the Blau index minimizes with total homogeneity and approaches one with increasing het-
erogeneity (Harrison, Sin 2006). Teachman’s (1980) index may range from zero to positive 
infinity depending on the number of categories of any (categorical) variable. It is equal to 
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zero in situations where all team members belong to the same social category and increases 
with the number of different categories in the team (Harrison, Sin 2006). Allison’s CV 
(Allison 1978) is probably the most commonly used measure to assess within-group diver-
sity (e.g. Williams, O’Reilly 1998). It is calculated by dividing the within-group standard 
deviation by the group mean. In contrast to other diversity measures, CV does not maxim-
ize when the variety of categories in the group increases but, likewise to s.d., grows with 
the magnitude of contrasts in the distribution of a given attribute. It reaches maximum val-
ues in teams with only one member being different to the others (Harrison, Sin 2006). The 
formulas for calculating these heterogeneity measures are presented in Table 2.1. Howev-
er, all measures share a joint conceptual weakness as they are all prone to small team bias 
(Bedeian, Mossholder 2000) as well as distortions arising from divergent team sizes in 
only one sample (Biemann, Kerney 2010).  
Table 2.1: Formulas for the Calculation of Heterogeneity Measures 
Heterogeneity measure Formula 
Allison’s (1978)  
Coefficient of Variation 𝐶𝑉 =  
√∑
(𝑥𝑖 − ?̅?)2
𝑁
𝑁
𝑖=1  
?̅?
 
Blau’s (1977) Index 𝐵 = 1 −  ∑ 𝑝𝑘
2
𝑁
𝑘=1
 
Standard Deviation 𝑆𝐷 =  √∑
(𝑥𝑖 −  ?̅?)2
𝑁
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
Teachman’s (1980) Index 𝑇 =  −(∑ 𝑝𝑘ln (𝑝𝑘))
𝑁
𝑘=1
 
Note. N = total number of teams; xi = individual level characteristics; x̅ = mean characteristics of 
the team; pk = proportion of team members in the kth category. 
Apart from the group-level heterogeneity measures presented above, there are other ways 
to conceptualize heterogeneity. First, relational diversity describes an individual’s 
(dis)similarity with his team mates and, thus, measures diversity at the individual level 
(e.g. O’Reilly, Caldwell, Barnett 1989, Tsui, Egan, O’Reilly 1992, Harrison, Price, Bell 
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1998). Second, research using within-group faultlines to assess group heterogeneity is re-
cently increasing. The faultlines approach identifies potential subgroups in teams and eval-
uates similarity within as well as dissimilarity between subgroups (e.g. Lau, Murnighan 
1998, Shaw 2004, Thatcher, Pantel 2011). However, in this meta-analysis we exclusively 
focus on group-level heterogeneity and do not include studies that apply either relational 
diversity or the faultlines approach.  
2.3 Theoretical Background of Diversity Research 
Diversity in teams is often referred to as “double-edged sword” (Milliken, Martins 1996, p. 
403) since two opposing research traditions and conflicting empirical findings do not allow 
for universally valid conclusions on the effects of homogeneity and heterogeneity in teams. 
On the one hand, social categorization theory and similarity-attraction paradigm emphasize 
the destructive nature of heterogeneity to team processes and performance. On the other 
hand, economic theory and information processing perspective argue that heterogeneity 
may be beneficial to team performance.
6
 Both theoretical strands are backed up by broad 
empirical and experimental evidence. The upcoming sections will briefly introduce the 
underlying ideas and main contributions. 
2.3.1 Social Categorization and Similarity-Attraction Paradigm 
Social categorization is the most commonly used theory in demography research. It em-
phasizes the negative consequences of heterogeneity in teams on team processes, outcomes 
and performance (Williams, O’Reilly 1998). The social categorization concept was estab-
lished in the early 1980s and has mainly been shaped by Turner (1987). It extends the so-
cial identity concept developed some years earlier by Tajfel (1982). While social identity 
focuses on intergroup behavior and seeks to explain the psychological processes of inter-
group discrimination, the social category theory is centered more generally on the question 
of how people may function as a group at all (Turner 1987). In that, it includes the social 
identity concept. As both theories share the same logic, this review only applies the more 
commonly used term of self-categorization for simplification.  
                                                 
6
  In addition, there are contributions arguing that both theoretical perspectives do not necessarily contradict 
each other but may simultaneously account for positive and negative effects of diversity in workgroups. 
One approach is the categorization-elaboration model (CEM) that incorporates assumptions of both in-
formation processing and social categorization (e.g. van Knippenberg, De Dreu, Homan 2004, van Knip-
penberg and Shippers 2007). 
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The main idea is simple: Self-categorization is based on the assumption that individuals 
define their social identity through their affiliation to social groups that are associated with 
emotional significance to them (Tajfel 1972, 1982). According to McGrath, Berdahl and 
Arrow (1995), it is this understanding that is colloquially referred to as diversity by most 
people. Usually, individuals have a strong desire to maintain a positive self-identity as well 
as a high level of self-esteem (Tajfel, Turner 1986). Both self-identity and self-esteem typ-
ically occur through social comparison with peers. Human beings, therefore, subconscious-
ly sort themselves and others into social categories along any possible dimension (e.g. age, 
gender, race, nationality, religion, organizational membership etc.). In that sense, they de-
fine their individual self-identity in comparison to others (Tajfel, Turner 1986).
7
 Based on 
this process, subgroups – in-groups vs. out-groups – emerge along the underlying charac-
teristics (Tajfel 1969). This implies a process of depersonalization as people are no longer 
seen as individuals, but as members of a given category (Brown, Turner 1981). This in-
group-out-group distinction manipulates the individual perception of behavior (Guinote, 
Fiske 2003) in favor of the in-group (Kulik, Bainbridge 2006, Bilig, Tajfel 1973). Thus, 
any individual stereotype dissociates from members of other categories (Tajfel 1982). As a 
consequence, out-group members are – even when classified on arbitrary variables – seen 
as less trustworthy, honest and cooperative (Brewer 1979). This so-called in-group bias 
was confirmed by Tajfel (1982), who detects this bias in reviewing over thirty studies. 
However, as people mirror negative behavior of in-group members (e.g. stereotyping or 
dissociation), hostile interactions as well as problematic inter-subgroup relations may oc-
cur and lead to an “us vs. them”- mentality within the group (van Knippenberg, de Dreu, 
Homan 2004). As a consequence, members that are similar along demographic traits are 
more likely to cooperate and communicate with each other. As a result, homogeneous 
groups should systematically outperform heterogeneous teams. Hence, social categoriza-
tion is mainly referred to by diversity research that emphasizes team heterogeneity to be 
destructive to team performance and outcome (see Horwitz, Horwitz 2007 for a review of 
studies).  
                                                 
7
  Turner (1987) distinguishes between three levels of abstraction within the social self-categorization con-
cept. First, individuals categorize themselves as human beings; this is referred to as super-ordinate level. 
Second, individuals categorize themselves into social groups along the distinction of in-group vs. out-
group; this is referred to as intermediate level. Third, individuals differentiate between their self as a 
unique person in comparison to the other in-group members; this is referred to as subordinate level. The 
levels are also referred to as human (inter-species), social (inter-group) and personal identity (inter-
personal comparison) levels, respectively.  
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Similar to social categorization, the similarity-attraction paradigm – introduced by Byrne 
(1969, 1971) – predicts homogeneous teams to outperform heterogeneous teams. The par-
adigm is built on the assumption that people tend to be interpersonally attracted to others 
that are – or are perceived to be – similar to them along demographic traits, activities, atti-
tudes or values (Byrne 1969, 1971). Vice versa, dissimilarity decreases interpersonal at-
traction (Rosenbaum 1986). The similarity-attraction concept differs from social categori-
zation in that it focuses entirely on the attraction of similarity and does not include any 
negative or hostile stances towards non-similar others, e.g. out-group members (Ely 2004). 
In work settings, similarity facilitates cooperation among interpersonally attracted individ-
uals and, hence, may function as positive reinforcer (Williams, O’Reilly 1998). Moreover, 
similarity and high interpersonal attraction help people to simplify their communication 
that in turn leads to high social integration (Wiersema, Bantel 1992, Tsui et al 1992). The 
logic of similarity-attraction is well established in the literature as it has been demonstrated 
that individuals are more likely to select others that are similar to themselves in free choice 
situations and that, as a consequence, naturally formed groups in organizations are typical-
ly based on similarity (e.g. Ancona, Caldwell 1992). Consequentially, the similarity-
attraction effect is acknowledged to be “one of the most robust findings in social psycholo-
gy” (Martins et al. 2003, p. 78). 
Given the high visibility and salience of demographic attributes such as age, gender and 
cultural background, these less task-related surface-level attributes can be assumed to pro-
voke social categorization and similarity-attraction more easily than other, deep-level de-
mographic attributes. As a result, heterogeneity in age, gender and cultural background 
may hamper team cooperation and decrease team performance. A substantial body of ex-
perimental and empirical literature confirms these arguments (e.g. Brewer 1979, O’Reilly, 
Caldwell, Barnett 1989, Chatman, Flynn 2001, Wiersema, Bantel 1992, Williams, 
O’Reilly 1998).8 Therefore, based on social categorization and similarity-attraction para-
digm, the following hypotheses can be derived with regard to less task-related demograph-
ic attributes:  
                                                 
8
  Yet, the impact of divergent surface-level demographic attributes is dynamic and may change with the 
length of cooperation due to two main effects. First, negative categorization effects may deteriorate as 
other non-salient categories surface after some time (Harrison, Price, Bell 1998). Second, team members 
start to classify themselves as fellow in-group members and increase cooperation (Chatman, Flynn 2001).  
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H1a: Age diversity is related negatively  
to overall team performance. 
H1b: Gender diversity is related negatively  
to overall team performance. 
H1c: Cultural background diversity is related negatively  
to overall team performance. 
2.3.2 Information Processing Perspective and Economic Theory 
In contrast to the aforementioned concepts that emphasize the superiority of homogeneous 
teams, the information processing perspective perceives a value in diversity. Following 
this idea, team members may benefit from combining their complementary individual re-
sources in order to balance individual weaknesses within the team. As a result, heteroge-
neous teams are supposed to outperform homogenous groups since members of the latter 
are limited to substituting resources (Cox, Lobel, McLeod 1991, Nemeth 1986, Stasser, 
Stewart, Wittenbaum 1995).   
The underlying theoretical argument was first introduced by Hoffman (1959) and Hoffman 
and Maier (1961) and advanced among others by Cox and Blake (1991) as well as Cox 
(1993). They all build on the idea that diversity within groups along a given set of attrib-
utes such as cognitive resources, functional background, experiences, tenure, information, 
education and network ties will positively influence group performance – at least in tasks 
associated with cognitive ability. Thus, the value of heterogeneity in groups derives from a 
broad base of resources such as knowledge and information as well as a more diversified 
set of methods to face a task – both not available to homogeneous groups (Cox, Blake 
1991, Hambrick, Cho, Chen 1996, van Knippenberg, Schippers 2007). Furthermore, vary-
ing perspectives, experiences or viewpoints – especially when largely contrasting (Nemeth 
1986) – can stimulate vivid discussions within the group and, thus, lead to new insights, 
ideas and solutions (Argote, Gruenfeld, Naquin 2001, Levine, Resnick, Higgins 1993). 
Additionally, members of heterogeneous teams have complementary network ties with 
people outside the initial group who provide external perspectives and additional infor-
mation from various sources (Ancona, Caldwell 1992, Jehn, Nothcraft, Neale 1997, 
Zenger, Lawrence 1989). For instance, one can easily observe an inverted cohort effect 
with regard to heterogeneity in organizational tenure since members that have entered the 
organization at different points in time have established diversified information networks, 
communication patterns, skills and experiences made within the organization (Ancona, 
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Caldwell 1992). As a consequence, teams that are heterogeneous along these attributes are 
often found to be more effective decision-makers, better problem solvers, superior product 
designers and more creative innovators (e.g. Ancona, Caldwell 1992, Pelled, Eisenhardt, 
Xin 1999, Wanous, Youtz 1986).  
Lazear (1999) offers an economic approach modeled on three factors that determine 
productivity gains from heterogeneous teams. First, a team can only benefit from hetero-
geneous team members if the individual skills or information sets are not overlapping but 
disjoint in the way that cooperation extends the information or skills available to the indi-
vidual. Exemplarily, Lazear (1999) supposes two economists who have a common educa-
tional and professional background and, therefore, might not stimulate each other’s work 
since the information they may share is largely substitutive. As soon as heterogeneous 
people come into play complementary information becomes available leading to positive 
effects on team performance, in particular if tasks within the team are complementary (Prat 
2002). Second, the individual skills or information sets must be relevant to the other team 
members and to the team task respectively. Lazear (1999) thinks of an auto mechanic 
whose knowledge is – although being disjoint from an economist’s knowledge – not rele-
vant to the economist’s work and, therefore, does not offer any help. In this case, diversity 
does not yield any economic gain. Third, diverse skills or information sets are only helpful 
if group members are able to communicate easily with each other to exchange the relevant 
information at a low cost. Without a common language, exchange would be costly and 
may wipe out possible gains coming from disjoint and relevant skills / information. As a 
consequence of high communication costs, people tend to communicate less frequently, 
which is negatively associated with firm performance, especially in businesses where co-
operation is necessary – e.g. in creative tasks (Zenger, Lawrence 1989). Although Lazear 
(1999) limits his understanding of language to its literal sense (e.g. English or French), 
other authors have extended the idea to other features of communication as well. For in-
stance, Kearney, Gebert and Voelpel (2009) state that professional jargons or varying in-
terpretative schemata may also impede communication.  
Based on the information processing perspective as well as Lazear’s (1999) economic con-
siderations, we assume highly task-related diversity to have a strong positive effect on 
team performance. This leads to the following hypotheses: 
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H1d: Tenure diversity is related positively 
 to overall team performance. 
H1e: Functional background diversity is related positively  
to overall team performance. 
H1f: Educational background diversity is related positively  
to overall team performance. 
H1g: Education level diversity is related positively to overall  
team performance. 
2.3.3 Moderators of the Diversity-Performance Relationship 
Diversity research – even if limited to primary studies on diversity at the work group-level 
– is still heterogeneous with regard to team size and team type. Both team size and team 
type might affect the diversity-performance relationship. We, therefore, hypothesize poten-
tial moderating effects.  
Team size 
It is a stylized fact that large teams have a higher probability of being heterogeneous than 
smaller teams. Thus, one might conclude that team size affects the diversity-performance 
relationship since team dissimilarity increases with additional team members. Indeed, re-
cent research identifies team size to be a significant moderator of the relationship between 
team diversity and team outcomes (e.g. Bowers, Pharmer, Salas 2000, Stewart 2006, 
Wegge et al. 2008). Yet, other studies fail to confirm the moderating effect of team size in 
the diversity-outcome relationship (e.g. Horwitz, Horwitz 2007, Wiersema, Bantel 1992). 
This dichotomy of findings may be attributable to two opposing ways of how team size 
may affect team performance. Each additional team member may contribute additional 
skills and knowledge that may complement those already available in the team. This 
broadens the cognitive resources of a team and, therefore, can be assumed to be beneficial 
to team performance (e.g. Hambrick, Cho, Chen 1996, van Knippenberg, Schippers 2007). 
Nevertheless, the risk of negative dissimilarities that are observed to be detrimental to 
communication, group cohesion, coordination and cooperation among team members may 
increase with team size (e.g. Amason, Sapienza 1997, Chatman, Flynn 2001, Smith et al. 
1994). As a result, team performance decreases.  
In this study, we assume a positive moderating effect of team size on the diversity-
performance relationship to be valid for highly task-related demographic characteristics 
such as tenure, function and education. Likewise, we believe the less task-related charac-
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teristics such as age, gender or cultural background to negatively moderate the link be-
tween group diversity and performance. Findings by Stewart (2006) support this argument. 
He confirms the positive moderating effect for top-management teams and project teams 
while observing a negative effect for production teams. Being aware of the cognitive na-
ture of team processes in TMT and project teams in contrast to the repetitive and standard-
ized work of production teams, these results come as no surprise. Based on these consider-
ations, we predict: 
H2a: Team size negatively moderates the relationship between diversity and 
team performance for less task-related demographics. 
H2b: Team size positively moderates the relationship between diversity and 
team performance for highly task-related demographics. 
As discussed above, team size might moderate the diversity-performance relationship 
simply for statistical reasons since the most commonly used heterogeneity measures (e.g. 
Blau index of heterogeneity, coefficient of variation, Teachman index) are prone to biases 
arising either from small team size (Bedeian, Mossholder 2000) or from team size varying 
within the sample (Biemann, Kerney 2010). The necessity to test for statistical artefacts in 
the diversity-performance relationship affirms us in assessing team size as a potential 
moderator of the diversity performance relationship. 
Team type 
It is a well-established fact in the team literature that team performance and the efficiency 
of teamwork is highly dependent on the type of the team (e.g. Cohen, Bailey 1997, Thyle-
fors, Persson, Hellström 2005). At the same time, there is broad evidence that team type 
moderates the diversity-performance relationship (e.g. Horwitz 2005, Stewart 2006). Team 
research applies multiple ways to distinguish between team types. For instance, Joshi and 
Roh (2009) differentiate teams along the longevity of cooperation. They assume visible 
diversity (e.g. age, gender) to be of less significance in teams designed for long-term coop-
eration (such as TMT or work groups deeply established in the organization), while invisi-
ble diversity (e.g. value, personality) is positively linked to length of cooperation (Harrison 
et al. 2002). Another strand of literature distinguishes teams along the tasks they perform 
(Sundstrom et al. 2000).  
In this study, we follow a team typology proposed by Devine (2002). First, intellectual 
work teams (such as TMTs) are assigned complex tasks in often uncertain situations and 
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are running non-standardized processes. Second, design teams (such as R&D) require crea-
tivity and technical innovation to fulfill their tasks. Third, physical work teams (such as 
production teams, performance teams or service teams) simply follow standardized tasks. 
We aim at testing for moderating effects along these three divergent team types. In general, 
TMTs and R&D teams are assumed to be heterogeneous on task-related attributes (i.e. 
functional and educational background) as the respective tasks require a broad base of var-
ying knowledge and experience. At the same time, these teams are likely to be homogene-
ous on non-task related characteristics (i.e. age, gender, cultural background). In contrast 
to this, physical work teams are found to be more heterogeneous in their composition (e.g. 
Horwitz, Horwitz 2007, Devine 2002). As a consequence of these considerations, we de-
rive two hypotheses on the impact of less task-related as well as highly task-related hetero-
geneity on team performance: 
H3a: The predicted negative relationship between  
less task-related heterogeneity and team performance will be weaker  
in R&D teams and TMT compared to other team types. 
H3b: The predicted positive relationship between  
highly task-related heterogeneity and team performance will be stronger  
in R&D teams and TMT compared to other team types. 
2.4 Meta-Analysis Approach 
In the following, we use the meta-analysis approach to test for the above stated hypotheses 
on the diversity-performance relationship as well as to examine potential moderating ef-
fects of team size and team type.  
Literature review 
A thorough literature review was conducted in order to identify studies on workgroup di-
versity. We focus on research published between 1994 and 2014 since we aim at quantita-
tively summarizing the last 20 years of diversity research without replicating earlier meta-
analyses that have already comprehensively reviewed earlier works (e.g. Bowers, Pharmer, 
Salas 2000, Webber, Donahue 2001). We located relevant studies on workgroup diversity 
for potential inclusion through several search strategies. First, we reviewed recent meta-
analyses and narrative reviews by Bower, Pharmer, Salas (2000), Williams, O’Reilly 
(1998), Horwitz, Horwitz (2007), Stewart (2006), Webber, Donahue (2001), Bell (2007), 
Bell et al. (2011), De Dreu, Weingart (2003) and De Church, Mesmer-Magnus (2010). 
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Second, we electronically searched the online databases Scopus, Business Source Complete 
and PsycINFO with combinations of the following keywords: team, group, diversity, het-
erogeneity, homogeneity, diverse, (team) composition, demography, demographic diversi-
ty, age, gender, female, male, tenure, education, function, culture, race, ethnicity, perfor-
mance, outcome, effectiveness and top-management-team. Third, the database search was 
supplemented with a manual search for in-press articles in both top-tiered journals and 
journals with a particular focus on group research including Administrative Science Quar-
terly, Organization Science, Journal of Applied Psychology, Academy of Management 
Journal, Academy of Management Review, Personnel Psychology, Group and Organiza-
tional Studies/Management, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 
Journal of Organizational Behavior, Journal of Management, Small Group Research, 
Group Dynamics and Human Relations. We only consider peer-reviewed, English-
speaking journal articles, thus excluding dissertations, conference papers, manuscripts or 
working papers. We are aware of the risk that this approach might put our results into 
question due to information loss as a consequence of publication bias. Yet, we proceed as 
described to be able to deal with the garbage-in-garbage-out issue (e.g. Egger, Smith, 
Sterne 2001) that seems of particular importance to us in the wide and complex field of 
diversity research. However, since published findings feature positive as well as negative 
relationships and do also report non-significant results at some instances, we feel confident 
to catch the substantial contributions without losing relevant information. Study abstracts 
were reviewed for suitable research on the relationship between demographic diversity 
variables and both team performance and creativity. This literature search yields a total of 
242 studies that were further examined for potential inclusion in the meta-analysis.  
In order to be included, a study has to meet several inclusion criteria. First, we focus ex-
clusively on empirical research that studies at least one of the hypothesized relationships 
between demographic diversity variables and workgroup productivity. In other words, we 
exclude studies that observe outcomes such as creativity, innovativeness, satisfaction or 
group cohesion. Additionally, we refrain from including aggregated measures of diversity 
such as demographic diversity, which is often used to combine age, gender and cultural 
background/ethnicity in only one variable. Moreover, we do not consider studies that ob-
serve psychological diversity variables such as cognitive ability or personality. Second, we 
only include studies that understood work groups as teams that meet the following criteria: 
Team members need to share a common goal, have similar or even identical working tasks 
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and be working interdependently. Moreover, teams should be embedded in an overall so-
cial system such as an organization and be regarded as a team by its members as well as by 
external persons (Guzzo, Dickson 1996). Third, since mixed levels of analysis are inap-
propriate for calculating sample-weighted effects (Beal et al. 2003), we focus on studies 
which assess diversity on the team-level and drop those studies that report findings on the 
individual level. Furthermore, we follow suggestions by Katzenbach and Smith (2005) and 
limit the maximum team size to twenty-five persons. Members of larger teams are usually 
not subject to task interdependency and do not adequately interact as a team, yet both fac-
tors are necessary to study diversity effects on team performance. Minimum team size is 
two persons. Fourth, we consider only studies that assess diversity based on objective 
measures such as within-group s.d., Blau’s (1977) index of heterogeneity, Allison’s (1978) 
CV and Teachman’s (1980) index of heterogeneity. Subjective measures of group hetero-
geneity are most likely biased due to individually differing perceptions of current group 
settings or cultural variations and are, therefore, not included in this meta-analysis. Addi-
tionally, we exclude studies that understand diversity either as relational diversity or as 
faultlines since both approaches are not comparable to the diversity concept applied here. 
Fifth, studies have to stem from real-life organizational settings. This excludes experi-
mental research, case studies and simulation research design. Moreover, we concentrate on 
teams in working environments. Therefore, we exclude studies that are based on student 
work groups, sport teams or other non-task related organizational settings. We do so in 
order to guarantee high practical relevance of implications drawn from this meta-analysis. 
Eventually, we exclude studies that we asses to suffer methodological weaknesses and/or 
are not comparable to the overall set of studies. Applying these strict inclusion criteria is 
necessary to guarantee between-study comparability. A total of 179 studies out of 242 ini-
tially identified studies failed to meet the inclusion criteria. This leaves a final number of 
63 studies to be included in our analysis. Two studies contribute two or more samples. As 
a result, we yield a final data set including 66 samples with information on a total of 
12,478 teams.  
Diversity variables 
The independent variables investigated in this meta-analysis include the demographic fea-
tures of age, gender, cultural/ethnical background, organizational tenure, functional and 
educational background as well as education level. To meet the inclusion criteria, diversity 
variables have to be aggregated to the team-level by means of an appropriate measure of 
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group-level heterogeneity, e.g. within-group s.d., the standard measures Blau’s (1977) in-
dex of heterogeneity, Allison’s (1978) CV and Teachman’s (1980) index of heterogeneity. 
Still, we allow for other methods to assess diversity objectively – such as the Herfindal 
index, the Gini index or the simple percentage share – as long as its choice seems reasona-
ble and comparability with other measures is given. Table A.1 in the appendix lists the 
frequency distributions of diversity measures used in primary studies.  
Following Pelled (1996) in clustering diversity attributes along the dimension of task-
relatedness, we categorize age, gender and cultural background/ethnicity (referred to as 
culture in the following) as less task-related, while we rate organizational tenure, function-
al and educational background as well as education level to be highly task-related. While 
the metric of age, gender, culture and organizational tenure diversity is quite self-
explanatory and only varies slightly between primary studies (e.g. age and tenure measured 
continuously or in categories), three diversity variables need further consideration. Func-
tional diversity is understood as functional experience gained during the career, the domi-
nant function, organizational roles and the primary professional orientation. Educational 
background diversity is conceptualized as the major level or the specialization of studies. 
Education level diversity is assessed either as the number of years of (formal) education or 
as the highest educational level achieved.  
Outcome variables 
The dependent outcome variables include divergent types of team performance assessed 
along either objective or subjective performance measures. Objective performance 
measures include financial key figures such as return on equity (ROE), return on assets 
(ROA) and return on sales (ROS) as well as measures of team effectiveness such as 
productivity, profitability and goal achievement. Subjective performance measures are 
based either on a team’s self-assessed performance appraisals or on external ratings from 
managers, supervisors or other persons outside the teams.   
Moderator variables 
Eventually, in order to test for potential moderating effects in the diversity-performance 
relationship we include information on average team size and team type. We include mean 
team size when reported in the initial study – usually measured as simple headcount of 
team members. Studies that do not report average team size are excluded from the modera-
tor analysis. Regarding team type, we cluster teams along Devine’s (2002) typology either 
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to be TMT, work team, R&D team or mixed teams. While TMT (executive) and R&D 
teams (design) match Devine’s (2002) intellectual work team cluster, work teams refer to 
the physical work team cluster. We understand “work teams” to include those teams intro-
duced as work teams in the initial studies, but also teams that continuously work together 
on the same persisting tasks, e.g. teams labeled as school staff, sales teams or branch 
teams. Studies on work teams that are engaged in specific types of cooperation (e.g. virtual 
teams) or subject to task profiles that change over time (e.g. venture or project teams) are 
classified as “mixed teams”. The same is true for studies which include divergent team 
types without reporting results separately. Again, studies that do not provide the appropri-
ate information on team type are excluded from moderator analysis at this instance.  
Meta-analytic procedure 
For this meta-analysis, we chose the product-moment correlation coefficient (r) to be the 
primary effect size index, because we exclusively focus on observational research and do 
not include experimental findings. However, product-moment correlation coefficients may 
entail serious statistical difficulties such as problematic standard error formulation (Lipsey, 
Wilson 2001) and excessive Type I error rates (Alexander, Scozzaro, Brodkin 1989). In 
response to these undesirable statistical properties, we follow suggestions by Lipsey and 
Wilson (2001) as well as Hedges and Olkin (1985) and correct correlation coefficients by 
Fisher’s Zr-transformation.  
With regard to model specification, we chose random effect models as introduced by 
Hedges and Olkin (1985) since this approach allows heterogeneity in the effect size to 
arise from two sources, subject level sampling error and variability of effects randomly 
distributed along studies (Lipsey, Wilson 2001). To test for the degree of precision of the 
mean effect size estimates, we calculated the 95% confidence interval (CI) around the 
population correlation. A CI that does not include zero indicates the mean effect size to be 
significant (Lipsey, Wilson 2001, Whitener 1990). If the 95% CI does not include zero, we 
follow Lipsey and Wilson (2001) in calculating z-tests to check whether the mean popula-
tion effect size is significant at p≤α (e.g. 10%-significance). In order to test for the homo-
geneity of the effect size, we apply chi-square distributed Q statistics (Hedges, Olkin 
1985). In general, homogeneity of effect sizes would imply that individual effect sizes dif-
fer from the estimated population mean effect size only by sampling error (Lipsey, Wilson 
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2001).
9
 In other words, rejecting Q statistics would denote heterogeneous effect size distri-
butions with two main implications. First, heterogeneity favors the use of random effects 
rather than fixed effects. Since we observe the majority of Q statistics to confirm heteroge-
neity in our data, our initial choice of random effect models is statistically supported. Sec-
ond, heterogeneity suggests that randomly distributed variables may moderate the variance 
in individual effect sizes. As a consequence, we test for the proposed moderating effects of 
team size and team type by applying the DerSimonian and Laird (1986) random-effects 
meta-regression methods approach with Knapp and Hartung (2003) tests of effect esti-
mates variance. QE is the corresponding residual heterogeneity statistic that indicates mod-
el significance (Lipsey, Wilson 2001).  
2.5 Results 
We start the discussion of our findings by examining the relationship between diversity 
variables and team performance as hypothesized in H1a to H1g (Table 2.2). Subsequently, 
we present our findings with respect to the moderating effects of average team size (H2a, 
H2b, Table 2.3) as well as team type (H3a, H3b, Table 2.4). For each analysis, we report 
the number of correlations from independent samples included in the meta-analysis (k), the 
total number of teams (N), the effect size given as the corrected population correlation (rz) 
(sample-size weighted through Fisher’s Z-transformation), the standard error of the cor-
rected population correlation (rz(se)), the lower and upper bounds of the 95% confidence 
interval (95% CI), Cochran’s Q as homogeneity statistics (Q) with the respective degree of 
freedom (df), and eventually the I
2
 statistic which presents the percentage of between-study 
variation attributable to heterogeneity (I
2
).  
Main results on the diversity-performance relationships (hypotheses H1a to H1g) are re-
ported in Table 2.2. Forest plots that illustrate the correlations a study contributes to the 
meta-analysis are presented for each diversity variable in Figures A.1 to A.7 in the appen-
dix. In support of Hypothesis H1a, we observe a negative effect size regarding the link 
between age heterogeneity and team outcome (rz = -0.052, 95% CI: -0.109 | 0.005). Since 
zero is included in the 95% CI, we calculate the z-test of effect size (ES) which allows to 
                                                 
9
  As an alternative to Q-statistics we calculate the I
2
 measure that gives the proportion of total variation in 
mean effect size attributable to between-study heterogeneity (Higgins, Thompson 2002). It is calculated 
as 𝐼² = 100% 𝑥 
𝑄−𝑑𝑓
𝑄
. As rule of thumb, one can say that an I² value around 25% indicates low heteroge-
neity, while values around 50% and 75% can be translated to moderate and high levels of heterogeneity, 
respectively (Higgins et al. 2003).  
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reject the null-hypothesis (ES=0) and, thus, confirm H1a at the 10%-level of significance. 
In other words, the more diverse team members are with regard to age the lower is overall 
group productivity. Hypothesis H1b predicted a negative relationship between gender het-
erogeneity and team performance. Our findings confirm the expected link (rz =-0.036, 95% 
CI: -0.076 | 0.004). Again, z-tests of effect size (ES) allow for confirmation of H1b (at the 
10%-level). This indicates that gender heterogeneity in teams is detrimental to team per-
formance. Regarding the relation between cultural diversity and team performance, we do 
not find any support for the expected negative relationship (H1c). Cultural diversity does 
not affect team productivity significantly. In summarizing findings on the less task-related 
diversity variables, results for both age and gender provide support for social categoriza-
tion theory as well as the similarity-attraction paradigm since diversity along these attrib-
utes is identified to affect overall team performance negatively.  
Table 2.2: Relationship between Diversity and Overall Team Performance 
Diversity  k rz rz(se) 
95% CI 
Q df I
2
 
Lower Upper 
Age 25 -0.052* 0.029 -0.109 0.005 88.79*** 24 73.00% 
Gender 30 -0.036* 0.021 -0.076 0.004 57.69*** 29 49.70% 
Culture 20 0.003 0.033 -0.061 0.067 105.98*** 19 82.10% 
Function 27 0.041 0.039 -0.035 0.117 369.37*** 26 93.00% 
Tenure 25 0.007 0.031 -0.054 0.069 178.85*** 24 86.60% 
Education         
Background 10 0.064* 0.038 -0.011 0.138 48.85*** 9 81.60% 
Level 12 -0.006 0.052 -0.108 0.097 43.23*** 11 74.60% 
Note. k = total number of correlation coefficients meta-analyzed; rz = corrected population correla-
tion (sample-size weighted based effect size (ES) on Fisher’s z transformed correlation coefficients 
with significance test for ES=0; rz = standard error of the corrected population correlation; 95% CI 
= lower and upper bound of the 95% confidence interval; Q = homogeneity statistics; df = degree 
of freedom; I
2 
= percentage of between-study variation due to heterogeneity.  
***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.1 
With regard to the expected positive relationship of heterogeneity in highly task-related 
attributes on team productivity, we only find support for educational background diversity 
as stated in H1f (rz = 0.064, 95% CI: -0.011 | 0.138). A significant z-test allows us to con-
firm H1f at the 10%-level of significance. This finding suggests teams to perform signifi-
cantly better when drawing on a broad set of diverse educational backgrounds. However, 
there is no support for the predicted positive relationship between team performance and 
organizational tenure, functional and education level heterogeneity (H1d, H1e and H1g). 
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Therefore, overall support for the information processing perspective is weak and only 
based on findings with respect to educational background heterogeneity. 
In order to investigate the relationship between team heterogeneity and team performance 
in more depth, we separate primary studies depending on the way they assess team per-
formance (Table A.2 in the appendix). While there are no outcomes other than those dis-
cussed above in the fields of age, gender, cultural, functional and educational background 
diversity, we gain additional insights for tenure diversity as well as education level diversi-
ty. In partial support of Hypothesis H1d, we observe tenure diversity to be positively relat-
ed to team performance at least when performance measures are based on subjective exter-
nal ratings, e.g. by supervisors (rz = 0.095, 95% CI: 0.021 | 0.106). Contrary to our expec-
tations as expressed in hypothesis H1g, we found a negative relationship between educa-
tional level diversity and performance measured on outsider ratings (-0.132, 95% CI: -
0.267 | 0.002).  
All in all, we are able to confirm the expected negative link between team performance and 
both age diversity (H1a) and gender diversity (H1b). Furthermore, we find support for the 
hypothesized positive relationship between educational background diversity (H1f) and 
team performance. Additionally, we can provide partial support for the expected positive 
relation between team performance and tenure diversity (H1d). At the same time, we have 
to partially reject H1g as we observe a negative relationship between education level and 
performance rated by outsiders. Subsequent to the discussion of the main results of the 
meta-analyzed diversity-performance relationship, the second set of analyses centers on 
the potential moderating effects of average team size (as stated in H2a and H2b) and team 
type (as stated in H3a and H3b). 
Team size 
In order to test for the moderating effect of team size on the diversity-performance rela-
tionship, we applied random-effects meta-regression. Results are reported in Table 2.3. As 
stated in H2a, we expect team size to negatively moderate the link between heterogeneity 
in the less task-related demographic attributes of age, gender and culture. Meta-regression 
findings largely support team size to be the predicted negative moderator. In particular, the 
correlation coefficients for the diversity-performance relationship reduce with each addi-
tional unit member (for age by -0.001, for gender by -0.013 and for culture by -0.021). 
Highly significant values of QE confirm the significance of the regression models. These 
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findings may suggest that coordination and communication among team members are 
complicated with increasing team size. Moreover, social categorization and conflict may 
be more pronounced in larger teams. As predicted in H2b, we observe positive moderating 
effects on the diversity-performance relationship for the task-related demographic attrib-
utes tenure (0.003), functional (0.013) and educational background (0.063) as well as edu-
cation level (0.016). These findings suggest that additional team members may contribute 
additional (complementary) knowledge, skills and experience. This seems to be beneficial 
to group performance at least for task-related heterogeneity. Overall, we are able to con-
firm hypotheses H2a and H2b. 
Table 2.3: Team Size as Moderator of the Performance-Diversity Relationship 
Diversity k rz rz(se) 
95% CI 
QE df I
2
 
Lower Upper 
Age 19 -0.001 0.008 -0.019 0.017 62.31*** 17 72.72% 
Gender 21 -0.013 0.005 -0.024 -0.001 35.54** 19 46.54% 
Culture 11 -0.021 0.013 -0.051 0.008 48.11*** 9 81.29% 
Function 15 0.013 0.016 -0.021 0.048 79.24*** 13 83.59% 
Tenure 14 0.003 0.022 -0.045 0.051 56.19*** 12 78.65% 
Education 
        
Background 6 0.063 0.049 -0.074 0.2 16.03*** 4 75.05% 
Level 11 0.016 0.026 -0.042 0.073 32.86*** 9 72.61% 
Note. k = total number of correlation coefficients meta-analyzed; rz = corrected population correla-
tion (sample-size weighted based ES on Fisher’s z transformed correlation coefficients with signif-
icance test for ES=0; rz = standard error of the corrected population correlation; 95% CI = lower 
and upper bound of the 95% confidence interval; QE = homogeneity statistics; df = degree of free-
dom; I
2 
= percentage of between-study variation due to heterogeneity.  
***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.1 
Team type 
Likewise to team size, we use meta-regression to test for moderating effects of team type 
on the diversity-performance relationship. Results are reported in Table 2.4. In hypothesis 
H3a we expected the negative relationship between less task-related heterogeneity and 
team performance to be weaker in TMT and R&D teams compared to other team types. 
For all three less task-related diversity attributes (age, gender and culture), we observe the 
predicted negative diversity-performance relationship for work teams and mixed teams. 
However, to our great surprise, results for TMT and R&D teams do not show the expected 
slightly weaker negative relationship but, instead, even suggest a positive relationship of 
age, gender and culture with team performance. In other words, for TMT and R&D teams 
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the assumptions derived from social categorization as well as similarity-attraction para-
digm on the advantageousness of homogeneous teams have to be neglected. Instead, our 
results support the information processing perspective stating that heterogeneity even in 
less task-related attributes is beneficial for TMT and R&D team performance. We attribute 
this finding to two possible explanations. First, as stated above, homogeneity in TMT and 
R&D teams along surface-level demographic characteristics is found to be very high (e.g. 
Horwitz, Horwitz 2007, Devine 2002). Second, we assume that within TMT and R&D 
teams disadvantages associated with heterogeneity (such as conflict, coordination as well 
as communication problems and social categorization) are of minor importance. Instead, 
even little heterogeneity in age, gender or culture seems to entail advantages to the particu-
lar tasks of TMT and R&D teams since strategic decision making and innovative thinking 
may be assumed to improve with differing perspectives of team members. For instance, 
consider management boards with and without female participation. In summary, we are 
able to confirm hypothesis H3a insofar as TMT and R&D teams not only suffer less from 
diversity in less task-related attributes but even benefit from the resulting divergent per-
spectives.  
Table 2.4: Team Type as a Moderator of the Performance-Diversity Relationship 
Team  
Type 
k rz rz(se) 
95% CI 
QE df I
2
 
Lower Upper 
Age         
TMT 20 0.023 0.064 -0.112 0.157 45.99*** 18 60.86% 
Work 20 -0.015 0.065 -0.152 0.123 44.44*** 18 59.50% 
R&D 20 0.185 0.15 -0.13 0.5 67.77*** 18 73.44% 
Mixed 20 -0.139 0.117 -0.386 0.107 68.64*** 18 73.78% 
Gender 
        
TMT 26 0.062 0.048 -0.036 0.1611 48.5*** 24 50.52% 
Work 26 -0.084 0.043 -0.173 0.0051 46.76*** 24 48.67% 
R&D 26 0.298 0.128 0.034 0.563 44.72*** 24 46.33% 
Mixed 26 -0.022 0.098 -0.225 0.181 51.29*** 24 53.21% 
Culture 
        
TMT 16 0.17 0.049 0.064 0.275 39.32*** 14 64.40% 
Work 16 -0.158 0.052 -0.269 -0.046 40.85*** 14 65.73% 
R&D --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Mixed 16 -0.165 0.221 -0.638 0.307 90.27*** 14 84.49% 
 
        
      (continues next page) 
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Tenure 
        
TMT 22 0.084 0.076 -0.074 0.242 126.62*** 20 84.21% 
Work 22 -0.08 0.08 -0.247 0.087 140.26*** 20 85.74% 
R&D 22 -0.016 0.098 -0.219 0.187 85.56*** 20 76.63% 
Mixed --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Functional 
        
TMT 24 -0.072 0.075 -0.228 0.084 184.63*** 22 88.08% 
Work 24 -0.03 0.085 -0.206 0.145 298.84*** 22 92.64% 
R&D 24 0.299 0.088 0.117 0.481 59.58*** 22 63.08% 
Mixed 24 -0.055 0.16 -0.386 0.277 346.42*** 22 93.65% 
Education 
        
Level 
        
TMT 11 0.233 0.098 0.012 0.454 21.29** 9 57.72% 
Work 11 -0.236 0.097 -0.455 -0.017 21.29** 9 57.72% 
R&D --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Mixed 11 0.01 0.238 -0.529 0.549 40.12*** 9 77.57% 
Note. k = total number of correlation coefficients meta-analyzed; rz = corrected population correla-
tion (sample-size weighted based ES on Fisher’s z transformed correlation coefficients with signif-
icance test for ES=0; rz = standard error of the corrected population correlation; 95% CI = lower 
and upper bound of the 95% confidence interval; QE = homogeneity statistics; df = degree of free-
dom; I
2 
= percentage of between-study variation due to heterogeneity.  
***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.1 
With regard to the highly task-related diversity attributes of tenure, functional and educa-
tional background as well as education level heterogeneity, we predict in H3b the positive 
relationship between diversity and performance to be stronger in TMT and R&D teams in 
comparison to other team types.
10
 Yet, the results are somehow mixed. While we observe 
the expected positive moderating effect of TMT teams, findings for R&D teams even re-
port a slightly negative moderating effect. When it comes to functional background diver-
sity, results are vice versa. Here, we find a strong and positive moderating effect in R&D 
teams, but a slightly negative effect in TMT. Fairly unexpected, reported findings on work 
teams and mixed teams depict a negative moderating effect on all three heterogeneity at-
tributes. In contrast to our expectations, this indicates that diversity within work teams and 
mixed teams functions in line with similarity-attraction paradigm and social categorization 
theory. Overall, we are able to confirm hypothesis H3b only partially.  
                                                 
10
  There are no findings reported for educational background diversity due to insufficient observations. 
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2.6 Conclusion and Implications 
Using meta-analysis, we study the influence of team diversity on team performance and 
productivity along a broad set of demographic attributes. These are understood to be either 
less task-related (age, gender, cultural background/ethnicity) or highly task-related (organ-
izational tenure, functional and educational background, education level). In addition, we 
test for two potential moderating effects of the diversity-performance relationship – team 
size and team type.  
When discussing the effects of homogeneity and heterogeneity in team composition on 
team outcome, diversity research mainly draws on two guiding research traditions: similar-
ity-attraction paradigm/social categorization theory and information processing perspec-
tive/economic theory. The former tradition assumes heterogeneity to trigger social catego-
rization, which may result in sub-group formation (in-group vs. out-group) and team con-
flict both assumed to be negatively associated with team performance. In order to avoid 
negative impacts on group performance, homogeneity in teams is stated to be preferable. 
Opposed to this, economic theory and information processing perspective argue that teams 
may benefit from heterogeneous cognitive resources, experiences or network ties – in par-
ticular when these are complements. As a consequence, heterogeneity in teams is reasoned 
to increase team performance. We use both theoretical concepts to derive the research hy-
potheses tested throughout this meta-analysis.  
Core findings of the meta-analysis suggest negative population correlations of heterogenei-
ty in less task-related attributes (gender and age) on team performance. This result con-
firms arguments stated in social categorization theory and similarity-attraction paradigm. 
Additionally, we detect a positive relationship between heterogeneity in highly task-related 
attributes (educational background) and team performance as expected by information pro-
cessing perspective / economic theory. Moreover, we identify team size and team type to 
moderate the diversity-performance relationship to a large extent. In line with Stewart 
(2006), we are able to confirm the predicted moderating effects of team size: With increas-
ing team size, the influence of diversity on performance decreases for less task-related at-
tributes and increases for highly task-related attributes. Furthermore, we observe a positive 
moderating effect of TMT and R&D team type on almost all attributes irrespective of the 
task-relatedness. Fairly unexpected, we find the work team type to negatively moderate the 
diversity-performance relationship for all attributes, again irrespective of the task-
Work Team Diversity and the Optimal Composition of Teams: A Meta-Analytic Approach  
 
37 
relatedness. We attribute these findings either to compositional effects – TMT and R&D 
teams are assumed to be quite homogeneous along surface-level demography (e.g. Hor-
witz, Horwitz 2007, Devine 2002) – or to the very particular task requirements these teams 
face concerning creativity, decision making and problems solving.  
Our findings offer profound implications for practitioners that might improve team coop-
eration and performance in organizational settings. Given the negative impact of age and 
gender heterogeneity on overall team performance, it seems to be recommendable to in-
crease overall homogeneity on these attributes in teams within organizations. However, 
this mainly holds true for teams classified as working teams in this study (e.g. teams in the 
production line) since both TMT and R&D team types positively moderate age and gender 
heterogeneity. With regard to the positive impact of educational background diversity on 
overall team performance, one might consider interdisciplinary teams since these are found 
to outperform homogenous teams. Again, this mainly holds true for TMT and R&D teams 
because work team type as well as mixed team type negatively moderate this relationship. 
To put it another way, it seems reasonable to increase heterogeneity even along less task-
related attributes in teams that require creative thinking, problem solving ability or deci-
sion making skills to fulfill their assigned tasks. This usually extends the cognitive re-
sources of these teams and, therefore, improves team performance. In contrast to that, 
teams that follow standardized and routine tasks without the need to find innovative solu-
tions are better off if team members are homogenous. These teams do not benefit from 
extended cognitive resources, but instead are likely to suffer from team conflicts that may 
arise through social categorization. Similar implications are offered regarding team size. 
Our results emphasize the advantageousness of large teams when highly task-related diver-
sity is concerned. In other words, if a team requires creativity, problem solving ability or 
decision making skills to fulfill its assigned tasks, each additional team member may con-
tribute complementary skills and knowledge. As a result, cognitive resources within the 
group increase and task performance may improve. Opposed to this, smaller teams are 
preferable if teams perform routine tasks since there is a negative moderating effect of 
team size for less task-related heterogeneity.  
With this meta-analysis, we contribute to the diversity research in several regards. We pro-
vide an up-to-date meta-analysis on the diversity-performance relationship by focusing on 
studies published within the last twenty years, from 1994 to 2014. Meta-analysis seems 
particularly important in diversity research for two reasons. First, related experimental and 
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empirical studies provide inconsistent and conflicting findings with regard to the produc-
tivity effects of a homogenous or heterogeneous composition. Hence, reviewing the litera-
ture qualitatively is highly unlikely to identify statistical patterns that may allow for uni-
versally valid conclusions. Instead, it seems necessary to quantitatively summarize the 
most important contributions to provide conclusions and implications that are generally 
valid – in particular in a field developing at such a vigorous speed. Second, primary studies 
are mainly built on small sample sizes that may raise doubts on the conclusions drawn 
from these contributions. In quantitatively analyzing these studies we might reduce exist-
ing doubts and contribute to the overall understanding of diversity. Furthermore, we con-
sider only studies on work teams in real life organizations and leave out other team settings 
such as sport teams or student work groups. This seems necessary to derive business-
oriented insights and evidence that are actually useful to enhance productivity within 
firms. In doing so, we contribute straightforward implications for practitioners on the ad-
vantageousness of team heterogeneity and homogeneity with regard to team performance. 
These insights may help to enhance team productivity and, thus, firm profitability.  
Despite its profound contribution, this study entails some limitations. First, we are limited 
in our moderator testing on team size and team type. However, there is broad evidence on 
further potential moderators such as organizational culture and context (e.g. Riordan, 
2000), group longevity (e.g. Pelled, Eisenhardt, Xin 1999) and task type in terms of com-
plexity, autonomy and interdependency (e.g. Bowers, Pharmer, Salas 2000, Horwitz, Hor-
witz 2007, Webber, Donahue 2001). Unfortunately, we could not test for these moderators 
due to the fact that data on these issues is seldom reported in most primary studies. Sec-
ond, the majority of primary studies summarized in this meta-analysis is based on cross-
sectional data. This is somehow problematic since both theoretical assumptions (e.g. Har-
rison et al. 2002) and research findings (e.g. Pelled, Eisenhardt, Xin 1999, Watson, Kumar, 
Michaelsen 1993) suggest that timing matters in the relationship between diversity and 
performance. In other words, diversity seems to be a dynamic construct that may vary with 
group longevity and, therefore, should be studied with longitudinal rather than cross-
sectional data. We call for future research to take these issues into consideration in order to 
arrive at a more detailed knowledge of the dynamics and moderating effects of diversity in 
work groups.  
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3 Employee Absenteeism: Determinants in the International 
Context 
3.1 Introduction 
In most industrialized countries employee sickness absence has become a significant trig-
ger for high public and private expenses and probably will remain a central issue for future 
economic growth of both national economies as well as private organizations. In the US, 
the overall absence rate in 2013 totals to 2.9% (United States Bureau of Labor Statistics 
2014), whereas in the European Union (EU-27 plus Norway) absence in 2010 varies be-
tween 0.8 in Italy to 7.7% in Norway with an overall mean of 3.8% (European Foundation 
for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions 2010).
11
 Detailed data for Germa-
ny reveal that employees missed a total of 567.7 million days at work due to sick leave in 
2013. In other words, each employee has been absent from work for 15 days on average 
(BAuA 2015). With respect to these statistics, it comes as no surprise that employee absen-
teeism imposes very high economic costs for national economies and private organizations 
alike.
12
 For the EU-27 plus Norway the total economic costs of employee absence are es-
timated to account for approximately 2.5% of the European Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP). For Germany, the costs imposed by employee absenteeism are estimated to amount 
to €59 billion in national production loss and even €103 billion in loss in gross value added 
(BAuA 2015). Given these numbers it becomes apparent that understanding the patterns of 
absenteeism may be crucial in order to enhance productivity and keep up with increasing 
global competition.   
In response to the costly nature of absenteeism for both public institutions and private or-
ganizations, practitioners and academics are eagerly seeking for new insights on possible 
determinants of absenteeism in order to develop instruments that benefit both employees’ 
health and employers’ bottom-lines. This is even more relevant now than ever since recent 
and future demographic shifts in industrialized societies can be assumed to prolong the 
                                                 
11
  It is worth noting that international comparison of absence figures has proven to be difficult due to na-
tional differences in recording methodologies (e.g. maternity, child care) that limit overall comparability 
of absence data (European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions 2010).  
12
  Costs imposed by absenteeism may be split up in direct and indirect costs (Martocchio 1992). Direct 
costs comprise all wages and statutory sickness benefits paid to employees on sick leave as well as ex-
penses for replacement workers to fill in the vacancies. Indirect costs may arise in terms of productivity 
losses, costs for rescheduling and administration, reduced quality of service, safety risks and motivational 
issues for attendant employees (European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Con-
ditions 2010). 
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overall working life span (e.g. Grund, Westergaard-Nielsen 2008). On this account there is 
a great need for reducing existing workplace burdens that might provoke stress or illnesses 
in order to sustain employees’ health in the long run. Detailed knowledge on the determi-
nants of absence may help tackling these issues.  
In general, absence can be defined as non-attendance at work when scheduled to (e.g. Kris-
tensen et al. 2006). This idea allows to distinguish between involuntary (e.g. sickness) or 
voluntary (e.g. shirking) absence behavior (e.g. Johns 1997, Sagie 1998). In lack of a 
unique theory on absence, several attempts to conceptualize absenteeism have emerged 
over the years with the well-known process model of Steers and Rhodes (1978) being the 
most commonly cited. In their tradition, absence is usually understood as being subject to 
various personal, organizational, social and environmental variables that influence both 
motivation and ability to attend work. Much of the (personnel) economics work on absen-
teeism relates to either neoclassical labor supply models (Allen 1981a/b, Dunn, 
Youngblood 1986) or efficiency wage theory (Shapiro, Stiglitz 1984). Theory is backed up 
by experimental and empirical results on demographics (e.g. Voss, Floderus, Diderichsen 
2001; Barmby, Ercolani, Treble 2002), group absence norms (e.g. Bradley, Green, Leeves 
2007; Bamberger, Biron 2007), work satisfaction (e.g. Kristensen et al. 2006), working 
conditions (e.g. Dionne, Dostie 2007), national sickness benefit regulations (e.g. Frick, 
Malo 2008; Johansson, Palme 2005), employment protection (e.g. Riphahn, Thalmaier 
2001; Ichino, Riphahn 2005) as well as economic environment and unemployment (e.g. 
Leigh 1985) – yet at some instances with inconsistent findings.  
In this article, we empirically investigate why absence figures of blue-collar employees 
vary considerably between different production sites of a large corporation although em-
ployees face similar circumstances in terms of working conditions, manufacturing process-
es and final product at each facility. In particular, we are interested in the role of economic 
and social determinants in determining employee absence. Moreover, we examine the in-
fluence of worker characteristics and working conditions on absence. Using a hitherto un-
available data set covering 160 blue-collar work units at four international production sites 
of a large European automobile manufacturer, we offer a comprehensive analysis of poten-
tial determinants of absenteeism including: 
 social peer influences (team size, team turnover, the share of temporary em-
ployed workers and the share of workers suffering health impairments) 
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 economic influences / incentives (sick pay regulations, employment protection, 
(un)employment and prosperity level) 
 employee characteristics (age, gender, tenure and health)  
 working conditions (shift system) 
Following the data analyses, we conducted a total of eighteen interviews with on-site ex-
perts to further interpret our empirical findings. Experts include HR managers, line manag-
ers, worker representatives and shop floor staff.  
The results presented in this paper indicate that absence at the respective corporation is a 
multifaceted phenomenon that only shows few statistical patterns that are valid at all four 
plants under observation. Instead, all determinants examined are differently affecting em-
ployee absence at each of the four production sites – details are discussed throughout chap-
ter 3.5. In a nutshell, we observe a positive link between absence and social peer influences 
such as unit size and unit turnover. Furthermore, a high share of temporary workers in-
creases absence of permanently employed workers while we do not find any absence effect 
of the share of workers suffering health impairments. The results regarding economic in-
fluence suggest strict employment protection laws as well as a favorable prosperity level to 
significantly increase absence, whereas findings for the national (un)employment situation 
remain inconclusive. Results for national sickness benefits legislation fail to reach statisti-
cal significance. With regard to worker characteristics, we observe unit absence to increase 
with the share of female employees. Additionally, we detect a positive link between age 
and both involuntary as well as voluntary absence. Evidence on the relation between ab-
sence and tenure as well as individual health is somewhat inconclusive. Eventually, results 
on working conditions imply that absence is higher in a two-shift and three-shift systems 
compared to the standard one-(day-)shift system. In chapter 3.6, practical implications for 
attendance management are considered based on the empirical findings and insights gained 
during expert interviews.  
Our study contributes to the existing literature in several regards. First, we add to the 
growing research on determinants of absenteeism by offering new perspectives from inside 
an organization. In particular, we benefit from unique data that allows for comprehensive 
empirical testing. Second, we appear to be among the first researchers who are able to 
work with international data from within only one organization. Since all data is reported 
on company standards, we can neglect organizational and international differences in re-
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cording methodology that usually limit international comparison (e.g. European Founda-
tion for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions 2010). Third, our data allows 
us to examine three absence measures. Thus, we are able to empirically proxy for volun-
tary vs. involuntary absence. Furthermore, by using unit-level absence data we address a 
weakness of previous absence research that has focused almost exclusively on individual-
level absenteeism and only account for unit-level effects in patches (e.g. Rentsch, Steel 
2003). However, since absence is usually modeled as a social phenomenon (e.g. Steers, 
Rhodes 1978, Kaiser 1998) it should, by definition, be influenced by unit-level peers. Fi-
nally, our study adds to the growing insider econometrics approach that has been first in-
troduced to personnel economics in seminal papers of Ichniowski, Shaw and Prennushi 
(1997) as well as Lazear (2000b).  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The upcoming section provides both a 
discussion of the absenteeism concept as understood in this paper as well as a review of the 
existing absence research. Section three will present the data set and the peculiarities of the 
organizational setting under observation. Section four discusses the estimation strategy 
while section five presents the empirical results. Eventually, section six concludes and of-
fers implications for both practitioners and future academic research.   
3.2 Theoretical Framework 
Research on absenteeism is multidisciplinary. It mainly originates from management lit-
erature but more recently arouse interest in (labor) economics and social psychology (Kai-
ser 1998). However, despite a substantial body of experimental and empirical evidence on 
absenteeism, a comprehensive understanding of the absence concept and its functioning is 
still missing. So far, research has merely agreed on a common definition of employee ab-
sence that includes all types of non-attendance at work when originally scheduled to, yet 
excluding scheduled absence agreed on with the employer such as holidays or flextime 
leaves (e.g. Kristensen et al. 2006). In other words, absenteeism is usually assigned to self-
certified or medically-certified sickness absence and recognized as such by the employer 
(e.g. Whitaker 2001). In this study, we follow this definition of absence.  
A “conceptual breakthrough” (Kaiser 1998, p. 81) in defining a theoretical framework of 
psychological absence research is the process model introduced in a now seminal article by 
Steers and Rhodes (1978). In their model, absence is understood as an individual decision 
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based on the ability and the motivation to come to work (see Figure 3.1). In their model, 
the authors address weaknesses of previous contributions in questioning the assumptions 
of job satisfaction being the primary cause for absence (a comprehensive overview is given 
by Kaiser (1998)). In response, Steers and Rhodes (1978) model absence to be depending 
on both the motivation as well as the ability to attend work which in turn both are directly 
influenced by personal characteristics (e.g. age, gender, tenure). Additionally, the motiva-
tion to attend is further subject to the individual job situation (e.g. job scope, job level, 
work group size) as well as various attendance pressures (e.g. economic conditions, work 
group norms). The authors assume the ability to attend (e.g. sickness, family responsibili-
ties) to moderate the effect of attendance motivation on absence. Later, the authors modi-
fied their first model into an advanced diagnostic model by including economic and social 
psychological factors that have not been considered in their initial model (Rhodes 1990).
13
 
Figure 3.1: Steers and Rhodes (1978) Process Model of Employee Absence 
 
Source: Illustration of Steers and Rhodes process model (Steers, Rhodes 1978, p.393). 
In economic research, the understanding of absence differs from the psychological con-
cepts. Much of the economic absence research relates to two main theories. First, neoclas-
sical labor supply models assume absence to occur from individual day-to-day labor-
                                                 
13
  Two alternative theories of absenteeism are discussed in the psychological absence literature. First, the 
withdrawal model which assumes absence to be withdrawal from unfortunate work circumstances (e.g. 
Hanisch, Hulin 1990, Porter, Steers 1973). In other words, absence may provide employees with stress-
relief and allows them to return to work more productive (e.g. Bachler 1995). Second, the social-
psychological approach that emphasizes the importance of absence norms within groups (e.g. Kaiser 
1998, Rentsch, Steel 2003).  
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leisure choice decisions (e.g. Allen 1981a/b, Brown, Sessions 1996, Dunn, Youngblood 
1986). The idea is simple: the individual utility is maximized when the marginal rate of 
substitution between income and leisure equals the wage offered by the employer. Howev-
er, due to imperfect labor markets and job search costs, one can assume individuals to ac-
cept a job offer even if this constraint is not fulfilled at the contracted number of work 
hours. If at a given wage the contracted number exceeds the desired number of work hours, 
the individual has an incentive to be absent from work (Allen 1981a/b). Yet, this only 
holds true as long as the utility gains of being absent exceed the individual costs of absen-
teeism. These costs may include the gap between regular pay and sick pay. In other words, 
employees may use absence to maximize their individual utility (Dunn, Youngblood 
1986). Therefore, absenteeism can be seen as “a desirable nonpecuniary element of the 
compensation package” (Allen 1981b, p. 207). Second, efficiency wage theory as dis-
cussed by Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) assumes absence to arise from moral hazard and 
shirking. Therefore, absence may serve as a measure of individual effort level choice deci-
sions and worker productivity and is widely used as such in the research (e.g. Ichniowski, 
Shaw 2013). The Shapiro-Stiglitz (1984) model is based on the assumption that the value 
of a present state (i.e. an employment relation) consists of the net current return as well as 
the expected future return. By being absent from work an employee risks dismissal and, as 
a consequence, the loss of the lifetime utility associated with the employment relation.  
Both neoclassical labor supply and efficiency wage theory share the assumption that ab-
sence, at least partially, is an employee’s individual decision under some constraints im-
posed by the employer. Hence, absence needs to be considered appearing either involun-
tary (e.g. as consequence of sickness or injury) or voluntary (e.g. to maximize individual 
utility). While involuntary absence spells are not expected to be influenced by motivation, 
voluntary absence can be modeled as utility maximization or shirking (e.g. Barmby, Ses-
sions, Treble 1994, Brown, Sessions 1996, Chadwick-Jones, Brown, Nicholson 1973, 
Sagie 1998). Moreover, in the tradition of Steers and Rhodes (1978) absence can be inter-
preted as a social phenomenon with absence decisions never made solely by the individual, 
but instead being subject to certain constraints imposed by peers, subordinates, superiors 
and the organization’s overall absence culture (e.g. Chadwick-Jones, Nicholson, Brown 
1982; Rentsch, Steel 2003). Nevertheless, a great part of absence research focus exclusive-
ly on individual level absence (e.g. Kaiser 1998, Rentsch, Steel 2003).  
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Considering a potential sorting of determinants of absence variance we are loosely inspired 
by Kaiser (1998). He suggests absenteeism to be determined by personal characteristics 
and individual responses to influences stemming either from the work or non-work envi-
ronment. Adding our own reading of the literature, we identify four fields of potential de-
terminants of employee absenteeism: social peer influences in teams, economic influences 
/ incentives, worker characteristics and working conditions. In what follows, we briefly 
discuss the determinants of absence along this classification in order to derive our main 
research hypotheses.
14
  
3.2.1 Social Peer Influences in Work Teams  
Turnover 
It has often been pointed out in absenteeism research that absence variance is small within 
and large between groups (e.g. Xie, Johns 2000). Usually, this phenomenon is attributed to 
social absence norms that exist either among groups, organizations or cultural spheres (e.g. 
Bamberger, Biron 2007, Rentsch, Steel 2003). Absence norms as understood in this paper 
can be defined as “set of absence-related beliefs, values and behavioral patterns that are 
shared among members of a work group or organizational unit” (Gellatly, Luchak 1998, 
p. 1086). Although there is comprehensive empirical evidence on the link between peer 
absence and individual absence (e.g. Martocchio 1994, de Paola 2010, Ichino, Maggi 2000, 
Rosenblatt, Shapira-Lishchinsky, Shirom 2010), little is known on the social mechanisms 
behind this relationship (Johns 1997).
15
 Since team members are rational utility-
maximizers, we assume absence norms to be most likely in favor of the employees and, 
thus, increase absence. Now, consider a team whose members share a common belief 
about the legitimacy of absence. Within this team, the enforceability of the shared absence 
norm is subject to changes in the group composition since new workers are not aware of 
any existing absence norm or might not agree on participating (e.g. Miners et al. 1995). As 
a consequence, team-level absence can be assumed to decrease with team turnover. This 
argument leads us to hypothesis H1: 
  H1: “Absence on the unit-level decreases with turnover.” 
                                                 
14
  We limit our review of the literature to those determinants that will actually be surveyed within this 
study. For a comprehensive overview on absence research see, for instance, review articles and meta-
studies by Beemsterboer et al. (2009), Duijts et al. (2007) as well as Farrell and Stamm (1988). 
15
  One possible argument is built on self-categorization (Turner 1987) and social identification theory 
(Taijfel 1982) since individuals prefer working with similar peers and, thus, adopt a particular peer be-
havior. 
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Unit size 
Referring to neoclassic labor supply models as well as efficiency wage theory, one can 
assume that some workers stay away from work without being genuinely sick. Given this 
assumption, researchers often model absenteeism as a potential indicator of shirking (e.g. 
Barmby, Orme, Treble 1995, Riphahn 2004, Bradley, Green, Leeves 2007). Economic 
theory suggests that the share of shirking employees usually depends on the probability of 
being detected as well as the potential consequences once being caught (e.g. Alchian, 
Demsetz 1972). In this context, the effect of group size on shirking is straightforward: 
Shirking can be deterred by appropriate actions either by employers (e.g. organized moni-
toring, incentive design) or by co-workers (e.g. mutual monitoring, social sanctions).
16
 
However, any of these actions will be harder to enforce with increasing group size. For 
instance, the ability to mutually monitor co-worker behavior is getting more difficult with 
each additional team member and, as a result, the effectiveness of social sanctions that 
discipline workers who are caught shirking declines. Likewise, monitoring by supervisors 
is getting more complicated and/or costly with increasing team size (Baron, Kreps 1999). 
Furthermore, from Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul (2005, 2009) we know about the im-
portance of social ties and familiarity among team members in determining productivity. 
The magnitude of worker familiarity, however, can be assumed to decrease with team size. 
Ultimately, one can predict shirking to be facilitated in larger teams due to reduced moni-
toring and less familiarity. These predictions are expressed in hypothesis H2:  
  H2: “Absence on the unit-level increases with team size.” 
Temporary workers  
It is widely recognized in economic research that temporary workers are less absent than 
permanent workers. Yet, as soon as taken on a permanent contract they significantly in-
crease their absence behavior (e.g. Bradley, Green, Leeves 2007, Engellandt, Riphahn 
2005). This phenomenon is mainly attributable to incentivizing contract characteristics 
since temporary agents seek to qualify themselves for permanent contracts that are usually 
associated with better working conditions (e.g. Aronsson 1999, Paoli, Merllié 2001) and 
higher pay (e.g. Mertens, Gash, McGinnity 2007). However, it remains an open question 
how temporary agents influence their permanently employed co-workers with regard to 
absence behavior. Two potential arguments may be considered. First, assume that perma-
nently employed workers are aware of the incentivizing nature of temporary contracts. 
                                                 
16
  On the importance of monitoring to reduce shirking in team settings recall Holmström (1982). 
Employee Absenteeism: Determinants in the International Context  
 
47 
Being rational utility-maximizers, permanent agents might allow themselves a more “gen-
erous” absence behavior as they suppose their temporary co-workers to be incentivized to 
fill in the gap left by their own absence. This implies that a high share of temporary work-
ers increases the absence of the permanently employed co-workers due to shirking. Sec-
ond, as mentioned above, temporary employment is usually associated with worse working 
conditions. Suppose, for instance, that temporary agents are appointed to the most burden-
some working conditions, e.g. by being excluded from job rotation. In turn, this would 
allow permanently employed workers to stay on less demanding work tasks and suffer less 
work-related strains. Following this argument, a high share of temporary workers might 
decrease permanent workers’ absence. Since we know that temporary agents are appointed 
on the same tasks and meet identical working conditions than permanent workers at the 
observed company, we believe the latter argument to be less convincing in our study de-
sign. Therefore, we base our thoughts on shirking behavior and hypothesize: 
H3: “Absence of permanently employed team members increases  
with the share of temporary team members.” 
Workers with health limitations  
It is common practice at the studied organization that workers suffering from particular 
certified health limitations might be subject to temporary or permanent health impairments 
such as the prohibition to carry heavy loads or work overhead. As a result, these workers 
are exempt from performing tasks that would further deteriorate their health condition. 
Yet, it remains an open issue if the presence of employees with health impairments affects 
overall unit absenteeism. This question is mainly based on two considerations. First, it 
seems to be quite a straightforward argument that health-restricted employees are more 
prone to absence due to their physical (or mental) condition. Medical research largely em-
phasized the great significance of chronical and pre-existing health impairments in deter-
mining absence (e.g. Dewa, Lin 2000, Kessler et al. 2001). Second, the easier jobs in the 
team’s operations may often be occupied by workers with health impairments and, as a 
consequence, are excluded from unit-intern job rotation. In this situation, initially healthy 
employees might face additional burdens as they need to staff those workplaces that their 
team mates with health impairments cannot cover. These higher burdens may increase 
their own absence. Therefore, we expect a positive relationship between absence and the 
share of team members with health-impairments. 
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H4: “Absence on the group-level increases 
 with the share of team members with health impairments.” 
3.2.2 Economic Influences / Incentives 
Sickness benefits  
It is a stylized fact in economics that the institutional framework determines employees’ 
absence behavior. Early evidence is given by Buzzard and Shaw (1952) who state that ab-
sence increase with higher sick pay replacement rates as the costs of absence decrease for 
employees. A corresponding labor supply model is offered by Brown and Sessions (1996). 
They argue that higher sickness benefits raise incentives of workers to be absent from 
work. These assumptions are supported by Frick and Malo (2008). Based on the European 
Survey of Working Conditions they observed a significant increase in absenteeism with 
more generous sickness benefits within the EU-14. Over the years, several EU govern-
ments initiated changes to national sickness legislation in order to address the burdens of 
sick pay for social security systems and employers. Absence research often benefits from 
these legislative changes that allow for natural experiments, e.g. Johansson and Palme 
(2002, 2005) as well as Voss, Floderus and Diderichsen (2001) for Sweden and Puhani and 
Sonderhoff (2010) as well as Ziebarth and Karlsson (2010, 2013) for Germany. These 
studies provide broad support of the positive link between statutory sickness benefit regu-
lations and employee absence. We, therefore, predict:  
H5: “Absence will increase with more generous sickness benefit regulations.” 
Employment protection 
The same line of argument holds true for employment protection. Focusing on a legislative 
change in Sweden, Olsson (2009) observes that a less favorable labor protection law in 
terms of seniority dismissal protection significantly decreases absence behavior in organi-
zations that are affected by the change. Based on German data, Riphahn and Thalmaier 
(2001) find that absenteeism increases after probation periods end and mandatory labor 
protection sets in. Further evidence is given by Ichino and Riphahn (2005) who observe 
the same behavior for Italian bank employees. Bradley, Green and Leeves (2012) report a 
significant raise in absenteeism when temporary workers are taken on permanently. They 
argue that the low employment protection associated with temporary employment incentiv-
izes workers to show high effort in terms of low absence. As soon as labor protection ap-
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plies to their employment relation, the formerly temporary agents reduce effort and no 
longer refrain from shirking. This argument leads to hypothesis H6: 
H6: “Absence will increase with strict employment protection legislation.” 
Unemployment and prosperity level  
In addition to the legislative framework, the economic environment and unemployment 
rates are often linked to absence behavior beginning with a seminal paper by Leigh (1985). 
Using data from the time of the US recession in the 1970s, he observed employees to re-
frain from absenteeism when unemployment is high as they assume employers to first lay 
off workers who have proven absence-prone. Askildsen, Bratberg and Nilsen (2005) report 
similar findings for the Norwegian labor market: An increase in local unemployment rates 
significantly decreases absence. This result even holds when controlling for workforce 
composition which is often claimed to be responsible for cyclical variation in absenteeism. 
Knutsson and Goine (1998) observe the link between absence and unemployment for 
Swedish males. With regard to the economic situation, Virtanen et al. (2005) observed for 
Finish public sector employees that a constantly poor local economy has a decreasing im-
pact on self-certified sickness. Audas, Goddard (2001) confirm the link between business 
cycle and absenteeism for the US. Thus, we predict:  
H7: “Absence will decrease with increasing unemployment.” 
H8: “Absence will increase with prosperity level.” 
3.2.3 Worker Characteristics 
Non-work related worker characteristics (gender, age) 
The link between non-work related worker characteristics (i.e. gender and age) and em-
ployee absenteeism is well established. While for gender it is a stylized fact that females 
exhibit higher sickness absence than males (e.g. Barmby, Ercolani, Treble 2002,  Maste-
kaasa 2000), results for age are less conclusive (e.g. Rhodes 1983).  
According to Bekker, Rutte and van Rijswijk (2009), there are three main reasons for gen-
der differences in absenteeism. First, due to physical differences women suffer more from 
reproduction-related health issues such as pregnancy and menstruation (e.g. Alexanderson 
et al. 1996, Sydsjö, Sydsjö, Alexanderson 2001). Second, females face other daily obliga-
tions than males such as the double burden of job and family since child care is traditional-
ly more associated with women (e.g. Åkerlind et al. 1996, Bratberg, Dahl, Risa 2002, 
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Vistnes 1997). Yet, recent research often fails to link child-care to absence (e.g. Maste-
kaasa 2000, Erikson, Nichols, Ritter 2000). Third, male and female occupations usually are 
clearly separated based on the socio-cultural concept of gender role orientation (e.g. Mess-
ing et al. 1998). This involves varying job strains (e.g. Laaksonen et al. 2010), and differ-
ent absence norms in female-dominated occupations (e.g. Mastekaasa 2005). Thus, we 
hypothesize: 
  H9: “Absence on the group-level increases with the share of female group members.” 
The Steers and Rhodes (1978) model associates age with both involuntary and voluntary 
absence. On the one hand, the relationship between age and involuntary absence seems to 
be direct as age-related factors such as illnesses and accident risk negatively influence the 
ability to attend (e.g. Rhodes 1983).  It is widely accepted that physical fitness and overall 
health condition are negatively related to age. As a result, older workers suffer from dimin-
ishing physical resources to cope with work-related and non-work related stressors and are, 
therefore, more prone to work-related illnesses (e.g. Ilmarinen 2001, Ng, Feldman 2013). 
Meta-analytic evidence confirms the positive relationship between age and sickness ab-
sence (e.g. Ng, Feldman 2008). This led us to assume: 
H10: “Involuntary absence as proxied by absence spell duration  
increases with unit mean age.” 
On the other hand, voluntary absence is indirectly influenced by values, expectations and 
satisfaction that are moderated by age (e.g. Rhodes 1983). Findings on voluntary absence 
measures (e.g. absence frequency) indicate a negative relationship between age and ab-
sence (e.g. Chadwick-Jones, Nicholson, Brown 1982, Leigh 1986). In other words, older 
employers are less likely to shirk without being genuinely sick. This behavior is often 
linked to higher social and financial duties that usually increase with age. Meta-analytic 
evidence emphasizes the negative influence of age on voluntary absence (e.g. Hackett 
1990, Martocchio 1989). Based on these considerations we hypothesize: 
H11: “Voluntary absence as proxied by absence frequency  
decreases with unit mean age.” 
Work-related demographics (tenure as proxy for work experience) 
Evidence on the tenure-absence relationship is somehow inconclusive as a positive (e.g. 
Barmby, Ercolani, Treble 2002, Tompa, Scott-Marshall, Fang 2008, Ng, Feldman 2013) as 
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well as a negative relationship is empirically supported (e.g. George 1989, Nicholson, 
Brown, Chadwick-Jones 1977). In a meta-analysis, Hackett (1990) even failed to confirm 
any tenure effect at all. However, there are reasonable arguments for the existence of both 
a positive and a negative tenure effect. On the one hand, absence can be assumed to de-
crease with tenure since more experienced workers have gained more (firm-specific) hu-
man capital. This may reduce the individual risk of injuries or illnesses since workers are 
familiar with the work-related risks and hazards (e.g. Breslin, Smith 2005). Moreover, we 
expect senior employees to have developed more elaborated strategies to cope with work-
related stressors. On the other hand, absence can be assumed to increase with seniority 
since tenure is highly correlated with age and, thus, any tenure effect might just represent 
the age effect as discussed above (e.g. Barmby, Ercolani, Treble 2002, Gordon, Johnson 
1982). Furthermore, seniority often increases job security that may allow workers to be 
absent without having to fear dismissal (e.g. Barmby, Ercolani, Treble 2002, Tompa, 
Scott-Marshall, Fang 2008). In the organizational setting at hand, we can neglect reasons 
of job security since the company imposes itself with strict employment protection regula-
tions without differentiating between newly hired or veteran workers. Thus, we believe 
tenure to be valid proxy for work experience and hypothesize: 
H12: “Absence decreases as work experience increases.” 
Acute health condition 
Acute health impairments such as influenza and influenzalike illnesses (ILI) are among the 
top reasons for sickness absence and may account for 10% to 12% of total absenteeism 
(e.g. Keech, Scott, Ryan 1998).
17
 Days of work lost due to annual ILI pandemics are found 
to vary between 0.3 to 5.9 days depending on the database (e.g. Keech, Scott, Ryan 1998, 
Tsai, Zhou, Kim 2014). In total, economic and social costs of ILI were estimated to 
amount up to $87.1 billion in the US in 2003 (e.g. Molinari et al. 2007). Although often 
advised only to children and older persons, ILI vaccination could help employers to signif-
icantly reduce cost imposed by ILI-induced absenteeism (e.g. Akazawa, Sindelar, Paltiel 
2003). In light of these facts, we hypothesize as follows:  
                                                 
17
  In addition, there is comprehensive empirical work, which is not emphasized over the course of the pre-
sent study, on the absence effect of chronical health condition (e.g. Dewa, Lin 2000, Kessler et al. 2001), 
obesity (e.g. Colditz 1999, Finkelstein, Fiebelkorn, Wang 2005) and addictive disorders such as smoking 
(e.g. Leigh 1995, Lundborg 2007) and alcohol abuse (e.g. Norström  2009, Bacharch, Bamberger, Biron 
2010). With regard to acute health issues we focus exclusively on ILI. Certainly, we are aware of other 
short-term health impairments such as lower back pain (e.g. Dagenais, Caro, Haldeman 2008, Maetzel, Li 
2002). Moreover, we exclude mental disorders and psychological problems since company representa-
tives name ILI (and long-term musculoskeletal disorders) to account for the majority of work days lost.  
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H13: “Absence increase with acute health impairments.” 
3.2.4 Working Condition 
Shift work  
Non-standard working hours in terms of shift-work and night shifts have become a neces-
sity to keep up productivity and business competitiveness (e.g. Costa 2003). In Germany, 
for instance, rotating shift work is affecting 15% of the total workforce and is applied at 
42% of all manufacturing companies (Jirjahn 2008). It is widely recognized that shift work 
is a risk factor for negative physical and mental health outcomes as well as sleeping prob-
lems (e.g. Koller 1983, Akerstedt 2003, Knutsson 2003, Knutsson, Bøggild 2010). Fur-
thermore, working shifts is detrimental to employees’ social well-being since shifts are 
usually concurrently scheduled to social and family activities (e.g. Jansen et al. 2004). In 
consequence, there is a substantial body of empirical evidence associating both health and 
social burdens of shift work with increasing absence (e.g. Slany et al. 2014, Morikawa et 
al. 2001, Fekedulegn et al. 2013).
18
 Since shift work is applied on a large scale at the com-
pany under observation, we consider the following hypothesis: 
H14: “Absence is higher in the presence of shift work and night shifts.” 
All in all, we identified fourteen hypotheses that will be tested throughout this study. In the 
following paragraph we will present the data set and discuss the particularities of the or-
ganizational setting under observation. 
3.3 Data Set and Descriptive Statistics 
In order to study the determinants of employee absence in shop floor settings, we use a 
unique panel data set with team-level information on sickness absence of blue-collar em-
ployees at four European production sites of a large automobile manufacturer. Two of the 
four locations are low volume production sites for luxury cars. These plants are relatively 
small and employees operate at a moderate cycle time. One of these plants is located in 
Germany (GER), the other one in the United Kingdom (UK). The other two locations are 
large volume car production sites with employees operating at a short cycle time. These 
production sites are located in Germany and Spain (ESP), respectively (see Table 3.1 for 
an overview of plant characteristics).  
                                                 
18
  We are aware that there are studies observing inconclusive or no significant relationships between shift 
work and absence (see Merkus et al. 2012 for a review).  
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Team-level absence data includes information on the overall absence rate, the mean dura-
tion of absence spells as well as absence frequency. In order to investigate the determi-
nants of absence, we match the available absence data with broad information on social 
peer influences, economic influences, worker characteristics and working conditions. All 
proprietary data is reported from company records on the work unit level (i.e. teams). Data 
comparability is guaranteed since all data share a common reference (the team-level) and 
identical reporting standards, e.g. recording of absenteeism data is based on similar group 
standards at all four production sites. In order to test for hypotheses H5 to H8 we add data 
gathered from external sources such as information on sick pay legislation, unemployment 
rates and economic environment. All variables used throughout this article are discussed in 
the next section in more detail. Our data covers an extended observation period of thirty-
six consecutive months from January 2011 to December 2013. We chose monthly report-
ing intervals over weekly or daily intervals since this procedure levels out short-term ef-
fects and more or less identifies variables that are relatively stable over time (e.g. Harrison, 
Martocchino 1998). The data set covers information on a total of n=160 organizational 
work units (with n=2,152 employees as of December 2013) and n=5,673 unit-month ob-
servations. In general, a work unit can be defined as a group of blue-collar employees that 
work together as shop-floor teams either in the press shop, the body shop, the paint shop or 
the assembly line.
19
 Within each team, job rotation is applied to level out the strains and 
burdens associated with some work places.  
Teams were selected randomly by company representatives. Only teams that meet the fol-
lowing criteria were considered. First, teams had to exist for the complete observation pe-
riod of thirty-six months. At this point stability is needed since at some sites teams were 
dissolved, consolidated or newly found due to organizational reasons (e.g. new products, 
new machinery etc.).
20
 Yet, variance in personnel structure within teams is highly appreci-
ated. Second, due to data privacy regulations, teams required reported data of five or more 
members for each month. Regarding the selection process, one might be concerned about a 
selection bias to be present. However, in our context, we can neglect this issue since all 
teams included in the data quite accurately represent the overall blue-collar work forces at 
the respective production sites in terms of absence, member characteristics and work tasks.  
                                                 
19
  Due to organizational reasons not all plants employ all four stages of automobile manufacturing. 
20
  We have to allow two exceptions to this rule in order to reach sufficient sample size for both luxury car 
producing plants. At the one plant, two units were newly found during the course of the year 2011. At the 
other plant, four units were consolidated into two during the year 2013. However, this should not be a 
great concern in our data set since the teams did not differ systematically from other teams. 
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics – Data Set Composition 
Plant Country Product Cycle time 
Organizational units 
covered by data set  
Employees covered by 
data set (Dec. 2013) 
A GER Luxury Moderate 6 136 
B UK Luxury Moderate 8 281 
C ESP Volume Short  104 1,245 
D GER Volume Short 42 490 
Number of units: 160 
Total number of unit-month observations: 5,673* 
 *   Missing values at some instances due to organizational changes 
As already mentioned absence data is matched with information on social and economic 
influences, worker characteristics and working conditions. Some of the summary statistics 
are presented in Table 3.2 for each plant. We find age to be distributed relatively homoge-
nous between the teams at each plant since standard deviations do not exceed 2.5 years. 
Concerning the gender distribution we find both luxury car production plants to have a 
very homogeneous labor force consisting mainly of males (97.02% and 97.74% males, 
respectively), while both volume car production sites employ a significant share of female 
workers (78.4% and 89.98% males, respectively). This might be reason to labor supply 
necessities. Unit size is quite similar at both luxury car producers with means of 32.8 and 
35.0 employees, but differs largely from the average unit size at both volume car producers 
(12.1 and 11.9 employees). This seems reasonable since volume car production is usually 
more subdivided into small production segments than luxury car production. The descrip-
tive absence data already reveal that some plants (B and D) show absence rates below or 
only slightly above the international average of 3.8% within EU-states (European Founda-
tion for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions 2010). In contrast to that, the 
other two plants (A and C) far exceed international reference values. This notion is sup-
ported by significant variances between plants concerning absence rate (F(2, 4136)=43.95, 
p=.000), mean absence duration (F(2, 4137)=3.86, p=.021) and absence frequency (F(2, 
4133)=429.56, p=.000). More than one-third of all unit-month observations display an ab-
sence rate of zero (34.82%).  
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
Table 3.2: Summary Statistics – Means and standard deviations 
Plant Product 
Unit size  
(in  
members) 
Age  
(in 
years) 
Gender  
(in % of 
males) 
Tenure  
(in 
years) 
Temporary 
workers  
(in %) 
Divisions  
Absence 
rate  
(in %)  
Absence spell 
duration  
(in days)  
Absence  
frequency* 
A Luxury 
32.81 
(8.31) 
35.12 
(1.82) 
97.02 
(2.87) 
5.62 
(.97) 
14.84 
(11.14) 
Assembly 7.03  
(3.44) 
5.64 
(2.38) 
.2827 
(.1115) 
B Luxury 
35.00 
(6.79) 
43.33 
(2.40) 
97.74 
(3.02) 
16.50 
(2.55) 
13.25 
(11.83) 
Body, Paint, 
Assembly 
2.73  
(2.53) 
5.01 
(3.55) 
.0844 
(.0586) 
C Volume 
12.10 
(4.22) 
37.43 
(2.33) 
78.40 
(17.93) 
10.99 
(3.31) 
n/a Press, Body, 
Paint, Assembly 
4.17  
(5.19) 
6.10 
(6.91) 
.0873 
(.0925) 
D Volume 
11.91 
(3.30) 
41.46 
(3.45) 
89.98 
(12.35) 
13.02 
(2.36) 
9.84 
(17.04) 
Press, Paint, 
Assembly 
6.25 
(5.45) 
7.07 
(6.81) 
.1844 
(.1512) 
  Number of units: 160 
Total number of unit-month observations: 5,673** 
* Absence frequency is calculated following Hensing et al. (1998) by dividing the number of absence incidents by unit size.  
** Missing values at some instances due to organizational changes. 
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Our study design has numerous advantages in addressing issues raised by previous re-
search on absenteeism. First, starting with early work by Chadwick-Jones, Nicholson and 
Brown (1982) absence is not solely modeled as an individual phenomenon but as being 
subject to social peer influences. Given that within-unit absence varies only little whereas 
between-unit absence varies widely one can assume unit-level influences to play an im-
portant role in determining absence (e.g. Rentsch, Steel 2003, Harrison, Martocchino 
1998). Thus, it seems surprising that relatively little work is done on absenteeism at the 
group level (e.g. Rentsch, Steel 2003) with only few exceptions (e.g. Xie, Johns 2000, 
Kristensen et al. 2006). We address this gap in absence research by offering new insights 
on sickness absence at the team level. Second, absence research mainly relies on self-
reported sickness data, e.g. gathered via questionnaires, since register data is often unavail-
able to researchers. However, the response sensitivity of self-reported data in comparison 
to register data varies from high (e.g. 91% (Voss et al. 2008), 88% (Burdorf, Post, Brug-
geling 1996)), to medium (e.g. 82% (Aguis et al. 1994)) and low (e.g. 55% (van Poppel et 
al. 2002)). In line with the latter, Johns (1994) finds employees to be absent actually twice 
as much as self-reported.
21
 Since we are able to use register data from company records we 
can neglect concerns about the reliability and validity of our data. Third, since our data set 
includes four production plants from Germany, Spain and the UK we are able to control 
for varying institutional frameworks across these countries. As discussed earlier, regula-
tions for sickness benefits and employment protection are found to significantly determine 
absence behavior in the international context (e.g. Frick, Malo 2008, Riphahn, Thalmaier 
2001). However, international comparability of absence statistics usually proves difficult 
due to widely varying reporting standards for specific cases such as family care or materni-
ty (European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions 2010). 
For this study, we can dispel any doubts about international comparability since all ab-
sence data is recorded based on company standards. Finally, we are able to apply multiple 
measures of absence as dependent variables to account for different aspects of absenteeism 
such as voluntary and involuntary absence. All absence measures used in this study are 
discussed in detail in the following section.  
                                                 
21
 Moreover, accuracy of self-reported sickness absence is found to decrease with time (Severens et al. 2000) 
and with increasing number of sickness days (Ferrie et al. 2005, Johns 1994). 
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3.4 Estimation Strategy  
Our empirical analyses are based on three different absence measures to consider absentee-
ism from various perspectives. We use absence KPIs reported on company recording 
standards. The most important absence figure is a unit’s monthly absence rate. It is defined 
as the percentage of time originally scheduled for work within the unit missed due to self-
certified and medically-certified sickness. All company-intern discussion on absence is 
entirely centered on this measure. Absence rates vary across units and locations, the over-
all statistics are presented in Table 3.2. Moreover, we follow Hensing et al. (1998)
22
 in 
constructing further absence measures since working with register data does not allow for 
a clear separation between involuntary and voluntary absence. We, therefore, apply two 
monthly proxies for both absence types proposed among others by Sagie (1998). First, one 
can assume involuntary absence spells to be usually longer since sicknesses and injuries 
are seldom cured completely after one or two days. Hence, we calculate the mean duration 
of sick leaves of a team rounded to integer values (Hensing et al. 1998). Second, voluntary 
absence is widely recognized as short-lasting but more frequent. That is why frequency 
measures serve well as proxy for voluntary absence (e.g. Chadwick-Jones et al. 1971). We 
follow Hensing et al. (1998) in calculating a frequency measure by dividing the number of 
absence spells of a given team by the number of persons in that particular unit. Still, a de-
finitive separation between involuntary and voluntary absence remains unclear since both 
proxies might include the other absence behavior as well. 
In general, our estimations are based on the following models with ABS representing the 
three absence measures discussed above as dependent variables: 
ABS  =  α  +  βPEER  +  γECON  +  δWORK + φCOND +  𝜗CONT  +  ε 
where α is the constant, PEER is a vector of social peer influences on the team level, 
ECON is a vector of economic influences / incentives, WORK is a vector of worker charac-
teristics, COND is a vector describing working conditions and CONT is a vector of further 
controls, β, γ, δ, φ and ϑ are the estimated coefficients and ε is the error term. All variables 
are discussed in more detail below. 
 
                                                 
22
  Hensing et al. (1998) propose frequency, length, incidence rate, cumulative incidences and duration of 
sick-leave as measures of absenteeism. Although we are not able to construct all measures for our sample 
due to unavailable or missing data, we use their frequency and duration measures.  
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Social peer influences (PEER)  
We model social influences of workers’ peers to study their impact on employee absence. 
One important peer influence is focusing on group absence norms (e.g. Bamberger, Biron 
2007, Rentsch, Steel 2003). These norms might change with turnover (Miners et al. 1995). 
With regard to hypothesis H1 we proxy for turnover by adding all new arrivals to and all 
exits from the team in order to create one overall turnover variable. The idea is simple: we 
use this quite intuitive measure of variance in team composition since absence norms 
should be influenced by both new and leaving workers alike. In addition, we address re-
search on shirking in team settings (e.g. Dunn, Youngblood 1986) by stating that with in-
creasing team size absence should be more pronounced due to facilitated shirking options 
(H2). To incorporate this idea in our estimations we include monthly team size for all 
units. We measure team size as the simple headcount of team members in a given month. 
As expressed by hypothesis H3, the share of temporary workers might increase the absence 
behavior of permanent workers. In order to control for this argument, we include the per-
centage of temporary workers in a unit in our estimations. Unfortunately, plant C did not 
report any information on the share of temporary workers. In hypothesis H4 we state that 
the share of team members with health impairments should increase unit-level absence for 
two reasons. First, most obviously these workers can be expected to be more prone to ab-
sence. Second, healthy workers might suffer additional workload. We take this hypothe-
sized relationship into account by including the percentage of team members that have any 
kind of certified health impairment in a given month.  
Economic influences / incentives (ECON) 
In order to study potential economic influences and incentive effects on employee absence, 
we extend the company data set with environmental variables identified by previous re-
search to determine employee absenteeism. At this point, we benefit from the international 
context of our study since we are able to compare different social security systems and 
employment protection laws as well as varying national economic environments. This al-
lows us to consider potential economic influences along the four main topics introduced in 
H5 to H8. First, as proposed among others by Riphahn and Thalmaier (2001) as well as 
Ichino and Riphahn (2005) employment protection may have a significant impact on em-
ployee absence behavior. To account for varying legislative settings in Germany, Spain 
and the UK we incorporate the OECD’s Indicators of Employment Protection (OECD 
2014a). Three synthetic indicators rate the strictness of a country’s regulations on individ-
Employee Absenteeism: Determinants in the International Context  
 
59 
ual and collective dismissal as well as on fixed-term and temporary work agency contracts 
on a scale from weak=0 to very strict=6. Second, we consider suggestions stating that ab-
senteeism increases with more generous sickness benefits (e.g. Frick, Malo 2008, Johans-
son, Palme 2002, 2005) in following an approach proposed by Frick and Malo (2008). 
They use the so-called MISSOC reports (Mutual Information System on Social Protection) 
published by the European Commission that describe national sickness benefits concerning 
their coverage, waiting period, maximum duration and replacement rate (European Com-
mission 2014a). We convert the report’s textual descriptions into a scale from weak=0 to 
generous=6 sickness benefits in order to match the OECD’s Indicator of Employment Pro-
tection scales. Third, following previous evidence (e.g. Leigh 1985, Askildsen, Bratberg, 
Nilsen 2005) we expect high unemployment rates to significantly influence employee ab-
sence behavior. Hence, we control for national (un)employment in two ways. On the one 
hand, we use seasonally adjusted monthly national unemployment rates. On the other 
hand, we include the share of persons employed in manufacturing (NACE Classification 
D) in percent of total employees to model workers outside options. Data is based on quar-
terly Eurostat statistics for both unemployment (Eurostat 2014a) as well as employment 
information (Eurostat 2014b). Finally, we take into consideration research stating a link 
between national economic situation and employee absence behavior (e.g. Virtanen et al. 
2005, Audas, Goddard 2001) by incorporating Worldbank information on annual percent-
age changes of GDP by country (Worldbank 2014).  
Worker characteristics (WORK) 
To account for the influence of worker characteristics on absence we chose four main po-
tential determinants of absenteeism. On the one hand, we include the classical non-work-
related demographic features of age and gender to test hypotheses H9 to H11. First, age is 
included as unit mean age. Although the measure of age on the group level seems some-
how not ideal since similar age values in groups may be caused by totally different age 
distributions (e.g. Kristensen et al. 2006), we believe that controlling for the coefficient of 
variation (CV) of age should level out potential biases. Second, we use the share of males 
to model the gender distribution within a team. On the other hand, we aim at addressing 
potential influences of work-related individual demographics on absence. We, therefore, 
use unit mean tenure and the respective CV as proxies for professional experience. Follow-
ing this logic, a high mean tenure indicates units with workers that have accumulated high 
firm-specific human capital and, thus, should have better strategies to cope with work-
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related stressors. Although age and tenure are highly correlated (0.698), results do not 
change when leaving tenure out from the estimations. Therefore, it seems that age and ten-
ure variables are actually measuring two different phenomena. This is in line with among 
others Barmby, Ercolani and Treble (2002) who observe a tenure effect on absence even 
when age is controlled for. Unfortunately, CVs were calculated neither for age nor for ten-
ure from plant D. Eventually, we address research on acute health condition with influenza 
and ILI being among the most stated reasons for staying away from work (e.g. Tsai, Zhou, 
Kim 2014, Keech, Scott, Ryan 1998).
23
 As suggested in hypothesis H13, we control for ILI 
and influenza by using influenza recordings from the World Health Organization (WHO). 
These statistics assess influenza activity from no activity to widespread outbreak on a na-
tional level (WHO 2014). We convert weekly textual evaluations to monthly ordinal scales 
of no activity=0, sporadic=1, local outbreak=2, regional outbreak=3 and widespread out-
break=4.  
Working conditions (COND) 
In H14 we address research stating that shift work usually increases absence due to higher 
burdens concerning sleeping habits, disordered diurnal rhythm and complicated family and 
social life (Slany et al. 2014, Morikawa et al. 2001, Fekedulegn et al. 2013). By taking a 
normal seven hour one-shift system (only morning shift) as reference category, we model 
additional shifts based on a two-shift (morning and day shift) or three-shift systems (morn-
ing, day and night shift).  
Control variables (CONT) 
In order to further exclude confounding effects on employee absence behavior, we add 
further controls to the company data set. First, we address evidence on the influence of 
weather on absenteeism (e.g. Shi, Skuterud 2015) by including information on monthly 
mean temperature, precipitation and sun hours.
24
 Second, we use month and year dummies 
to control for potential seasonality or other timing effects of absence.   
                                                 
23
  Yet, we do not have information on the individual health condition of employees or work units. 
24
  Since we aim to ensure data comparability by relying on single-sourced data provided from the interna-
tional network of the German Meteorological Service (DWD 2014), we only have a limited choice of me-
teorological stations close to the plants’ locations. Therefore, weather information was gathered at mete-
orological stations 130km away from sites at maximum. We do not assume this to be a problem.  
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3.5 Empirical Results 
As a first step, we conduct one-way ANOVAs in order to check for significant mean vari-
ance in absence rates between and/or within organizational units. While we find between-
unit variance in absence rates to be highly significant at all plants (plant A (F(5, 
192)=6.56, p=.000), plant B (F(7, 256)=8.60, p=.000), plant C (F(103, 3564)=9.67, 
p=.000) and plant D (F(41, 1419)=4.28, p=.000)), we observe within-unit absence to vary 
significantly at only 69 out of 160 units over time (43%). This phenomenon is in line with 
previous research that found absence variance to be great between units but smaller within 
units (e.g. Harrison, Martocchio 1998, Xie, Johns 2000).  
In response to this finding, we chose fixed effects regression models to be preferable over 
random effects models since there seems to be some group specific effects that remain 
constant over time. Fixed effects may be of psychological nature but may also be attributa-
ble to varying workplace characteristics that might increase ergonomic burdens of work. 
We, therefore, estimate fixed-effect models on all three absence measures to test for poten-
tial determinants of employee absenteeism.
25
 In this process, we follow a two-staged esti-
mation strategy. On the one hand, we pool data of two plants (both volume car production 
sites and both luxury car production sites, respectively) and apply pair-level estimations by 
using interaction terms for economic and social peer influences. This process seeks at 
avoiding potential biases arising from the fact that variables may not only vary between 
plants but may determine absence behavior at each plant in different ways. On the other 
hand, we apply plant-level estimations for each location independently to further control 
for plant-specific effects that might get lost in pair-wise regressions. For all estimations we 
use various model specifications including different sets of explanatory variables to control 
for the robustness of our findings.  
Subsequent to the empirical testing, we conducted a total of 18 on-site expert interviews at 
both international sites (B, C) in order to double-check our own experience from national 
plants. Experts are working in different organizational fields including HR experts, worker 
representatives, shop floor managers and shop floor staff. Their operational experience and 
practical knowledge helped us to interpret our findings comprehensively and derive impli-
cations that are feasible and realizable in organizational implementation.  
                                                 
25
  Other researchers often use count data methods such as (zero-inflated) poisson or negative binomial re-
gressions to study absence duration. Unfortunately, our duration data represents a unit’s mean and, there-
fore, does not meet the integer value assumption necessary for both regression models.  
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In the following, we start the detailed discussion of our findings by first presenting estima-
tion results on the effects of social peer influences on worker absence (H1 to H4). We then 
go on to present our findings with respect to economic influences / incentives (H5 to H8), 
worker characteristics (H9 to H13) and working conditions (H14). Within each paragraph 
we discuss pooled pair-level as well as plant-level results and further distinguish our find-
ings along the three main dependent variables absence rate, absence spell duration and 
absence frequency. Overall findings suggest that determinants of absence vary by plant. In 
other words, we only find few patterns in the data that are common at all four plants. Main 
results of pooled interaction estimations are reported in Tables 3.3 to 3.5, main results of 
plant-level estimations are reported in Tables A.1 to A.3 in the appendix. Estimations in all 
tables are numbered for a better orientation and referred to throughout the text. Due to rea-
sons of brevity we focus on presenting the main results in all tables.  
Social peer influences (PEER) 
Starting with peer effects, we have analyzed four potential determinants: turnover as a 
proxy for group norms, unit size as a proxy for shirking, the share of temporary workers 
and the share of workers with temporary or permanent health impairments. Results will be 
discussed in the specified order. In hypothesis H1, we predict absence to decrease with 
turnover because the enforceability of group norms – that we believe to increase voluntary 
absence – may be limited with variance in team composition. Yet, we find only weak sup-
port for this argument as the relationship between turnover and absence spell duration is 
only significant at plant D (estimation VI-4). However, since duration measures are usually 
used to proxy for involuntary absence, we refrain from interpreting this finding in support 
of H1. Instead, plant level estimations for location D (V-4) as well as interaction term es-
timations for locations C and D (III-4, -5, -6) indicate that high turnover increases absence 
frequency. Results for absence rate do not reach statistical significance. The great majority 
of local experts confirmed the empirical findings as they observe absence to be usually 
higher in units with high employee turnover. According to their experience, this behavior 
is attributable to employees feeling unsettled and uncertain rather than to changing group 
norms. Moreover, turnover and absenteeism are both identified to be strategies workers 
may choose in response to individual job dissatisfaction (theory of exit, voice and loyalty, 
e.g. Hirschman 1970, Farrell 1983). Thus, high turnover may reduce the workers’ need of 
other responses to job dissatisfaction such as absence. As a consequence, absence can be 
assumed to be low in high turnover situations. In total, we have to reject hypothesis H1. 
   
Table 3.3: Fixed-Effects Interaction Terms on Absence Rates (I) 
  luxury sites   volume sites  
 I-(1) I-(2) I-(3) I-(4) I-(5) I-(6) 
VARIABLES 
Plant A 
(GER) 
Plant B 
(UK) 
Plant A 
(GER) 
Plant B 
(UK) 
Plant A 
(GER) 
Plant B 
(UK) 
Plant C 
(ESP) 
Plant D 
(GER) 
Plant C 
(ESP) 
Plant D 
(GER) 
Plant C 
(ESP) 
Plant D 
(GER) 
Mean age (in years)  -0.949 -0.611 -0.206 0.703* -0.396 -1.512 -0.476 1.487 0.021 0.501** 1.601 0.257 
 (7.203) (2.612) (0.494) (0.385) (7.600) (2.699) (1.501) (1.908) (0.163) (0.223) (2.635) (2.762) 
Mean age² (in years) 0.00949 0.0170 --- --- 0.00260 0.0193 0.0059 -0.0134 --- --- -0.022 0.00293 
 (0.0994) (0.0287)   (0.105) (0.0299) (0.0201) (0.0236)   (0.035) (0.0338) 
Share of males  -19.74 5.273 -17.50 7.464 -15.52 -0.192 -2.78* -0.297 -6.988*** 0.972 -6.751*** -0.364 
(in %/100) (18.96) (8.150) (15.06) (7.947) (20.10) (9.218) (1.429) (4.916) (2.406) (6.67) (2.342) (6.735) 
Mean tenure (in years) 2.533 -2.223* -3.027** -0.344 -0.967 -1.472 0.0492 0.5573 0.2374 -0.5294 0.1902 1.457 
 (3.193) (1.223) (1.378) (0.226) (4.925) (1.015) (0.4074) (1.1011) (0.1652) (0.4025) (0.5842) (1.520) 
Mean tenure² (in years) -0.405 0.0521 --- --- -0.131 0.0426 0.0012 -0.0445 --- --- -0.0002 -0.0761 
 (0.260) (0.0336)   (0.379) (0.0289) (0.0148) (0.0401)   (0.0218) (0.0553) 
Unit size (in persons) 0.186** -0.0174 0.160*** -0.0322 0.136* -0.0264 --- -0.122 0.0464 0.0595 0.0611 0.0647 
 (0.0624) (0.0541) (0.0491) (0.0521) (0.0698) (0.0502)  (0.148) (0.06004) (0.168) (0.058) (0.158) 
Influenza 0.0602 0.101 0.144 
(0.248) 
-0.328 -0.5543 -0.816* 
(0=no activity,…) (0.275) (0.255) (0.291) (0.454) (0.460) 
Employment protection  6.857 6.423 --- 1.924 0.867 --- 
legislation (0=weak,…) (3.882) (3.743)   (3.875) (8.749)   
Employment in  106.2 88.02 --- 128.565 153.555 --- 
manufacturing (in %/100) (180.0) (202.2)   (91.666) (1.981)   
Unemployment rate  -11.46 -30.00 --- 3.3119 13.334* --- 
(in %/100) (96.23) (96.09)  (14.264) (26.688)   
Prosperity level (annual  10.56* 10.06* --- 6.1809** 3.495 --- 
change in GDP in %/100) (5.490) (5.673)  (2.541) (4.9687)   
2-Shift system (yes=1) 1.442 1.281 0.826 1.921 2.697 1.608 
 (1.083) (1.136) (1.229) (1.262) (1.699) (1.577) 
3-Shift system (yes=1) n/a n/a n/a 1.208 1.787 1.261 
    (1.152) (1.303) (1.266) 
Constant 3.501 -13.69 50.39 -21.86 -8.137 -16.24 
 (60.35) (35.07) (60.45) (25.73) (24.844) (35.19) 
Observations 471 471 471 4,878 2,128 2,128 
R-squared 0.189 0.182 0.157 0.042 0.07 0.068 
Number of units 14 14 14 146 146 146 
Robust standard errors in parentheses | *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
+ all estimations including month and weather dummies & age and tenure coefficients of variation | only main results presented |  n/a= not available  
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Table 3.4: Fixed-Effects Interaction Terms on Absence Spell Duration (II) 
 luxury sites volume sites 
 II-(1) II-(2) II-(3) II-(4) II-(5) II-(6) 
VARIABLES 
Plant A 
(GER) 
Plant B 
(UK) 
Plant A 
(GER) 
Plant B 
(UK) 
Plant A 
(GER) 
Plant B 
(UK) 
Plant C 
(ESP) 
Plant D 
(GER) 
Plant C 
(ESP) 
Plant D 
(GER) 
Plant C 
(ESP) 
Plant D 
(GER) 
Mean age (in years)  -0.276 -5.748 -0.274 0.0202 -0.540 -6.717 -2.24 0.950 0.0628 0.653** 2.566 -1.882 
 (2.570) (4.142) (0.388) (0.384) (2.407) (4.601) (2.345) (2.588) (0.2221) (0.302) (3.603) (3.091) 
Mean age² (in years) 0.000915 0.0673 --- --- 0.00411 0.0837 0.0301 -0.00550 --- --- -0.0347 0.0307 
 (0.0355) (0.0470)   (0.0337) (0.0527) (0.0317) (0.0317)   (0.0484) (0.0379) 
Share of males -21.42* 4.607 -24.3** 6.889 -22.85* 4.248 -2.721 -4.406 -5.2565* -4.135 -5.017* -5.513 
(in %/100) (11.35) (6.781) (9.569) (7.457) (12.78) (6.197) (1.789) (6.571) (3.0911) (8.806) (3.027) (8.841) 
Mean tenure (in years) -5.607 -0.563 -1.594 0.102 -5.164 -1.798 -0.1032 -0.604 0.4505** -0.734 -0.0047 1.354 
 (4.232) (1.034) (1.612) (0.222) (4.623) (1.029) (0.4351) (1.583) (0.2127) (0.566) (0.722) (2.377) 
Mean tenure² (in years) 0.295 0.0179 --- --- 0.283 0.0462 0.013 0.000880 --- --- 0.0167 -0.0799 
 (0.278) (0.0285)   (0.292) (0.0287) (0.0174) (0.0594)   (0.0291) (0.0926) 
Unit size (in persons) 0.0475 -0.0163 0.0735* -0.0612 0.0691* 0.00821 --- -0.0781 0.2712*** 0.399* 0.299*** 0.428* 
 (0.0362) (0.0888) (0.0399) (0.0704) (0.0373) (0.0927)  (0.146) (0.0845) (0.236) (0.0833) (0.232) 
Share of temporary  -0.306 -0.112 -1.233 --- --- --- 
workers (in %/100) (1.902) (1.704) (2.073)     
Employment protection  -4.271 -4.687 --- 4.748 1.586 --- 
legislation (0=weak,…) (3.690) (3.655)   (5.002) (10.27)   
Unemployment rate  -124.6 -133.0 --- 9.535 -23.96 --- 
(in %/100) (105.3) (102.0)   (18.03) (29.68)   
Prosperity level (annual  1.868 3.022 --- 7.583** 2.167 --- 
change in GDP in %/100) (4.328) (4.416)   (3.558) (6.486)   
2-Shift system (yes=1) 0.321 0.460 1.037 3.652** 3.606* 3.606* 
 (0.765) (0.695) (0.764) (1.714) (2.144) (2.144) 
3-Shift system (yes=1) n/a n/a n/a 2.503* 2.593* 2.593* 
    (1.371) (1.499) (1.499) 
Constant 99.98 14.80 120.3* -4.780 -12.28 -15.59 
 (63.79) (38.29) (58.64) (37.53) (30.78) (45.73) 
Observations 471 471 471 4,817 2,129 2,129 
R-squared 0.141 0.134 0.123 0.033 0.052 0.049 
Number of units 14 14 14 143 143 143 
Robust standard errors in parentheses | *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
+ all estimations including month and weather dummies & age and tenure coefficients of variation | only main results presented |  n/a= not available  
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Table 3.5: Fixed-Effects Interaction Terms on Absence Frequency (III)  
 luxury sites volume sites 
 III-(1) III-(2) III-(3) III-(4) III-(5) III-(6) 
VARIABLES 
Plant A 
(GER) 
Plant B 
(UK) 
Plant A 
(GER) 
Plant B 
(UK) 
Plant A 
(GER) 
Plant B 
(UK) 
Plant C 
(ESP) 
Plant D 
(GER) 
Plant C 
(ESP) 
Plant D 
(GER) 
Plant C 
(ESP) 
Plant D 
(GER) 
Mean age (in years)  -0.191 0.202* 0.00238 0.0199** -0.176 0.180 -0.00762 0.0188 0.0024 -1.10e-06 0.0237 0.0461 
 (0.188) (0.110) (0.0118) (0.00886) (0.193) (0.109) (0.0244) (0.04497) (0.0027) (0.00428) (0.0384) (0.0590) 
Mean age² (in years) 0.00261 -0.00205 --- --- 0.00238 -0.00198 0.00011 -0.00025 --- --- -0.00028 -0.00056 
 (0.00267) (0.00121)   (0.00273) (0.00122) (0.00032) (0.00054)   (0.0005) (0.00069) 
Share of males (in %/100) 1.074 0.0559 1.206* 0.0700 1.152 -0.0761 -0.056** 0.0593 -0.087** 0.04906 -0.081** 0.0201 
 (0.626) (0.301) (0.598) (0.327) (0.653) (0.293) (0.0256) (0.0795) (0.0368) (0.113) (0.0362) (0.107) 
Mean tenure (in years) 0.402** -0.0723 -0.0490 -0.0112* 0.293* -0.0609 0.0044 0.0442 0.0018 -0.0002 0.0072 0.0370 
 (0.157) (0.0612) (0.0517) (0.00594) (0.165) (0.0577) (0.0055) (0.0371) (0.00094) (0.00781) (0.00797) (0.0419) 
Mean tenure² (in years) -0.0331** 0.00173 --- --- -0.0249** 0.00168 -0.0002 -0.00139 --- --- -0.00027 -0.00141 
 (0.0115) (0.00174)   (0.0114) (0.00166) (0.00021) (0.00139)   (0.00031) (0.00152) 
Unit size (in persons) 0.00392* -0.00297 0.00211 -0.00176 0.00263 -0.00304 --- -0.00105 0.00104 -0.00228 0.00104 -0.00233 
 (0.00220) (0.00176) (0.00190) (0.00138) (0.00234) (0.00175)  (0.0033) (0.00094) (0.00340) (0.00094) (0.00335) 
Turnover  0.000184 0.000300 0.000199 0.0011* 0.00157** 0.00179** 
(arrivals & exits) (0.000365) (0.000412) (0.000365) (0.00064) (0.00082) (0.000814) 
Share of temporary  0.105 0.0847 0.157* --- -0.0114 -0.00426 
workers (in %/100) (0.0768) (0.0920) (0.0815)   (0.0598) (0.0565) 
Employment protection  0.161** 0.159** --- -0.0984 -0.0122 --- 
legislation (0=weak,…) (0.0638) (0.0680)  (0.0782) (0.1597)   
Employment in  6.746 4.146 --- 3.081 5.511** --- 
manufacturing (in %/100) (5.214) (4.832)  (1.909) (3.0594)   
Unemployment rate  -0.359 -0.905 --- -0.0436* 0.6342 --- 
(in %/100) (1.980) (2.365) 
--- 
(0.2449) (0.641) 
Prosperity level (annual  0.245 0.179 0.000921 0.3009*** --- 
change in GDP in %/100) (0.156) (0.172) (0.000630) (0.1112) 
3-Shift system (yes=1) n/a n/a n/a 0.0201 0.0290* 0.0268 
    (0.0155) (0.0174) (0.0173) 
Constant -3.049 -1.400 -1.242 
(2.060) 
-0.1187 -0.8429* -0.595 
 (1.977) (1.045) (0.4345) (0.5814) (0.611) 
Observations 471 471 
0.239 
471 4,810 2,123 2,123 
R-squared 0.272 0.250 
14 
0.053 0.064 0.061 
Number of unit 14 14 143 143 143 
Robust standard errors in parentheses | *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
+ all estimations including month and weather dummies & age and tenure coefficients of variation | only main results presented | n/a= not available 
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In H2, we have hypothesized that absence usually increases with unit size due to better 
shirking opportunities in larger teams (e.g. free riding is facilitated as managerial control is 
complicated and team members are less familiar). Concerning absence rate, we find sup-
port for the predicted relationship only at plant A. Here, a growth in unit size by one per-
son increases absence rate by 0.186 percentage points (significant at the 5%-level) in our 
preferred model specification (I-1, -2, -3). This relationship is confirmed for absence spell 
duration at sites A (II-2, -3), C (V-3) and D (V-4). While the findings for plant A display 
only moderate increases of absence spell duration between 0.069 to 0.074 days with each 
additional employee, findings for plant C (0.271 to 0.311) and D (0.399 to 0.428) suggest a 
steeper increase. However, we do not attribute these results to shirking behavior since ab-
sence spell duration is understood as a measure of involuntary absence. Instead, we assume 
attendance management by shop floor supervisors to be more difficult in larger teams (e.g. 
less time to care for individual needs and work-related and non-work-related health is-
sues). The positive impact of a communicative and trustful personal manager-employee 
relationship on employee health has been emphasized by almost all on-site experts. They 
confirmed that in small teams, managers are more familiar with health issues and personal 
circumstances of their subordinates and, therefore, can more easily take preventive actions. 
Recent research confirmed the beneficial effects of high-quality supervisor-employee rela-
tionships on employee absence (e.g. Tenhiälä et al. 2013). Eventually, we observe incon-
sistent findings for the relationship between unit size and absence frequency (positive at 
plant A (III-1), negative at plant B (VI-2)). Still, we find support for hypothesis H2, yet for 
different reasons than initially predicted.  
Concerning the share of temporary agents in a unit, we find mixed results with regard to 
absence rate.
26
 On the one hand, we observe a positive link at site B (IV-2) since absence 
rates increase with the share of temporary workers. On the other hand, we observe the op-
posite effect to be true at plant A (IV-1) with absence rates decreasing as the share of tem-
porary workers increases. Both effects seem to be reasonable to some degree when we 
assume temporary agents to be incentivized to refrain from absence due to their contract 
status (e.g. Engellandt, Riphahn 2005, Bradley, Green, Leeves 2007). This assumption is 
backed by on-site experts who report that temporary agents have nearly zero absence due 
to two main reasons. First, temporary agents do not benefit from sick pay regulations to the 
                                                 
26
  The share of temporary workers has only been reported by plants A, B and D. Thus, we had to exclude 
this variable from interaction term estimation of plants C and D.  
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same extent than do permanent employees. Second, absence is usually one of the most 
important criteria when deciding on employing temporary agents permanently. Taking this 
into account, two alternative interpretations might explain the mixed results. On the one 
hand, absence might decrease with the share of temporary agents as permanent employees 
are motivated to display low absence by means of productivity spillovers (e.g. Mas, Moret-
ti 2009). On the other hand, absence may increase since permanent employees intensify 
shirking. The latter argument is supported by findings on voluntary absence as proxied by 
absence frequency. We observe a positive link between the share of temporary agents and 
unit-level absence of permanent employees at sites A and B (III-3, VI-1). Thus, in units 
with a large share of temporary agents permanent workers seem to increase shirking. Yet, 
given the mixed results on absence rate, we can confirm hypothesis H3 only for voluntary 
absence at sites A and B.  
Data on the share of team members with health impairments has only been provided by 
both volume car producers C and D. Yet, in none of our model specifications we observe a 
significant effect on overall team absence. In other words, although workers with health 
issues are more prone to absence and might not be able to perform all tasks in the work 
area of the team, their impairments do not affect overall unit absence. We assume organi-
zational activities such as job rotation to support workers suffering from constrained 
health. Hypothesis H4 could not be confirmed.  
Economic influences / incentives (ECON) 
We consider four potential economic determinants in our analysis: sickness benefits, em-
ployment protection legislation, (un)employment situation and prosperity level. In order to 
check for influences of divergent national sickness benefits, we re-estimated our models 
using simple OLS regression models since fixed effects models treat the variable as plant 
fixed effect due to missing variation in national legislation throughout the observation pe-
riod.
27
 To our surprise we are not able to find any statistically significant relationship be-
tween sickness benefits and neither absence rate, nor duration or frequency. This is even 
more surprising since existing research comprehensively confirms the influence of national 
sickness benefit regulations on employee absence behavior (e.g. Frick, Malo 2008, Johans-
son, Palme 2002, 2005). However, we learned from on-site experts that both international 
producers supplement statutory sickness benefits with voluntary additional sick pay for 
                                                 
27
  Since results did reach statistical significance, OLS and random-effect estimations are not reported in this 
paper due to reasons of brevity.  
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their employees. In other words, national differences in statutory sickness benefits are lev-
eraged by the employer and, therefore, are of no importance in the organizational setting 
studied in this paper. Therefore, we refrain from empirically testing hypothesis H5 based 
on our data.  
In hypothesis H6, we assume a strict employment protection legislation to increase em-
ployee absence behavior because punishing or even dismissing workers for absenteeism 
should be complicated due to protective employment rights.
 
Again, we re-estimate our 
models with random effects specifications to account for the fact that employment rights 
only changed in Spain and the UK over the three-year observation window. However, re-
sults did not change. Absence rate and absence spell duration increase only at the UK site 
with stricter employment protection laws (IV-2). Moreover, absence frequency can be ob-
served to increase in pooled estimations at plants A and B (III-1, -2, VI-2), probably due to 
the fact that differences in employment protection laws between Germany and the UK are 
more pronounced than between Germany and Spain. In total, we find only weak empirical 
support for the relationship predicted in H6.  
Concerning (un)employment, we observe significant effects at both volume car producers. 
An increase in the share of employment in manufacturing induces an increase in absence 
frequency at plants C and D (III-5). Referring to absence frequency as proxy for voluntary 
absence it seems as if employees increase shirking when they assume to have good outside 
job opportunities. This finding is confirmed by a significant reduction of absence frequen-
cy when unemployment figures increase (III-5). Again, employees tend to increase shirk-
ing when overall employment is high and they do not have to fear long spells of unem-
ployment. This is in line with hypothesis H7. However, we observe absence rates to in-
crease with unemployment in one model specification at plants C and D (I-5). Thus, we 
cannot fully support hypothesis H7 due to inconclusive findings.  
Eventually, we explore hypothesis H8 predicting that with increasing prosperity level ab-
sence may be more pronounced. We found support for this argument, since pooled estima-
tions for plants A and B (I-1, -2) as well as C and D (I-4) suggest absence rates to increase 
with positive annual changes in GDP. The same is true for absence duration and absence 
frequency at plants C and D (II-4, III-5). In other words, employees increase their absence 
during a nationwide positive economic situation while decreasing absence in hard econom-
ic times. We believe the interpretation to be straightforward. Employees tend to shirk in an 
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overall positive economic environment as they do not have to fear job-loss or believe to 
have attractive outside options. This behavior has been observed by on-site experts at the 
Spanish site throughout the financial crisis of the last years. With the beginning of the eco-
nomic downturn, absence decreased dramatically while it starts to rise again due to the 
recent economic recovery. All in all, we are able to confirm hypothesis H8.  
Worker characteristics (WORK) 
We address potential influences of worker characteristics on absenteeism along the four 
dimensions of gender, age, tenure and acute health condition. Concerning gender, we ob-
serve a significant relationship between absence behavior and the gender composition of a 
work unit at plant C. Here, absence rates are lower in all-male vs. all-female teams. In oth-
er words, a higher share of females in a team is detrimental to work group absence. This 
result is in line with existing research on gender differences in absence behavior (e.g. 
Barmby, Ercolani, Treble 2002). The gender-absence relationship is often assumed to stem 
from higher daily burdens of job and family life for females since child (or elder) care is 
still more associated with women than men (e.g. Åkerlind et al. 1996, Bratberg, Dahl, Risa 
2002, Vistnes 1997). On-site experts at plant C confirmed this reasoning as the role model 
of the mother being responsible for child care is deeply entrenched in the Spanish culture. 
For absence spell duration we find a similar pattern – again only valid at plant C (II-5, -
6).
28
 Keeping in mind that absence duration is often classified as involuntary, one might 
assume that women suffer more from long-term illnesses which arise from burdening 
working conditions than their male colleagues. However, units with a larger share of males 
do not only display shorter absence spell durations at plant C, but also lower absence fre-
quency (III-4, -5, -6, VI-3).
29
 Two potential explanations seem reasonable. First, research 
often links female absence with short-term reproduction-related health issues such as men-
struation (e.g. Alexanderson et al. 1996, Sydsjö, Sydsjö, Alexanderson 2001). Second, 
acknowledging that women are more involved in child or family care than men one may 
assume that female workers might stay at home without being ill in order to nurse their 
sick child. Both interpretations are confirmed by on-site experts and may explain the larger 
frequency of absence coming along with a higher share of female workers. Overall, there 
seems to be a statistically significant relationship between the gender composition of the 
                                                 
28
  Although we find similar results for the German luxury car producer (A), we refrain from including these 
findings into our considerations since variation in gender composition is extremely low at this plant 
(mean share of males exceeds 97%). 
29
  Again, a significant finding for plant A is not further considered due to the high average share of males. 
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unit and absence behavior – at least at plant C. Here, units with a larger share of women 
show significantly higher absence rates, longer absence spell durations and higher absence 
frequencies. Therefore, we are able to confirm H9 for the Spanish volume site.  
We predict two potential effects of unit mean age on absence. On the one hand, H10 states 
that involuntary absence increases with age as workplace burdens are getting harder to 
cope with when getting older. On the other hand, we expect voluntary absence to decrease 
with age as older workers face higher financial and social obligations than younger work-
ers (H11).
30
 Findings on absence rate reveal a positive relationship with age at plant D (I-5, 
IV-4). With each additional year of unit mean age, absence rates increase by 0.501 to 
0.516 percentage points at this plant. The same result holds true at plant B (I-2). Here, a 
one year increase is associated with a raise of 0.7 percentage points. These effects might 
seem astonishingly high at first sight, but one has to take into account that workforces are 
quite homogeneous concerning age at all four sites (standard deviation of units’ mean age 
is 3.45 at max). We further tested for non-linear age effects by including squared age, but 
in none of our model specifications and for none of the dependent variables the squared 
term of age reaches statistical significance. Therefore, we assume the link between age and 
absence rate to follow a linear relationship. The very same relationship can be found at 
plant D for absence spell duration – the classical measure of involuntary absence (II-5, V-
4). With a one year increase in a unit’s mean age, absence spell duration increases between 
0.653 to 0.678 days per month. We, therefore, are confident to confirm hypothesis H10 for 
plant D. We assume this effect to arise from workplace burdens that become substantially 
more difficult to meet with increasing age. On-site experts confirm our reasoning. Fairly 
unexpected, we observe a positive relationship of age and absence frequency in our pre-
ferred model specification of plant B (III-2). Here, a one year increase of unit mean age 
yields at an increase of absence frequency by 0.02 points. We do not find any other statis-
tically significant effect with regard to absence frequency. This is even more astonishing 
since on-site experts have confirmed our hypotheses on voluntary absence in reporting 
older employees to have a more rigorous zero-absence tolerance while younger genera-
tions seem to be socialized with a less serious attitude towards absence culture at work. 
Still, based on the empirical findings we have to reject hypothesis H11.  
                                                 
30
  In order to address concerns that tenure and age are usually highly correlated (Barmby, Ercolani,Treble 
2002, Gordon, Johnson 1982), we re-estimate all models excluding tenure. Leaving out tenure variables, 
however, does not change any results and, in particular, does not influence our findings for age.   
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When it comes to tenure, we have predicted in H12 that absence decreases with tenure 
since more experienced workers should have developed better coping strategies over time 
which help them to bear workplace risks and burdens. With absence rate being the depend-
ent variable we observe the expected negative relationship at plants A (I-2, IV-1) and B (I-
1, IV-2). Likewise to age, the high effects may arise from low overall heterogeneity within 
the workforce regarding tenure (unit-level standard deviation of mean tenure reaches 3.31 
at max). Throughout discussions with on-site experts we learned that experience is a major 
asset helping older workers to outperform younger ones on many occasions. According to 
the experts, being “an old hand” often means knowing best how to tackle tasks and prob-
lems and to be used to workplace burdens from experience. We included squared terms to 
control for non-linear effects of tenure. Results suggest a u-shaped relationship between 
absence rate and tenure at plant B (IV-2). In other words, the predominantly negative rela-
tionship between absence rate and tenure is getting convex to a certain degree with increas-
ing tenure. With regard to absence spell duration, we find a positive link with tenure at 
plant C (II-5). This result is somehow surprising as it – against our predictions – suggests 
absence spell duration to increase with tenure. Squared tenure terms do not reach statistical 
significance indicating linear relationships between tenure and absence spell duration. 
Concerning absence frequency, we observe inconsistent findings in terms of an inverse u-
shaped relationship at plant A (III-1, -3, VI-1) and a negative linear relationship at plant B 
(II-2). In total, there is some support for our predicted relationship since absence rates de-
crease with tenure at both luxury car production sites. In contrast to this, absence spell du-
ration increases with tenure at plant C. Yet, results for absence frequency neither reject nor 
support our hypothesis H12 due to inconsistent findings. Thus, overall results on H12 re-
main inconclusive.  
Interestingly, we observe only a very weak relationship between employee absence and 
acute illnesses as proxied by national influenza activity. In particular, only two model 
specifications display significant but opposing effects, providing no clear-cut evidence on 
ILI determining absence (I-6, V-3). This is even more astonishing as literature confirms a 
strong relationship (e.g. Tsai, Zhou, Kim 2014, Keech, Scott, Ryan 1998) and on-site ex-
perts report influenza outbreaks to be clearly detectable in their daily absence data. We 
believe our national influenza measure to somehow dilute the findings since it does not 
allow for a further differentiation in local outbreak intensity. All in all, we could not pro-
Employee Absenteeism: Determinants in the International Context  
 
 
72 
vide support for hypothesis H13 – there is no link between absence and acute illness meas-
ured by influenza statistics detectable in our data.    
Working condition variables (COND) 
Following empirical results by Slany et al. (2014), Morikawa et al. (2001) and Fekedulegn 
et al. (2013), we predict in H14 that working hours other than the usually applied one-shift 
systems (day) increase absence due to negative health and social impacts coming along 
with irregular and/or atypical working hours. In our estimations, we observe two-shift sys-
tems to increase absence rates in comparison to the reference one-shift system at both in-
ternational plants B and C by 2.8 (IV-2) and 2.3 (IV-3) percentage points. For plant A, we 
find a significant effect in the opposed direction (IV-1). However, we believe this result to 
be highly biased since at plant A only three units worked a one-shift system for only six 
months, while operating on a two-shift system for the remaining observation period. Con-
cerning absence spell duration, pooled estimations for both volume car producers C and D 
reveal statistically significant effects of two-shift and three-shift systems (II-4, -5, -6). 
Plant-level estimations for two-shift systems at plants B (V-2) and C (V-3) and for a three-
shift system at plant C (V-3) support this finding. Referring to absence frequency, we find 
a weak support for the negative impact of a two-shift system at plants B (VI-2) and C (VI-
3) and a three-shift system at plants C and D (III-5). On-site experts acknowledge that 
night shifts are usually the most exhausting working hours for the majority of the work 
force as they are opposing the human sleeping pattern. In particular, the transition from 
night shift to the subsequent day shift is exceptionally burdening. Interestingly, experts  
report that absence is lowest in night shift weeks since employees do not want to forfeit 
night shift premiums which can amount up to 30% of their normal pay (see Stein (2015) 
for empirical support). Still, we are able to partially confirm our hypothesis H14. Addi-
tional shifts significantly increase employee absence at some plants.  
Control variables (CONT) 
Although no hypotheses were derived for date and weather controls, our estimations reveal 
some interesting insights.
31
 At both volume car producers, absence rates and spell duration 
are significantly lower during most summer months from April to September in compari-
son to the reference period (January) – even when influenza activity and weather is con-
trolled for. However, this phenomenon is most likely attributable to the summer holidays 
                                                 
31
  Results for control variables are not tabulated in this paper. 
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as absence is usually not reported while being on holiday. Findings for absence frequency 
are weak and inconsistent with no clear pattern. Concerning weather, we find support for 
arguments by Shi and Skuterud (2015) who state that employees adapt their absence be-
havior to the weather conditions. At the Spanish site, we find absence rate, duration and 
frequency all increase significantly with temperature. For instance, unit-level absence spell 
duration increases by 0.47 days with each degree Celsius at the 1%-level of significance. 
This finding is in line with the impressions of on-site experts at this plant. Same results are 
found at least for absence spell duration at plant D (0.2 days, 1%-level). No other effects of 
temperature, sunshine hours and precipitation are found. In other words, we observe a link 
between weather and absence at some plants indicating that employees may adapt their 
absence behavior to favorable weather conditions. This behavior can be interpreted as 
shirking.  
In order to control for the robustness of our findings, we re-estimate our models using 
quantile regression.
32
 Although this approach delivers additional significance at some 
quantiles, overall results remain the same. Furthermore, we pool our data over all four 
plants. Yet, we fail to find overall statistical patterns. Eventually, we limit our data to units 
working in the assembly line since assembly line production is the only division that is 
observed in all four plants. Yet, this does not deliver further insights on potential determi-
nants of worker absenteeism.  
Unfortunately, our study entails limitations at some instances. First, by focusing on aggre-
gated data we gain evidence on team-level determinants of absence, yet at the expense of 
limited insights on individual-level influences. Second, although using data on absence 
spell duration and frequency to proxy for voluntary and involuntary absence, our study is 
limited in so far that both measures may contain their respective counterpart as well 
(Thomson, Griffiths, Davidson 2000). Third, we are not able to control for individual or 
group-level health conditions of employees other than by applying nation-wide WHO in-
fluenza outbreak statistics. In doing so, we are quite confident to at least proxy for em-
ployee health conditions concerning acute flu pandemics. However, we do not have an 
appropriate measure for other illnesses such as musculoskeletal disorders or stress-induced 
illnesses provoked by monotony, repetitiveness and cycle time. Yet, we assume physical as 
well as mental sicknesses to be distributed homogeneously among shop-floor teams after 
                                                 
32
  Results are not reported in this paper.  
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controlling for age and gender. Fourth, by working on monthly intervals we only provide 
evidence on determinants that are relatively stable over time (Harrison, Martocchino 
1998). Conversely, this means that daily or other short-term effects on absenteeism are 
leveled out over the aggregated monthly periods and, therefore, could not be studied in this 
paper.
33
 Fifth, we are not able to control for educational and cultural influences on absence 
behavior. This would have been particularly interesting since discussions with on-site ex-
perts have shown that absence cultures vary widely between cultural spheres. Additionally, 
we are not able to include more detailed workplace characteristics other than the imple-
mented shift system to assure the anonymity of teams. Eventually, since this paper is built 
on insider data, findings might suffer from a lack of generalizability to other working con-
ditions and organizations.  
3.6 Conclusion and Implications 
Using a hitherto unavailable data set gathered from insider econometric data of four inter-
national manufacturing plants of a large European automobile company, we are able to 
provide evidence on determinants of absenteeism. In total, we investigate team-level ab-
sence of blue-collar employees organized in 160 work units (approx. 2,150 workers). 
Based on a comprehensive literature review we derive fourteen hypotheses covering four 
main areas of potential determinants on absence: social peer influences, economic influ-
ences / incentives, worker characteristics and working conditions. We focus our analysis 
on three unit-level dimensions of absence: absence rate (percentage of scheduled time lost 
due to absence), absence spell duration (average number of days lost per absence occasion) 
and absence frequency (number of absence incidents divided by unit size). Our empirical 
analyses follow a two-stage research strategy that complements insider econometric data 
analyses with interviews with on-site experts. Interestingly, we observe effects to vary by 
production site, however, with only very few consistent findings. Since a detailed descrip-
tion of results by plant has been given throughout chapter 3.5, we refrain from recapitulat-
ing effects by site in what follows, but instead summarize the overall effects.  
Considering social level determinants, we predicted turnover to decrease absence since 
group norms are less enforceable when team composition is changing. Yet, results are 
                                                 
33
  Although empirical evidence is missing at this point, we were able to gain some anecdotal insights by 
means of the experts’ discussions. For instance, experts confirmed findings by Rosenblatt, Shapira-
Lishchinsky and Shirom (2010) of increased absence around school holidays and weekends (“Monday 
morning flu”). At one plant, experts could also identify higher absence rates at match days of the local 
soccer team in the affected shift and, thus, support arguments by Thoursie (2004). 
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pointing in the opposite direction, presumably due to a feeling of uncertainty and the lack 
of an overall team spirit in teams with high turnover. In accordance with our expectations, 
we observe absence to increase with unit size. Although results may suggest shirking, we 
follow on-site experts in arguing that line managers’ attendance management may be more 
caring and familiar in smaller teams. With regard to peer effects, the share of temporary 
team mates is positively related to voluntary absence of permanent workers, presumably 
due to shirking. Surprisingly, the share of workers with health impairments fails to reach 
statistical significance in all model specifications. Evidence on economic influences and 
incentives reveals the expected positive link between employment protection laws and 
absence. In other words, workers tend to increase their absence behavior when feeling pro-
tected by strict employee rights. Moreover, we hypothesized a negative relationship be-
tween absence and outside options expressed by national (un)employment figures. Surpris-
ingly, we observe this relation to be inconclusive. Furthermore, we are able to confirm the 
expected positive link between prosperity level and absence behavior. This effect seems to 
be attributable to a certain feeling of job security since on-site experts observed the inverse 
relationship during the financial crises of the previous years. We were not able to properly 
study the effects of national sickness benefit systems on absence since the company at 
hand grants additional sick pay to compensate for weaknesses in statutory sickness bene-
fits. As a consequence, differences in national legislation are leveled out. Regarding work-
er characteristics, results suggest that absenteeism increases with the share of female em-
ployees within a unit. According to on-site experts, this effect is to a large degree attribut-
able to the double burden of work and family obligations which is even today substantially 
more pronounced for females than for males. For some sites, we were able to confirm the 
predicted positive relationship between age and absence rate and spell duration. Thus, it 
seems that meeting workplace burdens is substantially more demanding with age. Yet, 
against our expectations we observe weak evidence that voluntary absence, too, increases 
with age. Results for mean organizational tenure and acute health conditions expressed by 
national influenza outbreak statistics are inconclusive. Consistent with the hypothesized 
relationship, we find two-shift as well as three-shift systems to induce significantly higher 
absence than the standard one-shift system. According to on-site experts this effect is 
largely attributable to the non-correspondence of working hours and human bio-rhythm as 
well as social life. All findings are robust on various specifications and survive a large 
number of robustness checks.  
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Subsequent to the data analyses, we conduct a total of 18 expert interviews at both interna-
tional plants with shop floor staff, worker representatives, line supervisors and HR manag-
ers in order to double-check our own experience from the national plants. These interviews 
helped us to further interpret our results and to learn more about the instruments of attend-
ance management in practice at other locations. Based on our empirical findings and the 
practical experience of on-site experts, we yield some important implications that may help 
to increase both overall health conditions and attendance of blue-collar workers.  
The results on unit size seem to suggest that small units are advantageous over large units 
in terms of employee attendance. As discussed, we predicted this phenomenon to arise 
from better shirking options in larger teams. However, we learned from experts that quality 
of and familiarity within the manager-employee relationship is moderated by team size. 
We, therefore, suggest managers to invest in developing trustful and sincere social ties 
with their subordinates based on a fair and open culture. Of course, building up intensive 
relations within teams requires time line managers usually do not have. Thus, we call for 
HR and plant management to support line managers by granting a sufficient amount of 
time to invest in socializing with their teams. We believe the long-term outcomes in terms 
of reduced absenteeism will leverage any initial time loss.  
With regard to economic influences it seems to be infeasible for a company to take actions 
since politics (e.g. sickness benefits, employment protection) as well as overall economic 
situation (e.g. unemployment, prosperity level) are usually out of the range of influence of 
a company. Yet, it might be a reasonable strategy to openly communicate the current eco-
nomic situation of the company, in particular the competitiveness on the global markets, to 
the employees to increase their awareness of potential menaces. This could motivate em-
ployees who feel too secure. As mentioned above, both international plants compensate for 
weaknesses in statutory sick pay by offering additional sickness benefits. However, at one 
site employees with more than three non-work related absence occasions per 12 months 
are getting an official warning and are withheld additional sickness benefits on their next 
absence incident (repeated absence arising from known long-term sicknesses e.g. cancer is 
not taken into account). According to on-site experts, this policy has proven to be success-
ful in reducing absence frequency. Overall, empirical evidence on environmental determi-
nants is pointing in the direction that drawing international comparisons of absence figures 
within the company might be biased due to national variance in laws and economic situa-
tions. In other words, critical assessments of international locations are not necessarily 
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accurate and true and, as a consequence, policy decisions based on international compari-
sons may be misleading.  
In response to empirical evidence confirming the predicted positive link between age and 
absence, we emphasize the importance of harnessing all possible health-promoting poten-
tials in ergonomic workplace design and occupational health care (OHC). We 
acknowledge that at all four plants working conditions are constantly improving in terms 
of ergonomics. Additionally, it seems important to mention that medical attendance of 
musculoskeletal illnesses by OHC is very comprehensive and high in quality. The same is 
true for medical check-ups offered to employees for free in the company’s on-site OHC 
centers. However, we learned from local experts that work-related and non-work related 
mental stressors are of increasing importance even in manufacturing. Experts reveal that 
on-site OHC centers still lag in developing a strategy to treat stress-induced illnesses as 
comprehensively as musculoskeletal illnesses. Moreover, some findings emphasize the 
advantageousness of teams that are mixed with regard to age since younger worker can 
benefit from older ones and vice versa. It, therefore, seems reasonable to yield a heteroge-
neous team composition. 
Considering empirical evidence suggesting females to suffer from the job-family double 
burden more than men it seems important to support families in dealing with the reconcili-
ation of work and family life. From on-site experts we learned that a different set of sup-
porting activities is in practice at each site. Instruments that enhance individual flexibility 
have proven particularly helpful in increasing attendance of parents. We, therefore, suggest 
offering parents high flexibility given organizational constrains. For instance, at one loca-
tion parents can work reduced hours even when working shifts. Here, two persons on re-
duced shifts share one job. In situations where both parents are employed on the shop 
floor, they are offered opposing shifts if necessary to guarantee child care around the 
clock. At some plants, employees can use dependency leave (or third-party leave) when 
children or elders are ill and need intensive care. Although third-party leave has proven to 
be very useful in allowing parents to care for their sick children without having to fake 
own illnesses, employees report that making use of this instrument is often criticized by 
supervisors and HR. Greater understanding seems to be necessary at this point.  
Eventually, our findings on shift systems prompt the thought that shift-work should be 
avoided as we observe two-shift and three-shift systems to increase absenteeism in com-
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parison to the normal one-shift (day) systems. Yet, from local experts we learn that it is 
sometimes preferable to add a second or third shift to better distribute workload instead of 
using overtime. If shift work is unavoidable, it seems important to follow the latest scien-
tific insights on healthy shift work design.  
In general, the findings of this work depict an important contribution to (personnel) eco-
nomics absence research. In particular, we benefit from exceptional and unique insider 
data that allow for comprehensive econometric analyses. However, in this study we only 
observe automobile workers. As a consequence, we might suffer from selection bias that 
entails endogeneity problems – yet a common issue in insider econometric studies. We, 
therefore, encourage other researchers to further study absenteeism in different organiza-
tional contexts in order to gain a comprehensive idea of the functioning of employee ab-
senteeism and to refine ways to manage attendance.   
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4 ON THE ROAD AGAIN: CROWDING-OUT EFFECTS OF EXTRIN-
SIC MOTIVATION IN COMMERCIAL TRUCKING 
4.1 Introduction 
Today, the use of variable compensation schemes in the form of exogenous financial in-
centives has become a common practice in organizations to align interests of principals 
and agents.
34
 In this paper, we seek to study how extrinsic rewards may influence employ-
ee effort choice decisions and, thus, worker productivity. We analyze performance under 
varying incentive schemes based on unique data on commercial truck drivers. The trucking 
industry appears particularly suitable for this purpose since the carrier-driver relationship 
represents the classic principal-agent setting as modeled by economic theory (e.g. Oyer, 
Schaefer 2011) with agents producing their output far beyond the monitoring range of the 
principal.
35
 Additionally, truck driver performance is entirely achieved on an individual 
level and, therefore, is not prone to any kind of team bias.
36
 To solve this very specific 
principal-agent problem, asset ownership is often considered a particularly cheap and effi-
cient monitoring instrument. Yet, its applicability is limited since truck drivers are as-
sumed to be risk averse and limited in their access to capital (e.g. Arrunada, Gonzalez-
Diaz, Fernandez 2004, Nickerson, Silverman 2003, Sheikh 2007). Recently, modern GPS-
based fleet management systems advance driver monitoring from only observing the sim-
ple output (e.g. arrival time and goods carried) to more comprehensive real-time surveil-
lance of driver performance while on the road (e.g. Baker, Hubbard 2004, Barla et al. 
2010, Hubbard 2000). This allows for new approaches in incentive design for drivers.  
Trucking is, by and large, an increasingly competitive business environment for haulers as 
well as drivers. Nowadays, fuel costs account for around 30% of the total life-cycle costs 
of a heavy duty truck (e.g. Schittler 2003). In this situation, findings that only slightly in-
crease operational efficiency may leverage profitability and, therefore, are appreciated by 
practitioners. At the same time, the road transportation industry is a substantial consumer 
                                                 
34
  Exogenous material incentives as understood in this paper to comprise any wage configurations that at 
least partially involve variable remuneration such as bonus payments, piece rates and pay for perfor-
mance schemes. Although not existent in the organizational setting at hand, there might be non-monetary 
extrinsic incentives as well (see, for instance, seminal papers on tournaments by Rosen (1986) and career 
concerns by Fama (1980)).  
35
  Vernon and Meier (2012) discuss the peculiarities of principal-agent settings in trucking in more detail.  
36
  Still, exogenous influences determine driving behavior to a large extent, e.g. weather, road conditions and 
traffic density. Research that does not include these confounding impacts most likely provides incorrect 
and fallacious conclusions. Thanks to our extensive data, we are able to control for various external influ-
ences. All control variables are discussed in the remainder of this paper.  
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of fossil fuels. Within the EU, CO2 emissions of heavy duty vehicles – trucks, buses and 
coaches – have increased by 36% between 1990 and 2010 and now account for about 25% 
of overall CO2 emissions and 5% of all greenhouse gas emissions from road transport (Eu-
ropean Commission 2014a). Thus, motivating commercial truck drivers to adapt fuel effi-
cient driving provides a promising opportunity to contribute significantly to the reduction 
of both fuel consumption and CO2 emissions for economic and environmental benefits. 
This is where monetary incentives for drivers come into play.  
Academic theory knows two opposing effects of exogenous incentives on motivation. 
Classic personnel economics theory assumes exogenous incentives to increase employee 
effort choice and productivity by aligning the interests of principals and agents (e.g. Gib-
bons, Roberts 2013, Oyer, Schaefer 2011). There is broad empirical and experimental evi-
dence on this issue in varying organizational settings (e.g. Kahn, Silva, Ziliak 2001, Lavy 
2002, 2009, Lazear 2000b, Shearer 2004). Nevertheless, behavioral incentive theory as-
sumes exogenous incentives to crowd out intrinsic or social motives that are found to be 
equally important in determining employee effort choice and productivity (e.g. Bénabou, 
Tirole 2003, 2006, Gneezy, Meier, Rey-Biel 2011). As a consequence, overall employee 
performance might be lower when being monetarily incentivized. Again, there is compre-
hensive support for these arguments in the literature (e.g. Ariely, Bracha, Meier 2009, 
Frey, Oberholzer-Gee 1997, Gneezy, Rustichini 2000a, 2000b).  
In response to the concurrent theoretical assumptions and the conflicting findings on the 
effects of extrinsic incentives, this study aims at analyzing employee effort choice deci-
sions under varying incentive schemes given the specific organizational setting of the 
trucking industry. We use hitherto unavailable data on the performance of 37 commercial 
truck drivers. Data is gathered from the GPS-based fleet management system of an in-
house hauler of a large European truck manufacturer. The particular features of this re-
search are twofold. First, in contrast to most studies on extrinsic incentives we do not focus 
on the introduction of a bonus pay scheme, but on its abolition. Second, our analyses are 
based on four performance measures recorded by in-vehicle computers of the hauler’s fleet 
management system that collect real-time information on truck positioning, technical pa-
rameters and driving behavior. This data allows us to contribute to the ongoing discussion 
on the benefits and pitfalls of extrinsic incentives. If classic personnel economics theory 
holds true, we expect drivers to perform worse after the incentives are abolished. In con-
trast, if behavioral incentive theory holds true, we expect driver performance to increase 
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although drivers are no longer extrinsically incentivized. The empirical evidence of this 
work reveals a significant increase in driver performance after incentives have been abol-
ished, independent of the performance measure. Thus, our findings confirm assumptions 
stated by behavioral incentive theory as extrinsic incentives are shown to reduce employee 
performance. Following previous research (e.g. Frey 1994, Frey, Oberholzer-Gee 1997, 
Gneezy, Meier, Rey-Biel 2011), we attribute this phenomenon to the crowding-out effect 
of extrinsic incentives. Other important intrinsic motives – such as internal competition or 
drivers’ environmental believes – are literally bought off by monetary incentives.  
With this study, we contribute to the literature in several regards. First, we add to the cur-
rent discussion on the advantages and drawbacks of extrinsic incentives on worker produc-
tivity by extending the empirical literature on employees’ effort choice decisions under 
different incentive schemes. Our findings confirm the crowding-out approach suggested by 
behavioral incentive theory. Second, while numerous studies analyze the switch from fixed 
pay to performance pay (e.g. Lazear 2000b, Shearer 2004), little evidence is provided on 
situations where incentives are completely abolished. One of the few exceptions is a study 
by Freeman and Kleiner (2005) who study the change from piece rate pay to hourly wages. 
As a result, they observe a significant productivity loss. We add to their research by offer-
ing a comprehensive analysis of employees’ behavioral responses to the abolition of ex-
trinsic incentives. Third, to our knowledge we are the first to use truck driver performance 
data gathered by modern GPS-based fleet management systems to analyze employee be-
havior. This seems surprising since this data consists of broad objective performance in-
formation. We, therefore, hope to pave its way into personnel economics. Finally, our 
work contributes to the emerging insider econometrics approach introduced in seminal 
papers by Ichniowski, Shaw and Prennushi (1997) as well as Lazear (2000b). This ap-
proach applies elaborate econometric methods to (panel) data of only one organization. 
Thus, it delivers high-quality findings on a micro-perspective, yet at the expense of a lim-
ited generalizability. 
This paper proceeds as follows. The next paragraph discusses the two competing theories 
on the impact of extrinsic incentives on employee behavior. Section three describes the 
unique organizational setting of this study while section four explores the estimation strat-
egy as well as the results of our econometric analyzes. Eventually, section five offers an 
interpretation and final concluding remarks.  
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4.2 Theoretical Framework 
Exogenous incentives within organizations may affect employee behavior and worker 
productivity in two ways. First, extrinsic rewards trigger workers to behave as intended by 
the employer by means of a direct price effect (e.g. Lazear 2000b, Shearer 2004). Second, 
at the same time exogenous incentives induce psychological impacts that function against 
the price effect by crowding out the intended behavioral response (e.g. Frey, 1994, 
Gneezy, Meier, Rey-Biel 2011). On the basis of these assumptions, two competing theo-
ries are discussed. On the one hand, personnel economics theory broadly supports the prize 
effect argument of increasing effort and productivity if employees are incentivized exoge-
nously. Thus, monetary rewards are assumed to reduce information asymmetries in classic 
principal-agent settings by aligning the interests of principals and agents (e.g. Oyer, 
Schaefer 2011). On the other hand, behavioral incentive theory reckons the existence of a 
crowding-out effect that presumes exogenous incentives to undermine intrinsic motivation 
and, thus, to decrease employee effort and productivity. Experimental and empirical evi-
dence on both conceptions is broad and convincing over different research settings. In the 
following, we will discuss both theoretical approaches and offer a brief review of the re-
spective findings discussed in the literature.  
Classic personnel economics theory is built on the assumption that human beings respond 
to exogenous incentives by increasing their individual effort (contract theory).
37
 Agency 
theory is centered on the interaction of a principal who motivates one or more agents to 
perform a task, e.g. by paying a monetary wage. While the agents bear all costs of effort in 
terms of individual disutility, the principal entirely benefits from the employees’ produc-
tivity. Thus, as long as not otherwise motivated, agents will not choose effort levels above 
those minimum requirements that ensure persistent salary. In this situation, monetary in-
centives in terms of pay for performance may align the interests of principal and agents by 
linking, at least partially, compensation to effort. In other words, agents’ maximum utility 
changes with higher effort levels. Still, the principal might not be able to measure employ-
ee effort efficiently and, therefore, information asymmetries may arise. Again, exogenous 
incentives may help to overcome information asymmetries by deterring agents from shirk-
ing (for a detailed discussion of incentives in principal-agent settings see, among others, 
                                                 
37
  According to Lazear (2000b) it is a “cornerstone of the theory in personnel economics that workers re-
spond to incentives” (p. 1346). Other authors regard monetary incentives as „the essence of economics“ 
(Prendergast 1999, p. 7) or a “central tenet of economics” (Bénabou, Tirole 2003, p. 489). 
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Gibbons 1998, Gibbons, Roberts 2013, Oyer, Schaefer 2011). There is broad experimental 
and empirical evidence that exogenous incentives enhance productivity.  
In his seminal paper on windshield installers Lazear (2000b) observes productivity to in-
crease by on average 44% after the company shifted from fixed wages to piece-rate pay. 
However, only half of this raise seems to be attributable to individual-level productivity 
gains induced by pay for performance compensation.
38
 In a field experiment, Shearer 
(2004) finds a similar price effect observing a more than 20% productivity increase for tree 
planters following the introduction of a piece rate incentive scheme. Studying the perfor-
mance of fruit-pickers, Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul (2005) report a 50% productivity 
increase as a response to a shift from relative performance incentives to piece-rate pay. 
They argue that under relative incentives good workers retain performance to favor their 
less able colleagues. For the same data, Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul (2009) find evi-
dence that managers prefer workers they are socially connected with as long as they are 
paid fixed wages. However, when receiving incentives based on their subordinates perfor-
mance, managers seem to favor the most able workers regardless of any social ties. Kahn, 
Silva and Ziliak (2001) study the introduction of a performance incentive program that 
compensates Brazilian tax officials for collecting taxes and uncovering tax violation. They 
find a 75% increase in fines per incident once the pay for performance program had been 
launched. Likewise, Fernie and Metcalf (1999) confirm the incentivizing effects of per-
formance pay for jockeys. Based on an experiment on schoolteachers, Lavy (2009) reports 
teachers to respond to pay for performance schemes since pupils’ academic achievements 
(e.g. conditional pass rate, mean test scores) improved significantly when teachers received 
bonus payments based on their classes’ performance. Further evidence on the price effect 
following the introduction of exogenous incentives is given among others by Booth and 
Frank (1999) as well as Cadsby, Fei and Tapon (2007). The same pattern holds true for 
changes in incentive schemes that are unfavorable to employees: Freeman and Kleiner 
(2005) observe a significant decrease in productivity on the firm-level after one of the last 
shoe manufacturers in the US switched from piece rate pay to fixed pay.   
                                                 
38
  The other half is attributable to self-selection effects since the company is able to attract a more qualified 
workforce due the new incentive scheme. 
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In addition to studies on individual incentives, there is large support for the existence of a 
price effect at the group- or company-level, too.
39
 For instance, fairly recent evidence is 
provided by Lavy (2002) on schools and student performance, Knez and Simester (2001) 
on company-wide incentives at Continental Airline, Jones, Kalmi and Kauhanen (2010) on 
production lines of a Finnish food-processing firm, Jones and Kato (1995) on bonuses and 
stock option plans at 109 Japanese companies, Boning, Ichniowski and Shaw (2007) on 
production lines in US minimills and more general Zenger and Marshall (2000) on the de-
terminants of incentive intensity of team incentives as well as Che and Yoo (2001) on the 
general power of group-incentives.  
Despite the broad support for the productivity enhancing effects of incentives and perfor-
mance pay at the individual-level and the group-level (see Gibbons (1997) and Prendergast 
(1999) for detailed overviews), there are some difficulties in terms of hidden economic 
costs associated with performance incentives, too. First, individual incentives at least par-
tially shift the risk from employers on to employees. In order to still meet the employees’ 
participation constraints, employers need to compensate employees for taking the risk (e.g. 
Oyer, Schaefer 2011). As a consequence, overall labor costs increase to the disadvantage 
of firm profitability. Second, monetary incentives might shift employees’ attention from 
task activity towards task outcome. Moreover, employees might focus only on those tasks 
whose outcomes are actually rewarded and put less or none effort on other tasks (e.g. 
Holmström, Milgrom 1991, Baker 1992). Overall performance might suffer. Third, based 
on data on Canadian tree planters, Paarsch and Shearer (2000) find that at least some part 
of an incentive-induced quantity increase comes at the expense of a reduction in quality. 
This argument is confirmed among others by Frick, Götzen and Simmons (2013) who ob-
serve German steel workers to increase output after the introduction of monetary incen-
tives by means of reducing product quality. Fourth, further hidden costs may arise from 
cheating and shirking employees that aim to fully benefit from the incentive. For instance, 
Jacob and Levitt (2003) show that at least some schoolteachers cheat on their students’ test 
scores when incentivized for good class results. To avoid shirking, it seems to be important 
to examine variables that may interact with financial rewards in affecting task perfor-
mance. This argument suggests incentive pay plans to work best when matched with com-
                                                 
39
  Although group-based incentives are prone to free-riding by employees (Holmström 1982), peer pressure 
and mutual monitoring might offset free-riding at least in small groups (e.g. Kandel, Lazear 1992). How-
ever, we do not intend to discuss group-based incentives in this study in detail.  
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plementary HRM practices (e.g. Jones, Kalmi, Kauhanen 2010, Ichniowski, Shaw, Pren-
nushi 1997). 
However, in recent years starting with the now seminal work by Deci (1971) psychologists 
have raised doubts on the benefits of incentives as praised by agency theory. Based on lab 
experiments on puzzle tasks as well as a field experiment on a campus newspaper’s head-
line staff, Deci (1971) finds intrinsic motivation to decrease as soon as monetary incentives 
come into play. He concludes that financial rewards buy off – or crowd out – intrinsic mo-
tivation. Within the last decades, more and more economists have addressed this issue and 
presented extensive experimental and empirical evidence on the existence of the crowding-
out effect. Hence, a new strand of theory has evolved that Gibbons and Roberts (2013, p. 
90) refer to as behavioral incentive theory. The behavioral approach to incentive theory 
assumes peoples’ actions to be not entirely attributable to material motives. Rather, they 
are a multidimensional consequence of intrinsic, extrinsic and reputational incentives (e.g. 
Bénabou, Tirole 2006). However, the introduction of extrinsic incentives may prove detri-
mental to overall employee effort and performance. Since extrinsic incentives may crowd 
out other motives that are also important in determining employee effort, extrinsic incen-
tives may backfire and undermine the very behavior they intend to encourage.
40
 As a con-
sequence, with extrinsic incentives in practice employee productivity may be lower in 
comparison to a non-incentive environment. Put differently, monetary incentives that are 
often framed by economists as positive reinforcers of employee behavior may rather func-
tion as negative reinforcers (Bénabou, Tirole 2003).  
In the literature, there are two main reasons discussed that may trigger the crowding-out 
effect of exogenous incentives (e.g. Gneezy, Meier, Rey-Biel 2011). First, the principal 
can be assumed to be best informed about the peculiarities of a contracted task. When set-
ting incentives he should value both the task characteristics as well as the presumed ability 
of the agent to fulfill the task. Given these considerations, the introduction of an incentive 
might signal negative task characteristics to the agent and reduce his intrinsic motivation 
(e.g. Bénabou, Tirole 2003, Gneezy, Meier, Rey-Biel 2011). Furthermore, agents might 
sense a lack of trust if the principal feels the need to incentivize them extrinsically. Feeling 
or even being controlled is likewise found to reduce intrinsic motivation (e.g. Deci, Ryan 
1985, Falk, Kosfeld 2006). Second, following the multidimensional construct of employee 
                                                 
40
  A substantial body of literature extends the theoretical considerations on this issue (e.g. Besley, Ghatak 
2005, Ellingsen, Johannesson 2008, Prendergast 2008). 
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motivation proposed by Bénabou and Tirole (2006), one can expect extrinsic incentives to 
undermine other intrinsic or social incentives that motivate employees. A related body of 
work discusses crowding-out to arise among others from social preferences such as altru-
ism (e.g. Frey 1994), social concerns about one’s image, reputation and status (e.g. Ariely, 
Bracha, Meier 2009, Bénabou, Tirole 2006, Ellingsen, Johannesson 2008), the desire to 
reciprocate (e.g. Fehr, Falk 2002), trust (e.g. Sliwka 2007), effort norms and peer effects 
(e.g. Falk, Ichino 2006, Mas, Moretti 2009), but also individual values, beliefs and goals 
(e.g. Young, Beckman, Baker 2012), and the task itself (e.g. Frey 1997).
41
 Hence, for both 
reasons, monetary incentives are expected to negatively affect an agents’ intrinsic or social 
motivation and, as a consequence, reduce worker productivity. 
The theory is backed by broad empirical evidence that confirms the existence of the 
crowding-out effect. One of the first related contributions is work by Titmuss (1970) who 
argues that paying monetary incentives to blood donors reduces blood supply since exoge-
nous rewards crowd out other motives. This argument was confirmed in later studies by 
Mellström and Johannesson (2008) as well as Lacetera and Macis (2010). Based on two 
experiments, Gneezy and Rustichini (2000a) state that offering monetary incentives to in-
dividuals decreases their individual performance. First, students that are offered monetary 
incentives for each correct answer in IQ-questionnaires are performing worse unless the 
money paid per correct answer reaches a high enough level. This implies that performance 
incentives need to exceed some critical amount to do any good.
42
 Second, students that are 
rewarded financially for voluntary work reduce their performance. According to the au-
thors the material incentives replace students’ intrinsic motivation as well as their motiva-
tion through social approval. Frey, Oberholzer-Gee and Eichenberger (1996) as well as 
Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997) survey Swiss citizens confronted with governmental 
plans of regional nuclear waste repositories. They observe citizens’ support for the reposi-
tories to drop by half when offered public compensation. This emphasizes the argument 
that agents interpret incentives as compensation for negative consequences only the princi-
pal is aware of. Furthermore, Ariely, Bracha and Meier (2009) find monetary incentives to 
crowd out image concerns. They argue that people do not respond to highly visible extrin-
                                                 
41
  Further empirical evidence on non-monetary incentives is extensive (e.g. Charness, 2004, DellaVigna, 
List, Malmendier 2012, Falk 2007). 
42
  This result finds support in a recent study on contingent and non-contingent incentives. Surveys send to 
respondents either contained a reward or only promised a reward. Again, (contingent) incentives that are 
too small may undermine the intended behavior (Gneezy, Rey-Biel 2014). 
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sic incentives for prosocial behavior since this might be interpreted as pursuing self-
interests by their peers.  
Moreover, a substantial body of the literature suggests that negative impacts of monetary 
incentives are not limited to measurable performance. In experiments settled around a gift-
exchange game, Fehr and Gächter (2002) provide evidence that voluntary cooperation is 
largely undermined in incentive contract situations in comparison to non-incentive contract 
situations.
43
 Burks, Carpenter, Goette (2009) confirm this argument for Swiss bicycle mes-
sengers. Working with incentives in terms of penalties, Fehr and List (2004) conduct trust 
game experiments on both CEOs and students. They find that incentives penalizing shirk-
ing behavior may entail hidden costs in terms of less trustworthy behavior. In a field study, 
Gneezy and Rustichini (2000b) analyze the introduction of a monetary fine designed to 
incentivize parents to pick up their children from a private day-care center on time. In con-
trast to the expectations, late pickups significantly increased to twice the initial size after 
the fine was introduced. Again, incentives did not yield the desired effect. Further evidence 
on crowding-out of extrinsic incentives either in form of rewards or fines is given among 
others by Carpenter and Myers (2010), Georgellis, Iossa and Tabvuma (2011) as well as 
Reeson and Tisdell (2008). Several meta-analyses further support the crowding-out effect 
of monetary incentives (e.g. Deci, Koestner, Ryan 1999, Rummel, Feinberg 1988, Tang, 
Hall 1995, Wiersma 1992). 
In summary, classic personnel economics theory expects monetary incentives to align in-
terests of principals and agents and, therefore, to increase employee effort choice decisions 
and performance. In contrast to this assumption, behavioral incentive theory suggests ex-
trinsic rewards to crowd out other intrinsic and social incentives that are equally important 
in motivating employees. As a consequence, overall employee effort and performance 
might be lower under extrinsic incentives. Given both theoretical assumptions, our aim is 
to analyze how incentives may affect worker performance and productivity. In the organi-
zational setting at hand, commercial truck drivers were incentivized by the introduction of 
a monetary reward for meeting the company’s performance targets. After two years in 
practice, the incentive scheme was abolished by the company. If classic economic theory 
holds true we would expect a better performance while incentives were in practice due to 
the price effect of exogenous rewards. Thus, we should observe a decrease in worker per-
                                                 
43
  This finding is not limited to financial rewards. Drago and Garvey (1998) tested helping behavior at work 
and observed a negative link between promotion incentives and helping behavior.   
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formance and productivity after the monetary incentives are abolished. However, if behav-
ioral incentive theory proves true, we expect to find a reduced performance while bonus 
pay is in practice due to crowding-out. In other words, we should observe performance to 
increase after the incentives are abolished since drivers might draw their motivation from 
other intrinsic or social motives when no longer financially incentivized.  
4.3 Data Set and Descriptive Statistics 
In this paper we seek to analyze behavioral responses of workers to shifts from a bonus 
pay scheme to a non-incentive environment. Therefore, we use a hitherto unavailable panel 
data set that includes trip-wise performance information of commercial long-haul truck 
drivers of an in-house hauler of a large European truck manufacturer. The data is based on 
information recorded by GPS-based in-vehicle computers of the hauler’s fleet management 
system. Performance data covers an extended period of thirty-six months (January 2011 to 
December 2013). With the beginning of the observation window, the hauler installed a 
monetary performance premium to reward good driver performance. However, after two 
years in practice, the hauler decided to disestablish the incentive scheme again.  
Within the organizational structure of the parent company, the hauler realizes just-in-time 
delivery of intermediate goods from one production plant of the truck manufacturer to an-
other. While on the road, drivers travel roughly 1,250 kilometers across four Northern Eu-
ropean countries. To comply with drivers’ mandatory resting periods44, the total distance is 
split up into two stages with a fixed location for the drivers to rest. At this location, the 
hauler operates a premise that provides sleeping, cooking and sporting facilities for drivers 
during their rest. Upon their arrival at the location, drivers pass on their trucks to another 
driver who continues the journey on the very same truck. In other words, driver A arrives 
at the resting location, where driver B has just finished his mandatory rest. Driver B takes 
over the truck and immediately drives on to the final destination, whereas driver A stays 
for his rest and awaits the arrival of the next truck to continue his journey. Thus, drivers 
travel a round-trip with four stages on four different trucks before returning home. This 
procedure secures just-in-time supply of goods without transferring the company’s ware-
                                                 
44
  Due to European road haulage regulations drivers are not allowed to exceed 9 hours of driving per day 
with a subsequent mandatory rest period of at least 11 hours. There are few exceptions enabling drivers to 
break these regulations in order to react to current traffic conditions or short-term workload peaks (Euro-
pean Commission 2014b). 
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house on to the streets. Obviously, driver-truck sorting in this setting is totally random 
since drivers are required to take the next truck available without having any choice.   
Our initial data set includes 81 commercial truck drivers resulting in n=11,439 driver-trip 
observations.
45
 We focus exclusively on drivers on permanent contracts to avoid confound-
ing effects attributable to incentives arising from temporary contract characteristics as ob-
served in other studies (e.g. chapter five of this thesis, Bradley, Green, Leeves 2012). All 
trucks are reported to be deployed almost exclusively on long-haul assignments from one 
production facility to the other. To fully exclude short-haul assignments we restrict the 
data to trips with a length between 520 kilometers and 720 kilometers. We selected this 
range since the two production facilities are 570 km respectively 670 km away from the 
resting facility.
46
 Moreover, we exclude those observations with a reported fuel consump-
tion outside the range of minus two times and plus four times the standard deviation 
around the mean. Finally, we only include those drivers that we can observe at least on 80 
trips during the observation period (i.e. approximately four to five months of regular driv-
ing) and that have experienced the incentive scheme for at least three months. These con-
straints reduce the initial dataset thirty-seven truck drivers and n=6,825 observations.
47
  
We merged the trip-wise performance information with demographic data of drivers (age, 
gender and tenure). It appears from the summary statistics presented in Table 4.1 that the 
sample is dominated by male drivers, a fact that comes as no surprise in the trucking indus-
try. Still, three female drivers are included in the data accounting for 580 observations 
(8.5% of total observations). Reported driver age covers almost the entire working life 
span from 22 to 64 years (mean=44.08, s.d.=11.07). This variance allows for a thorough 
analysis of potential age effects. Tenure as a proxy for driving experience is included on a 
monthly level given the exact date a driver joined the company (mean=25.59 months, 
s.d.=12.02). Since we exclude drivers from the sample that are employed on a temporary 
contract, employment status is similar for all drivers. Moreover, we could neglect any cul-
                                                 
45
  The panel data set is unbalanced due to driver and vehicle turnover during the observation period. For 
instance, at this company trucks are replaced after a total mileage of 1m kilometers.  
46
  We extended both distances by +/- 50km to account for drivers who exceed the maximum allowed driv-
ing time before reaching their destination or need to take alternative routes due to construction work or 
traffic congestion.  
47
  However, not all models could be estimated with the full data set since not all vehicles are equipped with 
the latest version of the relevant on-board communication units. Hence, incomplete information produces 
missing values at some instances. 
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tural differences due to the fact that all drivers originate from the country domestic to the 
hauler. 
Table 4.1: Summary Statistics - Driver Demographics 
Variable mean s.d. min. max. 
Driver Age (in years) 44.08 11.07 22 64 
Driver Gender (male=1) .915 - 0 1 
Driver Tenure (in month) 25.59 12.02 1 64 
Bonus (Bonus=1) .58 - 0 1 
Number of drivers: 37 
Number of driver-trip observations: 6,825 
The GPS-based in-vehicle computers provide the hauler with extensive real-time infor-
mation offering considerable opportunities to manage and monitor fleet activities including 
truck positioning, fuel consumption, driving behavior, truck handling and vehicle status. 
Table 4.2 presents the fuel consumption in liters per 100 km (mean=27.89 l, s.d.=3.02 l) as 
well as a shortlist of the most important driving variables (e.g. brake applications, speed-
ing, average speed, maximum speed).  
Table 4.2: Summary Statistics - Driving Style 
Variable mean s.d. min. max. 
Fuel Consumption (in l/100 km) 27.89 3.02 21.2 39 
Average Speed (in km/h) 75.32 3.34 42.1 84.7 
Idling (in % of engine running time) .023 .02 .002 .238 
Coasting (in % of engine running time) .14 .05 .007 .399 
Speeding (in % of engine running time) .079 .11 0 .892 
Brake Applications (# per 100km) 12.62 7.83 .2 149.1 
Harsh Brake Applications (# per 100km) .11 .25 0 10.1 
Harsh Accelerations (# per 100km) .07 .27 0 4.3 
Maximum Vehicle Speed (in km/h) 96.23 5.55 84 114 
Number of drivers: 37 
Number of driver-trip observations: 6,825 
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The descriptive data already reveal interesting insights. First, idling – which is often la-
beled to be one of the most important determinants of fuel combustion (e.g. Lutsey et al. 
2004) – is not of major relevance in the organizational setting at hand (mean=2.3% of en-
gine running time). This might be due to the fact that drivers spend most of their time on 
highways and rarely face stop-and-go traffic in cities. Second, drivers are required by na-
tional legislation of the transit countries to drive 80 km/h at max. However, maximum val-
ues for average speed (max=84.7 km/h) and maximum vehicle speed (max=114 km/h) 
suggest that drivers override national speed limits occasionally. This might indicate that at 
times drivers need to catch up for traffic-induced delays to secure just-in-time supply. 
Third, the simple min-max comparison of several driving parameters reveals a high heter-
ogeneity (e.g. brake applications vary from .2 to 149.1 per 100 km). This indicates that 
driving style might to a large degree be influenced by exogenous effects such as traffic 
density or weather conditions. To address these issues we add external information to the 
data that enables us to control for exogenous conditions. All controls will be discussed in 
detail in the next section. 
Based on the information recorded by its in-vehicle devices, the fleet management soft-
ware is programmed to compute scores that assess driver performance in relation to target 
values predefined by the hauler. These scores cover drivers’ anticipation behavior, choice 
of gear, use of brakes and hill driving behavior.
48
 In addition, the software uses these 
scores as well as further driving parameters to assess overall driver performance for each 
trip as being either “good”, “mediocre” or “poor”. Expressed by a green-yellow-red traffic 
light visualization, the trip evaluation is reported back to the hauler via the fleet manage-
ment system. For transparency reasons, all results are accessible for all drivers via an 
online tool. Although fuel consumption is not directly evaluated by the software, a “good” 
driving behavior is congruent with an eco-friendly driving style. It appears from Table 4.3 
that driving scores on average display high means varying from 63% to 81%. Yet, we 
question the choice of gear score since a mean of 97% appears to arise from the usage of 
automatic transmission vehicles in the majority of the fleet. The limited number of obser-
vations on this score fits this picture. Concerning the traffic light evaluation scores, exactly 
half of all trips are evaluated as being “good” (50%), while slightly fewer trips are reported 
as being “poor” (45%). Only a small number is rated as being “mediocre” (5%).  
                                                 
48
  The underlying algorithms that assess driver performance and generate scores are corporate secrets and 
were not revealed to us. 
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Table 4.3: Summary Statistics - Traffic Light Performance Evaluation Tool 
Variable mean s.d. min. max. Observations* 
Driving Scores      
Anticipation (Score in %/100) .81 .16 0 1 5,251 
Choice Gear (Score in %/100) .97 .14 0 1 3,673 
Use Brakes (Score in %/100) .77 .19 .1 1 5,064 
Hill Drive (Score in %/100) .63 .25 0 1 5,028 
Trip Evaluation      
Overall (1=green, 2=yellow,   
3=red) 
1.94 .97 1 3 6,801 
Good (yes=1) .50 - 0 1 - 
Mediocre (yes=1) .05 - 0 1 - 
Poor (yes=1) .45 - 0 1 - 
 Number of drivers: 37 
*Varying number of observations since not all on-board computers report complete data at all instances. 
For an overview of mean, standard deviation, as well as within and between variance of all 
dependent variables listed separately for the period with incentives in practice and the pe-
riod after incentives have been abolished, see Table A.6 in the appendix. 
Our study design has numerous advantages and contributes to personnel economics in sev-
eral regards. First, the organizational setting allows studying the effects of the abolition of 
incentives. As mentioned before, the hauler installed a performance bonus as of January 1
st
 
2011. Based on the evaluation scores reported by the fleet management software, drivers 
were rewarded financially for good performances. We like to point out again that low fuel 
consumption is only indirectly rewarded. The maximum amount a driver could earn on 
incentives did not exceed 5% of his monthly fix pay. Two years later, the bonus system 
was abolished by the hauler at December 31
st
 2012. Interestingly, the hauler installed the 
performance bonus without telling the drivers for the first three months. Despite the de-
layed disclosure, we doubt that the introduction of the incentive scheme remained com-
pletely unnoticed by drivers without any rumors spreading or premature information leaks. 
This would bias any findings. Thus, we focus our main estimations exclusively on the abo-
lition of the bonus at the end of December 2012. This seems justified since there is broad 
evidence on productivity effects following the installation of incentives (e.g. Lazear 2000b, 
Shearer 2004), but to our knowledge we are among the first researchers who work on the 
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abolition of an incentive scheme in practice, with Freeman and Kleiner (2005) being a rare 
exception. Our set up, therefore, might offer new insights on the functioning of incentives 
that have not been covered by academic research so far. Second, comparisons among truck 
drivers are often hampered due to inconsistent exogenous influences coming along with 
different assignments, destinations and routes. Since the round-trip in the organizational 
setting at hand is identical for all drivers and constant over time, we can assume each driv-
er to be exposed to comparable exogenous influences while on the road (e.g. road condi-
tion, constructions, detours etc.). This allows for comprehensive analyses of driver perfor-
mance. Third, driver-truck sorting is totally random in the organizational setting of this 
study since drivers cannot influence which truck is the next available at either stage of 
their round-trip. Thus, we are able to control for good or poor driver-truck matches. 
Fourth, we can neglect any selection bias of agents sorting into specific incentive schemes 
since most drivers were already employed prior to the installation of the incentive scheme. 
Fifth, detailed date and time information for each trip allows us to control for exogenous 
effects (e.g. weather conditions) and temporary traffic density due to holiday traffic or dai-
ly rush hours. Both weather and traffic density can be assumed to highly determine truck 
handling and driver performance. Finally, vehicle load factors need to be similar over time 
to avoid biases arising from unequal vehicle maneuverability. Data by the European 
Commission (2014c) suggest that almost one quarter of all vehicle-kilometers of trucks 
within the EU is run empty.
49
 However, the hauler reports average load factors above 90%, 
thus we can assume similar cargo weights and equal maneuverability of trucks for all trips. 
This allows us to neglect this issue for our data. 
4.4 Empirical Models and Estimation Results 
Our data offers broad opportunities to measure truck driver performance. In total, our es-
timations are based on four dependent variables that proxy for drivers’ effort choice and 
productivity. First, we use the average fuel consumption in liters per 100 kilometers. Alt-
hough low fuel consumption is not directly incentivized, all target values set with regard to 
driving parameters and performance evaluations are based on eco-friendly driving behav-
ior and result in low fuel use. Since drivers receive individual fuel efficiency training on a 
non-regular basis, we can assume them to be well informed on how to meet company 
                                                 
49
  According to the European Commission (2014c) this is mainly attributable to strict cross-border transit 
regulations.   
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standards.
50
 Drivers deviating from these standards, therefore, may be assumed to have 
chosen low effort levels. Thus, we are convinced that fuel consumption used as dependent 
variable may serve as a good proxy for drivers’ effort choice decisions. In our sample, av-
erage fuel consumption is 27.89 l/100 km with a standard deviation of 3.02 liters (see Ta-
ble 4.2). Second, we deploy the most important driving parameters such as speeding, brake 
applications and average speed (see Table 4.2). Due to fuel efficiency training, drivers 
know how to meet company standards. Differing values, therefore, may again be an appro-
priate proxy for driver effort choice. Third, we use the four main driving scores (anticipa-
tion, use of brakes, choice of gear, hill drive) recorded by the in-vehicle computers (Table 
4.3). These scores directly influence trip evaluation and are highly relevant in determining 
the amount of bonus paid. Full online excess to the fleet management data base should 
raise drivers’ awareness on how they performed on each score. Hence, we assume drivers 
to know their individual strengths and weaknesses in driving behavior quite accurately. 
Otherwise put, drivers are aware of how they can increase individual bonus pay by im-
proving on those scores that do not yet meet company standards. In our estimations, we 
model low driving scores to proxy for low effort choices of drivers. Fourth, we deploy 
internal traffic light evaluation results based on software calculations (see Table 4.3). 
Again, drivers are offered full online excess to the evaluation reports that rate trips as ei-
ther “good”, “mediocre” or “poor”. In other words, drivers know about their individual 
performance and should be aware of any misconduct.
51
 Since they have both the ability 
and the knowledge to drive according to company standards, we believe trip evaluations 
other than “good” to result from low effort choice decisions. All four performance 
measures are insensitive to any subjective rater bias since they are recorded and assessed 
by in-vehicle computers automatically. While fuel consumption, driving parameters and 
evaluation scores are categorical variables, trip evaluation is of ordinal nature.  
The estimated models have the following general form (with FUELC being the fuel con-
sumption, DRIVPAR representing the driving parameters, SCORE representing the evalua-
tion scores and EVAL being the traffic light evaluation reports): 
                                                 
50
  According to van Mierlo et al (2004) (car) drivers know by intuition how to drive eco-friendly. Thus, it 
does not really matter that we have no information neither on the frequency nor the exact dates of indi-
vidual fuel efficiency training since we believe any training effect to arise from recollection instead of 
new insights.   
51
  According to Huang et al. (2005) and Roetting et al. (2003), truck drivers appreciate feedback from tech-
nology. 
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FUELC  
DRIVPAR 
SCORE 
EVAL 
= α + βDRIV + γVEH + δTRAF + φWEA + ωCONTR  + ε 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
where α is the constant, DRIV describes driver performance as expressed by equation (5), 
VEH controls for vehicle effects, TRAF describes a vector of external traffic conditions, 
WEA describes a vector of weather conditions, CONTR is a vector combining further con-
trols, β, γ, δ, φ and ω are the estimated coefficients and ε is the error term. The independent 
variables are discussed in more detail below.  
Driver performance (DRIV) is modeled as a function of the following form:  
 DRIV = f ((AGE + HUMC) * EFCH)  (5) 
with     EFCH = Intrinsic Incentives + Extrinsic Incentives (6) 
where AGE measures driver age and HUMC proxies driver human capital as driving expe-
rience with the hauler (monthly tenure). Age and experience are important personal char-
acteristics in determining driver performance. On the one hand, age has been proven to be 
detrimental to important abilities relevant to driving. For example, older drivers display an 
extended response time as well as lower visual and psychomotor abilities (e.g. Llaneras et 
al. 1998). On the other hand, experience is found to compensate these age-related impair-
ments (e.g. Brock, Llaneras, Swezey 1996, Guest, Boggess, Duke 2014). The importance 
of experience is even more pronounced when taking accident risk into account since 
younger and less experienced drivers have a higher risk to be involved in accidents (e.g. 
Häkkänen, Summala 2001, McCall, Horwitz 2005, Rodriguez, Targa, Belzer 2006). Thus, 
any analysis without including age and experience into the estimations would produce bi-
ased results. In lack of information on skills and qualification, we interpret age and experi-
ence as the overall performance potential of employees. However, the performance poten-
tial is at any moment subject to a drivers’ individual effort choice decision (EFCH). Per-
formance potential and effort choice eventually translate into actual driver performance. 
We model EFCH to be the joint effect of both intrinsic and extrinsic performance incentive 
(see equation (6)). While in the organizational setting at hand intrinsic incentives might 
include motives such as social preferences, altruism or eco-friendliness, extrinsic incen-
tives comprise the monetary performance pay incentives.   
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We use further variables to control for exogenous effects that might influence truck han-
dling and driving behavior as modeled in equations (1) to (4). First, we use a vehicle 
dummy variable VEH to control for different truck configurations. A different set of tech-
nological equipment might facilitate truck handling at some instances or influence fuel 
consumption solely for technological reasons. Second, we use a vector of date and time 
variables TRAF that proxy for traffic density while on the road. Concerning the time of the 
day, we assume rush hours in the morning (7 to 9 a.m.) and evening (4 to 6 p.m.) to im-
pose high traffic density, while drivers being on the road at night might benefit from open 
highways. Dummy variables control for rush hours and trips at night alike (trips from 8 
p.m. to 7 a.m.). Additionally, we control for day of the week effects since we expect e.g. 
Mondays and Fridays to be prone to congested roads due to weekend commuters. Fur-
thermore, we include a dummy variable covering a three-day window around international 
holidays since we believe roads to be congested due to holiday traffic at these dates.
52
 
Third, a vector of variables, WEA, controls for weather conditions during each trip. This 
seem necessary since previous research found weather to highly affect driving behavior, 
general traffic conditions and crash risks (e.g. Kilpeläinen, Summala 2007, Norrman, 
Eriksson, Lindqvist 2000). We, therefore, add control variables for temperature, precipita-
tion, snow depth and wind speed.
53 
Eventually, we apply dummy variables for all thirty-six 
months of the observation period to account for possible trend or timing effects. Likewise, 
we use dummy variables for all fifty-two weeks of a given year to account for seasonality. 
Taken together, this broad range of control variables excludes the major sources of poten-
tial exogenous influences on driver performance. Thus, we are confident that any perfor-
mance effect that we will detect in our estimations is entirely attributable to drivers’ effort 
choice decisions as a response to the incentive scheme. In the following, we discuss results 
on fuel consumption as modeled by equation (1) first, then report our findings on driving 
parameters as modeled by equation (2). Afterwards, we present results on driving scores as 
modeled by equation (3) and eventually discuss the estimations on trip evaluation as mod-
eled by equation (4). The key estimations are reported in Tables 4.4 to 4.7, respectively. 
Overall, our results support the crowding-out effect of extrinsic incentives since truck 
                                                 
52
  Only those holidays that are mandatory in all four countries drivers pass through during their round trips 
are considered (e.g. New Year’s Day, Easter, Christmas, etc.). 
53
  Since we do not have detailed truck positioning data, we gathered weather information at a meteorologi-
cal station approximately halfway the total distance. This should level differing climate conditions at the 
starting and arrival points. Data was provided by the German Meteorological Service (DWD 2014), a 
German state institution. 
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drivers’ effort (and as a consequence their performance and productivity) is significantly 
lower with monetary performance incentives in practice.  
First visual evidence on divergent levels of fuel consumption with and without incentives 
in practice is presented in Figure A.4.1 in the appendix. Comparing the kernel density 
functions for both incentive environments, it appears that fuel consumption shifts to the 
left after incentives have been abolished. This indicates lower fuel use without incentives 
in practice. As a first empirical test for significant behavioral responses, we run a two-way 
ANOVA on the thirty-seven drivers from April 2011 to December 2013 to examine the 
effect of incentives on fuel consumption as a proxy for driver performance and productivi-
ty (see Table A. 7 in the appendix). We focus on a time frame starting in April 2011 since 
the first three months of the observation window might be biased due to the secret intro-
duction of the performance pay.
54
 We found a significant effect of the bonus pay on driv-
er’s fuel consumption indicating that significantly different quantities of fuel are used de-
pending on the existence and non-existence of monetary incentives, F(1, 6,252)=4.31, 
p=.0379. Since the ANOVA does not report any significant differences in the simple com-
parison of drivers (p=0.5263) or the driver-bonus interaction (p=0.4610), we are confident 
that any performance effect estimated in this study may be explained by behavioral re-
sponses entirely attributable to the (non-)existence of the incentive scheme. Moreover, this 
finding supports our argument that drivers adapt their individual effort choice to the incen-
tive environment. To follow these indications, we apply elaborate empirical estimations to 
our data. We start with fixed-effect specifications since we are particularly interested in 
within-driver behavioral responses to the disestablishment of the incentive scheme. More-
over, fixed-effects models account for present driver fixed-effects that are not reported in 
the data. These effects can be either time-invariant (e.g. talent, prior driving experience, 
etc.) or quasi time-invariant without any or only slight modifications over time (e.g. driv-
ing style, environmental friendliness, professional ethos, etc.). To account for these unob-
served effects that are seldom uncorrelated with explanatory variables, fixed-effect specifi-
cations are preferable (e.g. Wooldridge 2013). Since the incentive scheme was introduced 
without telling the drivers for the first three months we restrict our estimations to a period 
from April 2011 to December 2013 to avoid any bias arising from premature information 
leaks.  
                                                 
54
  The secret installation might not have been as secret as intended by the hauler since we assume rumors to 
have circulated among the drivers prior to the introduction of the new remuneration scheme. 
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Table 4.4 displays the baseline results of the fixed-effect estimations with fuel consump-
tion as the dependent variable (variable FUELC in equation (1)). A total number of thirty-
seven drivers and a mean of 171 observations per driver (min=80, max=221) allow for 
profound fixed-effect estimations. We step-wise built up our estimations using varying 
model specifications to detect potential biases that may arise from including control varia-
bles. Our preferred model specification is the full model (6). A modified Wald test for the 
full model specification allows rejecting group-wise heteroskedasticity (Prob>chi2=.8305).  
Table 4.4: Baseline Results of the Fixed-Effects Estimations (Models 1 to 6)
+
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Incentives (yes=1) .166** .324*** .329*** .392* .454** .419** 
 (.0764) (.110) (.113) (.199) (.180) (.191) 
Age (in years)    .0506  -.447 
    (.114)  (.287) 
Tenure (in months)     .00842 .0436* 
     (.00859) (.0245) 
Constant 27.77*** 26.89*** 26.87*** 24.59*** 26.60*** 45.62*** 
 (.0476) (.321) (.414) (5.233) (.528) (12.22) 
Vehicle Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time Controls  YES YES YES YES YES 
Date Controls   YES YES YES YES 
Weather Controls   YES YES YES YES 
Driver FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 6,326 6,326 6,326 6,326 6,326 6,326 
R-squared .001 .012 .017 .017 .017 .018 
Number of driver 37 37 37 37 37 37 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1 
+
April 2011 to December 2013; dependent variable: fuel consumption. 
The fixed-effect estimations seem to support the arguments of the crowding-out theory. 
We find behavioral responses to the disestablishment of the incentive scheme to be statisti-
cally significant at the 5%-level: Drivers chose less effort and, therefore, use more fuel 
when monetarily incentivized. Thus, incentives that should motivate drivers to eco-drive 
are in fact backfiring on the very behavior they intend to stimulate. Other important intrin-
sic motives that might encourage drivers to eco-drive (e.g. environmental believes, profes-
sional ethos, peer group competition) seem to be suppressed by financial rewards. As a 
consequence, overall performance decreases and net fuel consumption increases. As soon 
as the extrinsic incentives are abolished, these motives seem to revive and enhance driver 
performance. The estimated coefficient of the incentive effect compared to the non-
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incentive situation is .419 (standard error=.419) in our preferred full model specification 
(model 6). Thus, ceteris paribus, a driver uses .419 l/100 km more fuel with incentives in 
practice. In other words, in reducing driver performance and productivity incentives pose 
an extra burden to the hauler’s baseline results. Since the average driver is on the road for 
about 125,750 kilometers per year and consumes approximately 35,000 liters of fuel while 
on the road, the additional fuel use attributable to the extrinsic incentive adds up to roughly 
530 liters per driver and year. Given an average fuel price of €1.50 per liter, this amounts 
to hidden costs of incentives of around €800 per driver and year that have to be added to 
the net costs of the incentive itself. Thus, the incentives appear disadvantageous for the 
hauler in two ways. 
In contrast to previous research (e.g. Rodriguez, Targa, Belzer 2006), human capital in 
terms of driver experience – proxied by cumulated tenure with the current employer – is 
not improving performance. Instead, each month a driver stays with the hauler seems to be 
even more detrimental to performance with fuel use increasing by .04 liters per 100 km. 
Yet, our findings do not allow for long-perspective reasoning since maximum tenure of 
drivers in our data set is limited to 64 months. Thus, we believe greater variance in tenure 
would be necessary to meaningfully interpret this finding. Concerning age, we are not able 
to detect an effect in any of our estimations. Referring to equation (1) and (2), both the 
negative tenure effect and the missing age effect emphasize the importance of motivational 
effort choices (EFCH) in determining performance at least in a low-skill occupation such 
as trucking. Interestingly, we find significant vehicle effects for some trucks. This is espe-
cially surprising since the hauler replaces trucks regularly after reaching a total mileage of 
1 million kilometers which usually happens every two years. Thus, the hauler’s fleet 
should only consist of similar state-of-the-art trucks. One possible explanation may be 
found in the particular role of the hauler within the truck manufacturer’s organization. Cer-
tain trucks of the fleet are occasionally equipped with newest technology developments for 
real-life trial e.g. endurance tests. Thus, although trucks seem to be equal at first glance 
they may be not. However, we do not have any information on which trucks are equipped 
and which effect on fuel consumption or driving behavior can be expected by the modifi-
cations. Yet, this should not be an issue in our estimations since drivers are observed on 
four different trucks per round-trip resulting in various driver-truck matches. Fairly unex-
pected, neither day of the week nor time of the day show any statistically significant influ-
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ence on fuel consumption.
55
 Significantly more fuel is used only during the three-day win-
dow around international holidays (+.42 l/100 km, significant at the 5%-level). This indi-
cates that around holidays driving indeed is impeded by traffic density. Eventually, con-
cerning weather conditions our results oppose expectations raised by previous research on 
the impact of weather on driving (e.g. Kilpeläinen, Summala 2007, Norrman, Eriksson, 
Lindqvist 2000). We only find air temperature to influence fuel use as overall fuel con-
sumption is reduced by -.04 l/100 km with each additional degree Celsius. This might be 
related to the often freezing temperatures in Northern Europe including glazed frost and 
snow falls which turn truck handling more difficult and require more fuel due to frictional 
resistance.   
To check for the robustness of our findings and to better understand the timing of the in-
centive effect, we re-estimate the fixed effect models on fuel consumption using different 
periods of time. First, we address doubts on the secret introduction of the performance in-
centives by estimating fixed-effect models for the first eight months of the observation 
window (January 2011 to August 2011). That is, three months during which drivers were 
not aware of the introduction of incentives (treated as 0 in the estimations) and the five 
consecutive months when drivers were informed about the existence of the bonus scheme 
(treated as 1). In support of our baseline results, estimations on the full model specification 
(see model (5) of Table A.8 in the appendix) show a strong initial effect of 2.223 liters 
used additionally per 100 km with incentives in practice (significant at the 10%-level). 
This is roughly five times the effect of our baseline findings for the entire period of April 
2011 to December 2013. Second, we narrowed the observation window to a period from 
May 2012 to August 2013. Since this period covers eight months pre and post the abolition 
of performance bonuses, it allows for a closer examination of the effect of abolished incen-
tives (see Table A.9 in the appendix for results). We prefer model (5) excluding age over 
the full model since age and bonus are highly correlated in this setting (both change only 
once on January 1
st 
2013). It appears from the estimations that fuel consumption is higher 
with incentives in practice. Again, this finding supports our baseline results with the coef-
ficient being twice as high as our baseline results suggest (additional .964 liters per 100 
km, significant at the 1%-level). In general, our findings so far support arguments of 
                                                 
55
  However, the controls for rush hours in the mornings (+.06 l/100km) and evenings (+.11 l/100km) indi-
cate the expected positive relationship yet without reaching statistical significance. In contrast, the control 
for trips at night shows a counterintuitive positive relationship (+.2 l/100km), again without reaching sig-
nificance. 
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monetary incentives crowding out other intrinsic motives that are likewise important for 
driver motivation. Yet, it appears as if behavioral responses are more pronounced in the 
first months after a shift in the incentive scheme.  
In a second step, we estimate seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) with the most im-
portant driving parameters as dependent variables (vector DRIVP in equation (1)). SUR 
was first proposed by Zellner (1962) and represents a special case of the generalized re-
gression model. It allows for the estimation of regression equations that each have its own 
dependent variable but share a common set of independent variables. Most likely, the error 
terms are correlated across equations in such models. This issue has to be accounted for 
when estimating these model specifications. Furthermore, estimating equations separately 
would neglect the important information that a similar set of regressors appears in all equa-
tions (Greene 2003). Since equation estimations for each driving parameter share a com-
mon set of independent variables, SUR is the most reasonable choice at this point. Results 
of SUR estimations are presented in Table 4.5. Again, we exclude the first three months of 
the observation period. It appears from the estimations that overall driving behavior seems 
to be more aggressive and less fuel efficient with the performance incentives in practice. 
More precisely, we find drivers to practice more speeding (plus 1.1 percentage points of 
total driving time), use the brake more often (plus 3.9 brake applications per 100 km), use 
the brake more often in a harsh manner (plus .03 harsh brake applications per 100 km) and 
make less use of coasting (minus 1.3 percentage points of total driving time). With the 
bonus pay abolished, the drivers display higher effort in terms of a more fuel efficient driv-
ing behavior. In other words, drivers do not seem to comply with eco-friendly company 
targets as long as they are financially rewarded. Instead, they respond to the abolition of 
the incentive scheme by choosing that effort level the hauler originally intended to encour-
age by paying incentives. Still, we do not find significant effects on maximal vehicle 
speed, average speed, idling and harsh accelerations. The explanation for this might be 
straightforward. While idling seems not to be an issue in highway carriage, both maximal 
and average vehicle speed levels are limited at some point due to technological (and legis-
lative) reasons. Only harsh accelerations would have indicated aggressive driving behav-
ior. The lack of significance at this point, thus, represents a counterintuitive finding.  
   
 
 
 
Table 4.5: Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) Results on Driving Parameters
+
 
Variables Speeding 
Max Vehicle 
Speed 
Harsh Brake 
Applications 
Brake 
Applications 
Harsh 
Accelerations 
Coasting 
Average 
Speed 
Idling 
Incentives .0112* .493 .0269* 3.896*** .00918 -.0138*** -.270 -.00169 
(yes=1) (.00652) (.313) (.0148) (.449) (.0153) (.00281) (.195) (.00108) 
Age .0105 -.292 -.00215 1.209 -.0382 -.00754 -.733** .000277 
(in years) (.0124) (.595) (.0282) (.852) (.0291) (.00534) (.369) (.00205) 
Tenure -.000443 .0953* .00445* .0793 .00455* -6.50e-05 .0740** -.000379** 
(in months) (.00103) (.0494) (.00234) (.0708) (.00242) (.000443) (.0306) (.000170) 
Constant -.376 107.9*** .122 -49.22 1.803 .508** 109.3*** .0202 
 (.566) (27.21) (1.288) (38.98) (1.331) (.244) (16.89) (.0938) 
Vehicle Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Date Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Weather Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Driver Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 6,326 6,326 6,326 6,326 6,326 6,326 6,326 6,326 
R-squared .051 .066 .044 .047 .017 .052 .027 .082 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1 
+
April 2011 to December 2013 
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Overall, our results provide great support for behavioral incentive theory and its crowding-
out assumption: Monetary incentives do not yield the behavioral changes desired by the 
hauler. 
Concerning the four major evaluation scores anticipation, choice of gear, use of brakes and 
hill drive we estimate a further SUR (vector SCORE in equation (1)). Again, we do so to 
account for correlated error terms across equations arising with similar sets of independent 
variables. Incomplete data restrict our estimations to a limited number of n=3,138 observa-
tions (April 2011 to December 2013). It appears from Table 4.6 that drivers score worse on 
the parameters (given in %/100) when subject to incentives.
56
 In numbers, drivers score 
nine percentage points worse on hill driving, thirteen percentage points worse on anticipa-
tion behavior and sixteen percentage points worse on the use of brake score when being 
rewarded financially for good performance.   
Table 4.6: Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) Results on Evaluation Parameters
+
 
Variables Anticipation Use of brakes Hill drive 
Incentives (yes=1) -.133*** -.158*** -.0899*** 
 (.0108) (.0142) (.0200) 
Age (in years) -.0170 -.0317 -.000994 
 (.0191) (.0250) (.0354) 
Tenure (in months) -.00407*** -.00515** -.00411 
 (.00158) (.00207) (.00293) 
Constant 1.857** 2.561** .816 
 (.873) (1.146) (1.619) 
Vehicle Controls YES YES YES 
Date Controls YES YES YES 
Time Controls YES YES YES 
Weather Controls YES YES YES 
Driver Controls YES YES YES 
Observations 3,138 3,138 3,138 
R-squared .203 .135 .094 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1 
+
April 2011 to December 2013 
Similar to our previous findings this result supports the crowding-out effect of monetary 
incentives. After the abolition of the incentive scheme, driver effort in terms of perfor-
mance scores improved significantly. As in most other estimations, age does not have any 
                                                 
56
  We deliberately leave out the choice of gear score from our considerations as a mean of .97 (see Table 3) 
suggests that the entire fleet consists of automatic transmission vehicles.  
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statistically significant influence on driver performance in any model specification. Yet, 
tenure exhibits a minor but significant impact on evaluation parameters with anticipation 
scores reducing by .4 percentage points and use of brakes score reducing by .5 percentage 
points with each month a driver is employed at the hauler. This result opposes theoretical 
considerations on human capital as an important determinant of employee performance 
(e.g. Rodriguez, Targa, Belzer 2006). We believe decreasing attentiveness as a result of 
routine to be one possible explanation since truck driving is a very monotonous occupation 
– especially in settings with constant routes and on highways. However, the limited obser-
vation window of only 33 months as well as the overall limited tenure (max of 64 months) 
might bias our findings at this point. Vehicle dummies only seldom reach statistical signif-
icance. Coefficients for weather condition as well as date and time dummies are incon-
sistent for all four variables. Therefore, we refrain from reporting these results in detail.  
In a final step, we estimate models on the traffic light trip evaluation assessed by in-vehicle 
computers (variable EVAL in equation (1)). We use trip evaluation as a proxy for driver 
effort choice decisions (EFCH) and, thus, are confident to detect potential performance 
effects of incentive. Following Gujarati and Porter (2009) as well as Wooldridge (2013) 
we estimate ordered logit and ordered probit regression models to address the ordinal na-
ture of trip evaluation data. However, since probit regression only constitutes a minor 
modification of logit regression and yields barely different findings (Greene 2003), we 
focus on logit regression results in this paper due to reasons of brevity. Table A.10 in the 
appendix displays results for the ordered logit estimations with trip evaluation being the 
dependent variable. It becomes obvious that evaluations are significantly worse when per-
formance incentives are in practice. Post-estimation probabilities of trip evaluation with 
and without incentives in practices are given in Table 4.7. 
Table 4.7: Estimated Probabilities for Trip Evaluation in both Incentive Environments 
Variables 
Incentives in 
Practice 
Incentives 
Abolished 
Change 95% CI for Change 
Trip Evaluation  
    
Good  .4034 .6894 .2860 -.3421 -.2298 
Mediocre  .0619 .0513 -.0106 .0072 .0139 
Poor  .5347 .2594 -.2754 .2219 .3289 
 
On the Road Again: Crowding-Out Effects of Extrinsic Motivation in Commercial Trucking   
 
 
105 
With incentives in practice the probability of a trip being assessed as “good” by in-vehicle 
computers is 40.34% compared to 68.94% after the abolition of incentives. This is a differ-
ence of 28.6 percentage points or 70.89%, respectively. At the same time, the probability 
of a trip being evaluated as “poor” dropped by 27.54 percentage points or 51.5% from 
53.47% to 25.94%. Probabilities for “mediocre” trip evaluations vary only slightly by 1.06 
percentage points or 17.2% after the abolition of the incentives. In other words, with per-
formance incentives in practice the probability of a good truck driver performance is 
markedly lower compared to a situation without any extrinsic incentives. This indicates 
drivers to choose lower levels of effort when monetarily incentivized. Similar to the other 
results of this paper, this finding supports the crowding-out assumption of extrinsic incen-
tives backfiring on the very behavior they intend to prevent.  
All estimations represented in Tables 4.5 to 4.7 are based on the full model specification. 
To control for biases arising from control variables we re-estimated all models under dif-
ferent specifications. Results proved to be robust for all estimations with little variation in 
coefficients. The same holds true when excluding the choice of gear score from the SUR 
models. Findings for the other dependent variables remain robust. We further check for the 
robustness of the results in two ways. First, we re-estimate our models excluding the three 
women from the data set. Second, we include all temporary drivers in the estimations. Alt-
hough we expected an incentive effect deriving from the contract characteristics (chapter 
five of this thesis, Bradley, Green, Leeves 2012), the baseline results vary only marginally 
in coefficients. Thus, we are very confident that our findings are robust.  
Still, our study entails some limitations as a consequence of its organizational setting. 
First, we do not have detailed information neither on the algorithm that determines perfor-
mance evaluations nor on the underlying mechanisms that determine the total amount of 
incentives. It would have been interesting to work on the incentive scheme in more detail, 
e.g. by observing only those drivers at the verge to a higher incentive level. Second, the 
incentives were introduced for the first three month without informing the drivers. Still, 
there is the possibility that the information might be spread premature. Since we expect the 
results for this period to be biased due to information leaks, we exclude the respective 
three months window from our baseline estimations. Yet, checking for the introduction of 
incentives after three months supports our overall findings (see Table A.8 in the appendix). 
Third, the bonus payments incentivize low fuel consumption only indirectly by rewarding 
an eco-friendly driving style. Therefore, one might question the validity of our findings on 
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the link between incentive scheme and fuel consumption. However, all target values of the 
driving parameters and evaluation scores set by the company aim at reaching eco-friendly 
driving behavior that yields at low fuel-consumption. Moreover, our findings on fuel con-
sumption are entirely supported by estimations for raw performance indicators such as 
driving parameters and evaluation scores. Thus, we are confident to address doubts on the 
indirect relationship of incentives and fuel consumption. Finally, our data set includes only 
three women. Although there is support for a gender effect in self-selection and perfor-
mance under incentives (e.g. Croson, Gneezy 2009, Dohmen, Falk 2011), we avoid work-
ing on this issue to account for the unequal gender distribution among drivers. Yet, the low 
share of women is industry specific and, therefore, should not bias or impact our overall 
findings. 
4.5 Conclusion 
With this study we offer new insights to the ongoing debate on the benefits and drawbacks 
of extrinsic incentives. While classic economic theory assumes employees to react to ex-
trinsic (monetary) incentives by increasing performance and productivity, behavioral in-
centive theory suggests extrinsic rewards to crowd out other important intrinsic and social 
incentives that motivate people. There is broad experimental and empirical support for 
both theoretical assumptions. 
To contribute to this discussion, we use a hitherto unavailable data set on the performance 
of commercial truck drivers collected from the internal fleet management system of the in-
house hauler of a large European truck manufacturer. Truck drivers receive bonus pay-
ments for good performance within the first twenty-four months of the thirty-six months 
observation period. Subsequently, management decided to abolish the incentives. We em-
pirically measure the effect of the abolition of the incentive scheme on driver effort choice 
decisions by analyzing four separate sets of dependent variables of driver performance: 
fuel consumption, driving parameters, driving scores and trip evaluation. Consistent with 
behavioral incentive theory, we find comprehensive support for crowding-out effects of the 
bonus pay scheme applied by the hauler. In other words, we observe drivers to display 
significantly lower effort and performance when extrinsically incentivized compared to the 
non-incentive environment. These findings are in line with previous research (e.g. Deci 
1971, Gneezy and Rustichini 2000a). More precisely, fuel consumption is significantly 
higher when incentives are in practice, adding up to additional 530 liters used per driver 
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and year which translates to extra fuel costs of €800 per driver and year. We interpret this 
amount as hidden costs of incentives. Combined with the net bonus payments, the hidden 
costs constitute a serious financial burden to the company’s baseline results – especially in 
a business as competitive as the trucking industry. When narrowing the observation period 
around the lagged information on the introduction and the final abolition of the bonus pay, 
we observe strong initial effects for both events. Further analyses of driving parameters 
suggest that drivers put less effort in adapting an eco-friendly driving style. This results in 
significantly lower values on driving scores: nine percentage points worse on hill driving, 
thirteen percentage points worse on anticipation behavior and even sixteen percentage 
points worse on use of brake. Concerning trip evaluation data, we observe a more than 
70% higher probability of a trip being rated as “good” subsequent to the abolition of incen-
tives. In short, our results indicate that drivers respond to incentives not the way intended 
by the hauler. Instead, it is the abolition of the incentive system that significantly increases 
driver performance. These findings remain robust on all four performance measures under 
various specifications and robustness checks. The results clearly support crowding-out 
effects of extrinsic rewards as stated by behavioral incentive theory. In this sense, the em-
pirical evidence is in clear contrast to classical economic arguments on the benefits of 
monetary incentives (e.g. Gibbons 1998, Oyer, Schaefer 2011).  
We believe our findings to arise from monetary incentives crowding out other important 
intrinsic and social motives that seem to play a major role in truck driver motivation. In 
other words, drivers are for some reasons intrinsically motivated to choose a certain level 
of effort. Though, an extrinsic incentive – such as a financial reward – seems to diminish 
or even disperse their intrinsic motivation. As a consequence, overall net effort choice and 
performance may be lower than without receiving financial rewards. There are some in-
trinsic and social motives that might serve as interpretation at this point. First, research 
identified individual environmental awareness and concerns to be essential for adapting 
pro-environmental behavior (e.g. Eagly, Kulesa 1997, Fransson, Gärling 1999). Therefore, 
we assume drivers’ environmental beliefs to be a major intrinsic motive to adapt eco-
friendly driving.
57
 In line with this argument, extrinsic incentives are observed to crowd 
out pro-environmental behavior (e.g. Thøgersen 1994). Second, prior research has identi-
fied social image, status and reputation as powerful intrinsic incentives to people’s motiva-
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  For an overview on pro-environmental behavior of truck drivers see Schweitzer, Brodrick and Spivey 
(2008). 
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tion (e.g. Ariely, Bracha, Meier 2009, Ellingsen, Johannesson 2008). Hence, we assume 
drivers to have some social concerns on having an eco-friendly image and reputation, in 
particular as they are working in a high-polluting industry. This might be even strength-
ened as the country domestic to the drivers is far below OECD average on CO2 emissions 
(OECD 2014b). Third, peer competition among drivers may represent an intrinsic incen-
tive, too. According to company staff, the first thing drivers do when returning from a 
round-trip is to check their traffic light evaluation relative to peer-group performance. 
Theory and empirical evidence suggest that peer-group competition functions as social 
incentive. For instance, effort choice is higher when relative performance rankings are re-
ported (e.g. Charness, Masclet, Villeval 2013). We believe that monetary incentives – at 
least partially – bought off the game-like character of peer competition. The same holds 
true for classic peer effects that motivate drivers to good performance via social pressure 
(e.g. Falk, Ichino 2006, Mas, Moretti 2009). Eventually, introducing incentives in the first 
place might be interpreted by drivers as an act of distrust. According to Sliwka (2007), 
feeling distrust might turn a person into selfish behavior. This effect could even be intensi-
fied by the secret introduction of the incentive scheme that most likely was seen as a lack 
of trust by drivers. Acting selfish might reduce truck drivers’ concerns about both the envi-
ronment and the competitiveness of their employer. Instead, they might increase their own 
utility by putting less effort in economic driving behavior. Furthermore, our findings sup-
port prior evidence on people responding strongly to both well-structured and badly de-
signed incentives (e.g. Roberts 2010). In particular, incentives that reward performance 
with an amount too small may counteract the intended behavior (e.g. Gneezy, Rustichini 
2000a, 2000b). By offering less than 5% of the monthly net income, the hauler might have 
badly designed the incentive by choosing an amount below the incentivizing threshold. 
This especially holds true given that drivers are working in a high-paying company in a 
country with a high wage level and, therefore, may anecdotally be ranked among the top-
earning truck drivers in Europe.  
However, translating our findings into clear implications to practitioners proves to be diffi-
cult. It seems that principals need to abandon the idea that extrinsic incentives serve as a 
panacea to motivational issues. Instead, monetary incentives do not work as intended per 
se and employee performance and productivity depend on other intrinsic and social mo-
tives, too. Introducing extrinsic incentives without seriously reflecting on these issues 
might prove detrimental to overall productivity in the end. Thus, we highly recommend 
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considering the internal and external fit of incentive schemes and general HRM instru-
ments. At this point, we follow Ichniowski, Shaw and Prennushi (1997) who argue that 
incentive plans work best when introduced with complementary HRM practices. There-
fore, we like to encourage practitioners to carefully monitor incentive systems and to take 
appropriate actions if incentives appear to have counter-productive effects. Nevertheless, it 
seems to be good news that mistakes once made in incentive introduction or design seem 
reversible since employees quickly respond to new settings.  
Eventually, the very particular organizational set up and the insider econometric approach 
of this paper might raise doubts on the generalizability of our findings. However, given 
that our results support theoretical assumptions stated by behavioral incentive theory and 
are in line with previous research, we are confident that our evidence is applicable to simi-
lar situations at least to some extent. Yet, we are not able to provide clear evidence on the 
generalizability of our findings to other organizational settings. We therefore encourage 
researchers to further contribute to the ongoing debate on both crowding-out and price 
effect of extrinsic incentives. Studies examining different organizational settings apart 
from insider econometrics might widen general insights on incentive effects on employees’ 
effort choice decisions. In response to the so far inconsistent findings on extrinsic incen-
tive effects on employee effort, research on moderating and mediating effects of incentives 
and the fit between intrinsic and extrinsic incentives seems to be highly appreciated. 
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5 BEHAVIORAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE TRANSITION FROM 
TEMPORARY TO PERMANENT EMPLOYMENT 
5.1 Introduction 
Temporary employment contracts have become a common practice in modern organiza-
tions to circumvent labor market regulations considered as restrictive and to flexibly react 
to changing staff requirements that are due to changes in product demand (e.g. Houseman 
2001). Moreover, temporary employment offers firms opportunities to reduce labor costs 
as well as administrative complexity (De Cuyper et al. 2008). According to the most recent 
Eurostat Labor Force Survey, about 14% of all employment contracts in the EU-28 in 2013 
were temporary in nature
58
 (Eurostat 2014c). Among those on temporary contracts, young-
er workers are heavily overrepresented (OECD 2014c). In this paper we define temporary 
contracts to be different from standard contracts with respect to the following three dimen-
sions: limited duration, various statutory drawbacks (no or little employment protection, no 
minimum wage etc.) and the different organizational setting (temporary contracts are often 
with temporary-work agencies (e.g. De Cuyper et al. 2008)).
59
   
Temporary employment is not only used to avoid labor shortages and reduce labor costs 
but is often considered a “stepping stone” (Booth, Francesconi, Frank 2002) or a “port of 
entry” into permanent employment (Berton, Devincienti, Pacelli 2011, Buddlemeyer, 
Wooden 2011). Recent research emphasizes the nature of temporary employment as a 
screening device allowing employers to test the quality of a particular job match without 
the risk of long-term contractual obligations (e.g. Güell, Petrongolo 2001, Gagliarducci 
2005). Moreover, a growing body of literature demonstrates that contract characteristics 
significantly affect employees’ behavior (e.g. Ichino, Riphahn 2005, Guadalupe 2003) in 
the sense that e.g. temporary and permanent workers are found to differ significantly in 
their choice of effort levels (e.g. Engellandt, Riphahn 2005). Although permanently em-
ployed workers are supposed to perform better than temporary workers because they re-
ceive more (firm-specific) training and report higher work satisfaction, empirical studies 
found the opposite to be true by demonstrating that temporary workers sometimes outper-
                                                 
58
  In the country where the headquarters of the hauling company is located, the percentage of temporary 
employees is slightly above EU-28 average (OECD 2014). 
59
  In this study, the term “temporary employment” refers to all kinds of contingent, fixed-term, casual or 
non-permanent employment relations with an employer characterized by an ex ante defined limited con-
tract duration. 
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form permanent workers (e.g. Livanos, Zangelidis 2013, Amuedo-Dorantes 2002). We 
believe the reasons to be twofold. On the one hand, employers very often use temporary 
employment as a screening device. On the other hand, employees consider motivation and 
effort as strong signals to an employer that are likely to increase their probability of being 
promoted to a permanent contract. Both effects incentivize temporary workers to outper-
form permanent workers in terms of effort levels. However, this holds true only as long as 
temporary work is associated with inferior job characteristics compared to permanent em-
ployment. So far, temporary positions have been found to be associated with less favorable 
working conditions (e.g. Paoli, Merllié 2001), lower wages (e.g. Mertens, Gash, McGinni-
ty 2007), less training (e.g. Arulampalam, Bryan, Booth 2004) and lower levels of job sat-
isfaction (e.g. Boyce et al. 2007). Moreover, the uncertainty about future job prospects can 
be a mental burden to temporary workers resulting in health problems (Sverke, Hellgren, 
Näswall 2002). Finally, temporary workers do not benefit from mandatory job protection 
legislation to the same extent as permanent workers. Given these disadvantages, temporary 
workers should have strong incentives to demonstrate motivation and effort to “qualify” 
for a promotion from a temporary to a permanent contract.  
These considerations inevitably lead to the question of whether and to what extent former-
ly temporary workers adjust their effort level after having signed a permanent contract. 
One might expect significant behavioral responses from employees who have been offered 
more favorable working conditions, including dismissal protection legislation. Using an 
unbalanced panel of truck drivers from the GPS-based fleet management system of an in-
house hauler of a large European truck manufacturer we are among the first to address this 
issue with individual productivity information from employees whose contract status was 
changed from temporary to permanent. Our results confirm a significant reduction in 
commercial truck drivers’ effort levels resulting in higher fuel consumption and a poorer 
overall driving performance after being promoted from temporary to permanent employ-
ment.  
Our study contributes to the literature in several regards. First, we add to the growing re-
search on the influence of employment contract characteristics on employee behavior. In 
particular, we extend the literature on workers’ effort choices when contract characteristics 
become more employee-friendly (e.g. Ichino, Riphahn 2005). Second, we are among the 
first to use data from a modern GPS-based fleet management system to analyze driver be-
havior. This usually extensive source of data has not yet made its way into the personnel 
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economics literature. Third, we follow the insider econometrics tradition, which has en-
joyed increasing popularity among personnel economists since the publication of the semi-
nal papers by Ichniowski, Shaw and Prennushi (1997) on HRM practices in U.S. steel 
plants and Lazear (2000b) on monetary incentives for windshield installers. The insider 
econometrics approach applies sophisticated econometric methods to a (panel) data set 
gathered in one or a few companies. The resulting nano-perspective allows detailed in-
sights into the behavior of individuals upon changes in incentives, working conditions, etc.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section provides both a re-
view of the literature on the incentive effects of temporary employment as well as on em-
ployees’ behavioral responses to changes in contract characteristics. The specific organiza-
tional setting and the data set are described in detail in section three. Section four presents 
the estimation strategy as well as the results while section five concludes. 
5.2 Literature Review and Theoretical Framework 
It is a stylized fact in the personnel economics literature that temporary workers receive 
less training by employers due to the usually rather short duration of the employment rela-
tion (e.g. Arulampalam, Bryan, Booth 2004, Hoque, Kirkpatrick 2003, Forrier, Sels 2003, 
Arulampalam, Booth 1998). As a consequence, temporary workers accumulate less firm-
specific knowledge than permanently employed workers. Since firm-specific skills are 
critical for performance (e.g. Hatch, Dyer 2004, Hitt et al. 2001) permanently employed 
workers are expected to outperform temporary workers.   
However, there is also evidence showing that despite their lower levels of training tempo-
rary workers often outperform employees with a permanent contract. The performance 
differential is likely due to temporary workers’ higher levels of motivation and work effort. 
Using the Swiss Labor Force Survey Engellandt and Riphahn (2005), for example, find 
that the probability of working unpaid overtime is 60% higher for temporary compared to 
permanent workers. Moreover, in a large data set from Australia Bradley, Green and 
Leeves (2007) find evidence of significantly lower levels of absenteeism (their preferred 
measure of employee effort) among temporary workers. This latter result is confirmed by 
Livanos and Zangelidis (2013) for the EU, Arai and Thoursie (2005) for Sweden and 
Amuedo-Dorantes (2002) for Spain. Moreover, using data from a Spanish survey Guada-
lupe (2003) finds that other things equal temporary workers have a five percentage points 
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higher accident probability which may be due to lower investments in temporary workers’ 
human capital as well as their pronounced incentives to demonstrate high levels of motiva-
tion and effort in the sense of taking higher risks.  
The incentive effects of temporary contracts that are assumed to result in higher motivation 
and effort levels of temporary employees are due to their specific screening and signaling 
properties (Spence 1973). First, temporary contracts are often used as a screening device to 
test newly hired workers before they are being offered a permanent contract (e.g. Green, 
Leeves 2004). Second, temporary work may be considered a “stepping stone” into perma-
nent employment (Booth et al. 2002). Consistent with the latter argument Güell and 
Petrongolo (2001) find that temporary workers often sign a permanent contract before their 
initial temporary contract had expired. This suggests that firms use temporary employment 
as a screening opportunity to discover workers’ “true” qualities and offer permanent con-
tracts as soon as the required abilities have been identified (see also Buddlemeyer and 
Wooden (2011) with comparable evidence for Australia and Gagliarducci (2005) for Italy). 
Summarizing, these studies suggest that temporary contracts are used as a screening in-
strument that enables employers to reduce information asymmetries about workers’ moti-
vations and effort choices without the risk of long-term contractual obligations.  
Summarizing, the characteristics of temporary contracts should provide strong incentives 
for temporary workers to choose high effort levels to produce those signals that maximize 
the probability of being hired on a permanent contract. This holds true, however, only as 
long as permanent employment proves to be advantageous over temporary employment. 
Indeed, temporary employment is usually associated with poorer working conditions and 
lower pay levels for equal performance. On the one hand, temporary workers have been 
found to benefit less from investments in health care or ergonomics leading to higher lev-
els of job dissatisfaction, fatigue and muscular pain (Benavides, Benach 1999, Benavides 
et al. 2000). On the other hand, they are exposed more often to repetitive tasks and move-
ments as well as heavy loads (Paoli, Merllié 2001), enjoy lower levels of work autonomy 
and report themselves the least well-informed about their work environment (Aronsson 
1999). Furthermore, temporary workers often consider themselves subject to “status stig-
matization” leading to lower levels of well-being, job satisfaction, and performance 
(Boyce et al. 2007). Generally speaking, temporary jobs are found to be of an overall lower 
job quality (Green, Kler, Leeves 2010). The wage penalty of temporary workers is well 
documented in the literature: Mertens, Gash, McGinnity (2007) for example find that the 
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wages of temporary employees are 6.0% lower in Germany and 4.4% lower in Spain com-
pared to employees with permanent contracts. Holmlund and Storrie (2002) find a wage 
penalty of around 10% in Sweden. Thus, employees on temporary contracts should be 
highly motivated to compete for promotion into permanent contracts. Reinforcing these 
incentives is that job insecurity has been found to be detrimental to health and well-being, 
leading to increasing psychological morbidity (Virtanen et al. 2005) and overall job stress 
(De Witte 2005)
60
. 
In addition, strict employment protection for workers on permanent contracts is often asso-
ciated with low effort levels (e.g. Riphahn 2004, Ichino, Riphahn 2004) as employees feel 
sheltered by law from employer actions. Temporary workers who are usually exempt from 
labor protection legislation should, first, exert more effort to avoid negative consequences, 
such as a lay-off. Second, temporary workers have strong incentives to exert high levels of 
effort to recommend themselves for permanent contracts that, in turn, are associated with 
stricter employment protection. Summarizing, temporary contracts are associated with less 
favorable characteristics than permanent contracts. Thus, temporary workers have strong 
incentives to display high levels of effort in case that employers use temporary contracts as 
a screening device. High effort signals increase the probability of qualifying for tenure, 
leading to better working conditions, higher pay and stricter employment protection (Ami-
lon, Wallette 2009).  
In this paper we seek to answer the question whether and to what extent employees’ effort 
choices are affected by changes in contract status, i.e. by being promoted from a temporary 
to a permanent contract. From an economic point of view (individuals are assumed to be 
utility maximizers) a change is to be expected: As soon as the incentivizing effect of a 
temporary contract is gone, a formerly temporary worker is not motivated any longer to 
choose a high effort level. This assumption has been documented in a body of literature 
studying the behavioral responses of employees after the end of their probation period 
(during probation, i.e. in the first three to six months in a new job, employees do not bene-
fit from mandatory employment protection legislation and can, therefore, be dismissed 
easily). Thus, this instrument is popular among employers to screen the qualities of new 
recruits without having to accept long-term contractual obligations from the onset. Similar 
to temporary employees, workers during their probation period are assumed to have strong 
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  Two recent meta-analyses by Sverke, Hellgren and Näswall (2002) and Cheng and Chan (2008) summa-
rize the health-related consequences of job insecurity. 
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incentives to signal that they are able to meet and exceed the employer’s expectations in 
order to increase the probability of staying with the company and qualifying for employ-
ment protection. There is growing evidence in the literature confirming a behavioral re-
sponse of employees reducing effort choice and increasing shirking after the probation 
period ends. Using the “German Socio Economic Panel”, a large and representative sample 
of the German working population, Riphahn and Thalmaier (2001) find evidence of this 
behavioral (moral hazard) effect by demonstrating a statistically significant increase in 
absenteeism as soon as legal employment protection sets in after probation. Using a large 
sample of employees working for an Italian bank with branches all over the country, 
Ichino and Riphahn (2005) also find a significant increase in individual absenteeism once 
the employees’ probation periods have come to an end and they are sheltered by mandato-
ry employment protection laws. Finally, Pfeifer (2010) using personnel data from a large 
German company finds that newly hired white-collar workers are more than 50% less like-
ly to be absent during their probation period than in the following nine months. 
Given the behavioral responses of employees after probation, this argument has recently 
been adapted to explain changes in the behavior of (formerly) temporary workers who 
have been signed on permanent contracts. Using a representative sample of Australian em-
ployees, Bradley, Green and Leeves (2012) report significantly higher levels of effort (in 
terms of lower absence rates) for temporary workers who are assumed to be incentivized 
by being rewarded with a permanent contract. They find a statistically significant increase 
in individual absenteeism for workers moving from temporary to permanent employment. 
Summarizing, the available evidence leads us to conclude that temporary workers have 
strong incentives to reduce their effort levels after having signed permanent contracts as 
they do no longer need to demonstrate high levels of effort or avoid behaviors that might 
be considered by employers as shirking. Thus, we expect employee performance to deteri-
orate after a change in contract status (from temporary to permanent).  
We extend the available literature by applying the concept of behavioral changes following 
a change in contract status, i.e. when employees are promoted from a temporary to a per-
manent job. We are, to the best of our knowledge, the first researchers to work on this 
question with individual performance data other than absenteeism. Our data set from the 
trucking industry offers two unique and perfectly objective performance measures – indi-
vidual fuel consumption as well as a performance evaluation automatically generated by 
the company’s GPS fleet management system. Moreover, we add to the insider economet-
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rics literature by using a unique data set from one particular company. Finally, by using 
data derived from the fleet management system of the in-house hauler of a large European 
truck manufacturer we are, again to the best of our knowledge, the first economists to liter-
ally open the treasure box of this promising data source for personnel economics research.   
Investigating the issue of behavioral responses to changing contract characteristics in the 
trucking industry is promising in three ways. First, driver performance in terms of driving 
style immediately influences costs and thus operational efficiency. Since trucking is a 
highly competitive industry, even small differences in drivers’ effort choices can signifi-
cantly affect a company’s profitability. Therefore, research resulting in implications for 
firms to increase their operational efficiency should be appreciated by both, academics and 
practitioners. Second, while in the past the carrier-driver relationship was considered a 
prototypical principal-agent setting with the agent performing his tasks beyond the princi-
pal’s monitoring range,61 modern GPS-based on-board electronic computer systems now 
make driver monitoring an easy task (Hubbard 2000, Baker, Hubbard 2004). While until 
recently only the final result of a commercial truck driver’s performance could be meas-
ured (amount of goods transported and arrival time), modern fleet management systems 
now allow for an evaluation of the way the trip was carried out by monitoring driver be-
havior while on the road (Hubbard 2000) providing haulers via on-board computers with 
reliable and real-time data on driver performance. Thus, these systems offer indisputable 
evidence of driver performance and, at the same time, discourage drivers from manipula-
tion. Third, the performance of individuals is unaffected by the performance of their peers, 
suggesting that team effects arising in other environment are completely absent here. 
However, the performance of commercial truck drivers remains subject to exogenous con-
ditions the drivers themselves cannot influence, e.g. weather and road conditions or overall 
traffic. All this can influence driver performance in ways that conclusions drawn from the 
electronically assembled performance data may be misleading. However, our data set ena-
bles us to control for these external effects. These controls as well as the data set will be 
discussed in more detail in the following section.  
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  For a first application of the principal-agent model in the trucking industry see Vernon and Meier (2012). 
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5.3 Data Set and Descriptive Statistics 
To analyze employees’ behavioral responses to a change in contract status, we use a 
unique panel data set generated from the internal GPS-based fleet management system of 
an in-house hauler of a large European truck manufacturer. The data covers 36 consecutive 
months (from January 2011 to December 2013) and has detailed information on commer-
cial truck drivers’ performance on a trip-by-trip basis. The data was recorded via on-board 
computers installed in every truck and includes information on various driving parameters 
such as fuel consumption, distance covered and a large number of truck handling variables 
(e.g. average speed, speeding, number of brake applications, etc.). Moreover, the on-board 
computers assess driving performance by means of an internal traffic light evaluation tool. 
The data is supplemented with external information we believe to influence traffic condi-
tions and truck handling (e.g. weather, time of the day, day of the week, etc.). Additional-
ly, the data set was expanded to include information from the drivers’ personnel records 
(e.g. age, tenure and current contract status, i.e. temporary or permanent).  
The drivers’ assignment is to deliver intermediate products from one production facility of 
the truck manufacturer to another by passing through four Northern European countries, 
covering a distance of 1,250 kilometers. Since drivers are legally required to strictly com-
ply with mandatory driving and resting periods
62
, the hauler operates a resting facility ap-
proximately halfway. There, sleeping, cooking and sporting facilities are provided for use 
during the mandatory break. A typical route for a single truck is as follows: Driver A ar-
rives and immediately hands over his truck to driver B, who has just finished his resting 
time. Driver B continues the trip to the final destination making sure that the goods arrive 
just-in-time. At the same time, driver A awaits the arrival of the next truck. After having 
finished his mandatory rest period driver A then continues his journey to the final destina-
tion on a truck that has just been handed over to him. Thus, on a standard round-trip each 
driver completes four different stages on four different vehicles with the drivers having no 
influence whatsoever on the kind of truck (the trucks are different in terms of age and in 
terms of brands).  
The initial data set includes information on 81 drivers (n=11,439 driver-trip-observations). 
However, we exclude observations of drivers whose contract status did not change during 
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  According to regulations on road haulage operations by the European Commission the daily driving peri-
od must not exceed 9 hours while daily resting periods of at least 11 hours are mandatory. Drivers may 
slightly deviate from these regulations two or three times a week (European Commission 2014d). 
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the observation period resulting in n=2,769 driver-trip-observations. We further restrict the 
dataset to include only trips with a reported distance between 520 and 720 kilometers since 
the production sites are located 570 kilometers and 670 kilometers away from the resting 
facility
63
. Moreover, we only retain in our data set drivers with at least 30 trips before and 
30 trips after a change in contract status. Finally, we exclude trips with “suspicious” levels 
of fuel consumption, i.e. a reported fuel use outside a range of minus two standard devia-
tions to plus four standard deviations from the mean.  
These restrictions lead to a small sample including eight drivers only (these drivers repre-
sent 10% of the company’s workforce in long-haul trucking).64 More important, however, 
is the fact that we have at least 100 observations for each of the eight drivers (mean=162.4 
observations). The final number of driver-trip-observations (n=1,299) appears to be suffi-
cient for a detailed econometric analysis as the data set  covers approximately 11.4% of all 
trips during the period under investigation.  
As already mentioned above, the information from the fleet management system was 
matched with driver demographics including age and tenure as well as information on the 
exact date when a driver’s contract was converted from temporary to permanent (Table 5.1 
displays the summary statistics of drivers’ demographic characteristics. 
Table 5.1: Summary Statistics – Driver Demographics 
Variable mean s.d. min. max. 
Driver age (in years) 42.4 12.3 19 61 
Driver tenure (in 3-months 
intervals) 
5.9 3.3 1 13 
Driver temporary status 
(temporary status=1) 
.44 - 0 1 
Number of drivers: 8 
Number of driver-trip observations: 1,299 
Interestingly, reported driver age covers almost the complete working life ranging from 19 
to 61 years with a mean of 42.4 years (s.d.=12.3). Comparing the age of these eight drivers 
                                                 
63
  Distances shorter than 570 km occur if drivers exceed the maximum driving time allowed before reaching 
either the resting facility or one of the production sites (due to e.g. traffic jams). Distances longer than 
670 km arise if drivers have to avoid traffic congestions or constructions by taking alternative routes.  
64
  In addition to long-distance trucking the hauler operates domestic short-haul trucking as well as further 
transportation services (e.g. bus transportation, etc.).  
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with that of the remaining 73 trucker, we see that the figures are almost identical 
(mean=44.2, s.d.=11.0, min=22, max=64). The same holds true with respect to nationality 
as all drivers are reported to originally come from the hauler’s domestic country. With 
respect to tenure – reported in three-month intervals – we find slightly lower values for the 
eight drivers who were initially employed on a temporary contract. Of the 1,299 driver-trip 
observations that we use in our estimations, 44% occurred when the drivers were on a 
temporary contract while 56% occurred after the drivers’ contracts had been converted to 
permanent. This allows for a “clean” pre-post contract status comparison.  
The hauler operates a modern GPS-based fleet management system to manage and monitor 
all activities of its fleet. Each vehicle is equipped with on-board computers providing 
abundant information on fuel consumption, driving style and truck handling. Furthermore, 
the system automatically assesses driver performance along selected driving parameters. 
With the help of a complex algorithm – which is unknown to us – the on-board devices 
compute evaluation scores based on target values predefined by the hauler. Four of the 
most important evaluation criteria are anticipation, use of brakes, hill drive and choice of 
gear. These scores are then merged with further driving parameters to an overall trip eval-
uation classifying each trip as either “good”, “mediocre” or “poor”. Based on a traffic light 
system, the evaluation is reported to an online tool which allows fleet managers to monitor 
each driver’s performance on every single trip. Interestingly, drivers can also access these 
evaluation reports and compare their results with the performance of their peers.  
Table 5.2: Summary Statistics – Dependent Variables 
Variable  mean s.d. min. max. 
Fuel consumption       
Fuel consumption (in l/100km)  28.0 2.9 21.6 38.7 
Trip Evaluation      
Overall (good=1, med=2, poor=3)*  1.89 .98 1 3 
Good (yes=1)*  .54 - 0 1 
Mediocre (yes=1)*  .03 - 0 1 
Poor (yes=1)*  .43 - 0 1 
Number of drivers: 8 
Number of driver-trip observations: 1,299 
* Reduced number of observations due to three missing values (n=1,296). 
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It is important to bear in mind that the traditionally used measure “fuel consumption per 
100 km” is not included in the automatic evaluation of the individual trips. However, driv-
ing behavior that leads to a “good” evaluation is characterized by an eco-friendly driving 
style (no harsh accelerations, no speeding, etc.). It appears from Figure A.1 in the Appen-
dix, that fuel consumption and trip evaluation are uncorrelated: Average fuel use for trips 
evaluated as “good” is 28.1 liters per 100 km, for trips evaluated as “mediocre” it is 28.2 
liters and for trips evaluated as “poor” the respective value is 27.9 liters (F=0,49; not sig-
nificant). Moreover, it appears from Table 5.2 that slightly more than half of all trips 
(54%) are assessed as “good” and 43% as “poor”. Only 3% of all trips are evaluated as 
“mediocre”. Thus, apart from the standard performance measure “fuel use per 100 km” we 
use in our estimations a second performance measure (“quality of trip as assessed by the 
company’s fleet management system”) that is uncorrelated with the first one.   
Our study design has a number of advantages avoiding major weaknesses of previous re-
search in the economics of trucking. First, drivers can usually not be compared as they 
work under highly variable conditions, experiencing different exogenous effects of differ-
ent routes and destinations (e.g. road conditions, constructions, detours, etc.). Due to the 
organizational setting of our study we are able to assume equal road and environmental 
conditions since all drivers use the same predefined route. Second, based on detailed in-
formation on date and time of each trip, we are able to control for weather as well as for 
date- (e.g. holiday) or time-of-the-day related (e.g. rush hours) peaks in traffic density 
since “timing” is likely to influence driving performance. Third, drivers are observed on 
different trucks without having any influence on truck selection. Thus, we can account for 
vehicle specific effects and eliminate any impact of driver-truck matches. Fourth, almost 
one quarter of all vehicle-kilometers of trucks in European cross-border traffic occurs on 
empty trucks (European Commission 2014c). Any study that is unable to control for load 
factors is thus likely to suffer from an omitted variable bias as full and empty trucks differ 
in maneuverability and fuel consumption. Since the hauler whose data we use here reports 
average load factors of more than 90% on its out as well as its return journeys, this issue 
can be neglected.    
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5.4 Empirical Models and Estimation Results 
Recall that our empirical analyses are based on two different, yet somewhat related per-
formance measures that can be considered proxies for choice of effort. First, we use in our 
estimations average fuel consumption per 100 km as the dependent variable. It appears 
from Table 5.2 that mean fuel consumption is 28.0 liters/100km with a standard deviation 
of 2.9 liters. Since all drivers receive individual fuel efficiency training in irregular inter-
vals, we consider them well-informed on how driving behavior and style affects fuel con-
sumption.
65
 Thus, we suggest any differences in fuel consumption to derive from drivers’ 
individual effort choices. Second, we use the reports of the internal trip evaluation tool 
assessing each trip as either “good”, “mediocre” or “poor” (see Table 5.2). Since drivers 
are offered full online access to all evaluation reports they are aware not only of their per-
formance relative to their peers, but also of any kind of “misconduct” in driving behavior. 
Interestingly, publicly available performance evaluations have recently been found to elim-
inate social loafing and increase performance at least in group work settings (Lount, Wilk 
2014). Further research indicates feedback to be highly appreciated by truck drivers with 
feedback from advanced technology being less desired than feedback from supervisors 
(Huang et al. 2005). Thus, drivers receiving performance feedback and still not performing 
in accordance with the employer’s expectations are assumed to drive with reduced effort. 
While fuel consumption is a categorical variable, the trip evaluation variable is ordinal. 
Both outcome variables are computed by the in-vehicle computers and are not prone to any 
subjective rater bias or manipulation by the drivers.  
Our models have the following general form (with FUELC denoting fuel consumption per 
100km and EVAL being the composite evaluation measure): 
FUELC = α + βDRIV + γVEH + δTRAF + φWEA + ωCONTR  + ε (1) 
EVAL = α + βDRIV + γVEH + δTRAF + φWEA + ωCONTR + ε (2) 
where α is the constant, DRIV represents the driver performance (see equation (3) for de-
tails), VEH is a set of vehicle dummies, TRAF a vector of traffic conditions, WEA a vector 
of weather conditions and CONTR a vector of further controls, β, γ, δ, φ and ω are the es-
                                                 
65
  Although we have no information on the frequency or the exact dates of individual fuel efficiency train-
ing we assume this not to be a problem since recent research has convincingly demonstrated that (car) 
drivers seem to know by intuition how to drive eco-friendly (van Mierlo et al. 2004). Therefore, we as-
sume that fuel efficiency training does not fundamentally change driver behavior, i.e. fuel consumption 
goes down after training but returns to its pre-training level rather quickly.    
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timated coefficients and ε is the error term. All variables are discussed in more detail be-
low.  
Driver performance (DRIV) is modeled as follows:  
DRIV = f ((AGE + HUMC) * EFCH) (3) 
where AGE is driver age and HUMC represents a drivers’ human capital in the form of 
past driving experience with the current employer (tenure in three-month intervals).
66
 Pre-
vious research provides evidence for the negative effect of age on various abilities relevant 
to driving, e.g. response time, visual and psychomotor abilities (e.g. Llaneras et al. 1998). 
Other findings, however, suggest that older drivers can compensate for age-related im-
pairments by experience (e.g. Guest, Boggess, Duke 2014). Additionally, young and less 
experienced drivers are found to have a higher probability of being involved in accidents 
(e.g. Häkkänen, Summala 2001), which further underlines the importance of experience in 
trucking. Hence, we include age as well as driving experience in our model to account for 
these effects. Both variables taken together represent the performance potential of an em-
ployee, which is then subject to drivers’ current effort choice (EFCH). Depending on the 
choice of effort, performance potential eventually translates into actual driver performance. 
In our estimations EFCH is represented by a dummy variable taking a value of 1 of a driv-
er is on a temporary contract and 0 if he is on a permanent contract.  
In addition, we control in our estimations for exogenous effects that may influence truck 
driver performance. VEH is a series of vehicle dummies accounting for differences in 
technological configurations of trucks that might facilitate driving and/or decrease fuel 
consumption. TRAF is a vector of variables controlling for traffic density on the trips in 
two different ways. On the one hand, we include variables to control for the time of the 
day when the streets are presumably less congested (e.g. during night time, between 8 p.m. 
and 7 a.m. the next day) or more congested (e.g. during rush hours, between 7 a.m. and 9 
a.m. in the morning as well as between 4 p.m. and 6 p.m. in the afternoon) when traffic 
density is particularly high due to commuter traffic. On the other hand, we include the day 
of the week as we believe some days to be systematically different (e.g. Mondays or Fri-
days) from others. Furthermore, we control for a three-day window around international 
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  We are well aware that tenure on a monthly basis would be preferable for the first few months; however, 
we chose three-month intervals because during our observation period of 36 months any effect of month-
ly tenure is likely to disappear quickly as time elapses.  
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holidays during which we suppose traffic density to be higher due to holiday traffic (public 
holidays in all countries the drivers pass on their trips, e.g. New Year’s Day, Easter, 
Christmas, etc.). WEA is a vector of weather dummies including wind speed, precipitation, 
snow depth, and temperature
67
 because previous research has found driving behavior, traf-
fic conditions as well as crash risks to be associated with weather conditions (e.g. Kil-
peläinen, Summala 2007). Moreover, we include dummy variables for all thirty-six months 
to account for possible trend or timing effects. Finally, to control for season effects we 
include dummies for all fifty-two weeks of a particular year. Given the wide range of con-
trol variables, we are confident to have excluded most exogenous influences on driver per-
formance and are thus able to study the “clean” effect of drivers’ behavioral responses to a 
change in their contract status.  
We start the discussion of our findings by looking first at the impact of contract status on 
fuel consumption (equation (1) above) in the short-term, followed by a detailed analysis of 
its impact in the long-run. We then go on to present our findings with respect to the impact 
of contract status on trip evaluation (equation (2) above). The main results are reported in 
Tables 5.3, 5.4, and 5.5 suggesting that commercial truck drivers significantly change their 
behavior following changes in their contract status, i.e. reduce their effort levels after hav-
ing been promoted from a temporary to a permanent contract. The baseline results of our 
fixed-effects estimates with fuel consumption as the dependent variable are displayed in 
Tables 5.3 and 5.4. We use various specifications including different sets of explanatory 
variables to control for the robustness of our findings. 
To identify the impact of a change in contract status on fuel consumption in the short-run, 
we narrow the observation period to a six-month window and compare for each driver his 
performance in the last three months under the temporary contract with that during the first 
three months under the permanent contract. It appears from Table 5.3 that the immediate 
consequence of promoting a driver from a temporary to a permanent contract is a statisti-
cally significant and economically relevant increase in fuel consumption of more than 10% 
(3.04 l/100km). While this finding supports our assumption of a strong initial behavioral 
response in the first few months after having been promoted to a permanent contract, it is 
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  Weather information was collected from a meteorological station located approximately in the middle of 
the round-trip route. This admittedly crude weather proxy helps to overcome the problem that we cannot 
control for truck position in detail. Thus, we assume that weather information from half the distance ade-
quately reflects the slightly differing climate zones of the trips’ starting and arrival points. Data was pro-
vided by the German Meteorological Service (DWD, 2014).  
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not yet clear whether this initial reaction remains constant over time or whether drivers 
change their behavior once more after some time has elapsed. 
Table 5.3: Impact of Contract Status on Short-Term Fuel Consumption  
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Temporary Contract (yes=1) -1.887** -1.887** -3.035** 
 (.628) (.628) (.903) 
Age (in years)  .480 1.079 
  (4.215) (4.188) 
Tenure (in three-month intervals)   -1.445 
   (.872) 
Vehicle Dummies YES YES YES 
Date Dummies YES YES YES 
Time Dummies YES YES YES 
Weather Dummies YES YES YES 
Driver Fixed-Effects YES YES YES 
Constant 37.31 25.46 -1.461 
 (72.72) (170.0) (171.5) 
Number of observations 308 308 308 
Number of drivers 8 8 8 
R-squared .343 .343 .350 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10 
Table 5.4 displays the results of our second estimation, identifying the long-run behavioral 
responses of commercial truck drivers to changes in contract status. According to the point 
estimates, drivers on average reduce their individual effort level upon a change in contract 
(e.g. from temporary to permanent). The coefficient of contract status in our preferred 
specification (model 3) is -.475 (standard error = .150). This implies that, other things 
equal, a driver uses .475 l/100km less fuel when employed on a temporary contract. On 
average, drivers cover an annual distance of 125,765 km and use 35,185 liters of fuel. The 
estimated coefficient translates into an increased fuel use of 600 liters per year after a 
change in contract status. Assuming a fuel price of €1.50 per liter, this amounts to addi-
tional fuel costs of around €900 per driver and year for everybody who is promoted from a 
temporary to a permanent job. Thus, these costs can be interpreted as “hidden costs of con-
tract conversion” (from temporary to permanent).  
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Table 5.4: Impact of Contract Status on Long-Term Fuel Consumption
68
 
Variables 
FE RE 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Temporary Contract  -.397* -.415** -.475** -.487** -.487*** 
(yes=1) (.180) (.161) (.142) (.150) (.151) 
Tenure (in three-month     -.0740 -.0026 
intervals)    (.208) (.209) 
Age (in years)    -.604 -.0740 
    (1.550) (.027) 
Date Dummies YES YES YES YES YES 
Vehicle Dummies  YES YES YES YES 
Time Dummies   YES YES YES 
Weather Dummies   YES YES YES 
Driver Fixed-Effects YES YES YES YES  
Constant 25.51*** 25.65*** .118 39.11 0 
 (1.085) (1.126) (25.37) (64.72) (0) 
Number of observations 1,299 1,299 1,299 1,299 1,299 
Number of drivers 8 8 8 8 8 
R-squared .090 .116 .128 .128  
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1 
To further control for the influence of age and tenure we estimated a random-effects mod-
el, the results of which are displayed in column 5 of Table 5.4. Contrary to previous re-
search (e.g. Llaneras et al. 1998), we find driver performance to be unaffected by age 
and/or experience. This is perhaps surprising as the drivers in our data set are very hetero-
geneous in terms of age (19 to 61 years) and tenure (up to 38 months). The fact that a driv-
er’s human capital (in terms of experience) seems to be irrelevant for his style of driving 
renders the impact of motivation and choice of effort (EFCH) even more important. Per-
haps surprisingly, none of the thirty-eight vehicle dummies comes close to statistical sig-
nificance (coefficients not displayed in table to save space). This finding might suggest 
that vehicle technology is not as important as driver behavior in determining fuel con-
sumption. Yet, we believe this finding to be due to a more straightforward explanation. 
The hauler sorts out vehicles from its fleet after they have been used for about one million 
kilometers. Since this threshold level is usually reached after about two to three years, the 
hauler’s fleet consists of almost (brand) new trucks and all drivers are equipped with state-
of-the-art technology. Therefore, it seems reasonable that our dummies representing differ-
ences in vehicle technology fail to reach statistical significance. Interestingly and in con-
trast to previous research (Kilpeläinen, Summala 2007), the only statistically significant 
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  Age and tenure effects were estimated individually but fail to reach statistical significance. 
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weather variable in terms of fuel consumption is wind speed (+.11 l). This is again plausi-
ble as trucks are prone to windage due to their size and unfavorable aerodynamic features. 
None of the remaining weather variables, e.g. temperature, snow fall and precipitation 
came close to statistical significance. In particular, we expected high temperatures to have 
a noticeable influence on fuel consumption since air conditioning systems are widely 
known to increase fuel use. With respect to the time dummies (months and weeks), no 
clear pattern emerges. On Tuesdays fuel consumption levels are higher (plus .77 liters per 
100 km) higher than on the reference day (Mondays). No other day of the week effect can 
be identified.
69
  
The results of our fixed-effect estimations still hold after including a dummy variable rep-
resenting presence of a bonus regime during the first two years of the observation period.
70
 
The bonus regime might be an additional factor influencing driver behavior via choice of 
effort (EFCH). In particular, the bonus regime might impact the motivational effects that 
we attribute exclusively to behavioral responses following the change in contract status. 
However, we fail to find any significant effect of the bonus regime (see Table A.11 in the 
appendix with estimations including the bonus regime). Thus, we are confident that the 
behavioral responses identified are entirely attributable to changes in motivation and effort 
choice triggered by a change in contract status.  
Since we are particularly interested in the timing as well as the persistence of the individu-
al drivers’ behavioral response, we included in our estimations a trend variable counting 
the number of months after contract conversion for each driver. The respective coefficient 
indicates a statistically significant negative effect (-.140), suggesting an increase of fuel 
consumption after the change in contract status (see Table A.12 in the appendix). The coef-
ficient of the squared time trend, however, is positive and significant (.004) indicating a u-
shaped pattern (with the turning point after 18 months). This, in turn, suggests that truck 
drivers in the long run return to their initial performance levels. Apparently, utility-
maximizing truck drivers seem to no longer feel the need of displaying high levels of effort 
                                                 
69
  The coefficients for trips at night (-.008 l) and during evening rush hours (+.26 l) have the expected signs 
but fail to reach statistical significance. Surprisingly, the coefficient for morning rush hours (-.11 l) is 
negatively signed, but also fails to reach statistical significance. 
70
  The bonus regime was in practice from the beginning of the observation period in January 2011 until 
December 2012 when the hauler decided to abolish it. Although a low fuel consumption was not directly 
rewarded by the incentive system, drivers were financially incentivized to perform according to the 
measures of the on-board evaluation tool.  
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after having been signed to a permanent contract. Indeed, individuals reduce their effort 
levels substantially and performance deteriorates considerably once a transition in contract 
status has occurred. However, with respect to fuel consumption this change in behavior 
seems to get weaker over time. 
We now present the findings of our second estimation using the automatically generated 
trip evaluation as a measure for driving performance and proxy for driver choice of effort. 
To account for the ordinal nature of the data, we estimate a series of ordered logit models 
as suggested by Gujarati and Porter (2009) as well as Wooldridge (2013). It appears from 
Table A.12 in the appendix that there are significant behavioral responses in terms of high-
er levels of effort depending on contract status (temporary vs. permanent). Table 5.5 pre-
sents the post-estimation probabilities for individual trip evaluations. 
Table 5.5: Estimated Probabilities for Trip Evaluation 
Variables Temporary Permanent Change 95% CI for Change 
Trip Evaluation      
Good  .7471 .4140 -.3331 -.4837 -.1825 
Mediocre  .0404 .0559 .0155 -.0045 .0355 
Poor  .2124 .5300 .3176 .1682  .4671 
 
According to our estimations the probability of a trip being evaluated as “good” is 74.7% 
when a driver is on a temporary contract and 41.4% when a driver is permanently em-
ployed. Thus, the probability of a performance that is in accordance with the employer’s 
expectations is 33.3 percentage points (or 80.4%) higher in the case of the former workers. 
An inverse pattern appears for trips evaluated as “poor”. Here the probability for tempo-
rary workers is 21.2% compared to 53.0% for drivers on permanent contracts. This yields a 
difference of 31.8 percentage points or 150%, respectively. This result confirms our main 
finding that drivers on temporary contracts have strong incentives to signal motivation and 
high levels of effort. After having signed a permanent contract, drivers quickly reduce their 
effort levels leading to a lower overall driving performance evaluation. However, a closer 
look at the data reveals that when comparing both fuel consumption and trip evaluation 
before and after promotion to a permanent contract, only half of the drivers perform worse 
after they have been promoted. Thus, while some drivers show (negative) behavioral reac-
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tions to a change in contract status, others do not (this finding is in line with e.g. Nagin et 
al. 2002 as well as Riphahn and Thalmeier 2001). 
We admit that due to the organizational setting of our study we have to be aware of some 
limitations that preclude generalization of our findings. First, the number of drivers (n=8) 
is quite small. However, the data set consists of at least 100 observations per driver result-
ing in a total number of observations of 1,299. We are, therefore, confident that our results 
are robust and reliable. Second, due to the hauler’s data privacy restrictions of drivers’ 
personnel records, we are unable to include in our estimations measures of driver qualifica-
tion and former experience with other employers. Yet, since we control for age and tenure 
with the current employer, we believe to have included sufficient proxies for qualification 
and past driving experience. Moreover, the coefficients of both, age and tenure failed to 
reach statistical significance indicating a negligible importance of qualification and (for-
mer) driving experience. 
5.5 Conclusion 
Using a hitherto unavailable data set compiled from the fleet management system of an in-
house hauler of a large European truck manufacturer, we provide robust evidence on em-
ployees’ behavioral responses to changes in contract status (i.e. following the transition 
from a temporary to a permanent contract). We analyze commercial truck drivers’ effort 
choices before and after they have been signed to a permanent contract using two perfor-
mance variables – fuel consumption per 100 km and an automatically generated trip evalu-
ation measure. 
In line with previous research (Bradley et al. 2012), our findings suggest that commercial 
truck drivers choose their effort levels depending on the nature of their contracts, i.e. they 
exert more effort (in the sense of using less fuel and better trip evaluations) when on tem-
porary contracts. After having been promoted drivers adjust their effort levels, i.e. use 
more fuel and receive more “bad” evaluations. These findings are robust on various speci-
fications and survive a number of robustness checks. Drivers on temporary contracts (or 
more general: workers) – being aware of or just assuming screening activities to be used 
by the hauler (or more general: firms) – choose high levels of effort to signal motivation 
and dedication. However, as soon as drivers (workers) are signed to permanent contracts, 
they reduce effort back to “normal” levels. When employed under a permanent contract, 
fuel consumption of drivers is 600 liters higher per year (the additional costs per driver are 
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around 900 € per year) than when employed under a temporary contract. We interpret this 
as the hidden costs of changes in contract status (from temporary to permanent). This 
negative (expensive) behavioral response is particularly strong in the first months after 
contract conversion but then declines to reach the initial level again after about 18 months. 
Moreover, for drivers on temporary contracts the probability of a trip being evaluated by 
the trucks’ computer system as “good” is 55% higher than for drivers on permanent con-
tracts. Yet, we find only half of the drivers to display these behavioral changes when being 
promoted from a temporary to a permanent contract. The other half does not respond to the 
new contract status but instead perform at their initial effort levels. This finding is in line 
with Nagin et al. (2002) who also find that only a fraction of employees behave as “ration-
al cheaters” when given the opportunity to do so while many others resist that temptation.    
Where do the incentive effects of temporary contracts come from? Permanent contracts 
have been found to be associated with better working conditions, higher pay, more job 
security and higher levels of employment protection. Most temporary workers want to rec-
ommend themselves for permanent contracts to enjoy increased levels of job security and 
dismissal protection legislation. This is particularly true in our case as the country where 
the headquarters of the hauler is located has most recently been ranked below average on 
OECD’s “Indicators of Employment Protection” for workers on temporary contracts and 
above average for workers on permanent contracts (OECD 2013). Moreover, we are not 
aware of any differences in working conditions for temporary and permanently employed 
drivers at this particular firm.  
What are the practical implications that can be derived from our results? From an organiza-
tional point of view, the results seem to suggest keeping employees on temporary contracts 
as long as possible to maximize the returns from higher effort levels. Yet, labor laws rule 
out recurring extension of temporary contracts. It may, therefore, appear an even more 
promising strategy to employ temporary workers only. However, in the absence of promo-
tion opportunities (from temporary to permanent contracts) temporary workers lack the 
necessary incentives to choose high levels of effort. Dolado and Stucchi (2008) find that 
firms with a high contract conversion rate (by promoting workers from temporary to per-
manent contracts) display higher levels of labor productivity. Thus, it seems a reasonable 
strategy to openly communicate the screening nature of temporary contracts since then 
temporary workers will be motivated to choose high levels of effort. Moreover, offering 
properly designed monetary incentives during the weeks and months after contract conver-
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sion may help to deter negative behavioral responses by workers. Thus, by offering em-
ployees “new” incentives, firms can compensate for the loss of incentives after having 
signed formerly temporary workers to permanent contracts. 
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6 SUMMARY AND FUTURE OUTLOOK 
This research provides a comprehensive analysis on how economic and social influences 
affect employee behavior and, hence, worker productivity. Primarily, the aim of the pre-
sent work is to contribute to a better understanding of the influence that environmental 
variables – in terms of incentives and teamwork – exert on workers’ effort choice decisions 
in order to identify ways and instruments that may enhance worker productivity. Along 
these research interests, the four separate analyses of the work at hand can be divided into 
two parts. The first part (chapters two and three) centers on potential social determinants 
within work groups (peer effects and worker heterogeneity) that may affect workers’ effort 
choices. Subsequently, the second part (chapter three to five) analyzes the link between 
potential economic determinants (incentives) and workers’ effort choice. Implications to 
enhance worker productivity are discussed in detail for both parts.  
Throughout this thesis, productivity is assessed by means of the three following categories 
of performance measures: 
 overall team performance based on subjective or objective performance 
measures (chapter 2) 
 employee absenteeism (chapter 3) 
 objective computerized performance evaluations (chapters 4 and 5) 
The respective covariates of teamwork / work groups used in chapters two and three can be 
categorized as follows:  
 diversity in the composition of the group 
 task-related variables (tenure, function, educational background, edu-
cational level) 
 non-task related variables (age, gender, culture) 
 team size  
 consistency of group composition (turnover) 
 worker characteristics (share of temporary workers, share of workers who 
suffer from health impairments) 
The respective covariates of incentives applied in chapters three to five are:  
 incentives in the economic environment 
 national regulations (sickness benefits, employment protection laws) 
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 economic circumstance (prosperity level, (un)employment rate) 
 incentives in the employment relationship 
 performance incentives (bonus pay depending on work performance) 
 contract status (temporary vs. permanent employment contracts) 
Relevant insights on social and economic influences that determine worker productivity 
are provided throughout all four studies of the thesis at hand. While the first study (chapter 
two) is built on existing empirical research in applying state-of-the-art meta-analytic pro-
cedures, the subsequent studies (chapters three to five) are drawing on rich – hitherto una-
vailable – insider econometric data from inside a global automobile manufacturer. The 
research interest of each chapter has been broken down to simplified one-sentence research 
questions (as stated in chapter one): 
Chapter 2:  Is employee behavior and, thus, work group performance affected by work 
group composition in terms of homogeneity/heterogeneity? 
Chapter 3:  What are potential social and economic determinants of employee absence 
behavior at the team-level? 
Chapter 4:  Do employees respond to unfavorable changes in extrinsic incentive design 
by adapting their behavior in terms of effort choice and productivity? 
Chapter 5:  Do employees adjust their effort choice and productivity when being “pro-
moted” from temporary to permanent employment? 
The first two questions address peer effects of work group settings on employee behavior. 
Findings presented in chapter two confirm work group diversity to affect team perfor-
mance. In support of similarity-attraction and social categorization theories, a negative 
effect of less task-related age and gender heterogeneity on overall team performance is 
identified. In line with economic theory, results for highly task-related educational back-
ground diversity suggest a positive relation to work group productivity. Team size and 
team type moderate the diversity-performance relationship. Implications that seek to in-
crease team productivity have to be distinguished along the task of the team. Two major 
lessons learned can be stated in order to provide practitioners with relevant information on 
how to manage work group diversity. First, group heterogeneity should be low in teams 
that work on standardized or routine tasks, e.g. blue-collar work teams. In contrast to this, 
group heterogeneity – even on less task-related attributes – is valuable for teams whose 
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tasks require creative thinking, problem solving and decision making, e.g. TMT and R&D 
teams. Second, large teams regularly outperform smaller teams on creative tasks and deci-
sion making. Hence, groups performing these tasks benefit from additional members.  
In line with general findings on shirking in groups, results of chapter three reveal produc-
tivity to decrease with team size. According to experts from inside the company, this is 
attributable to less extensive monitoring and absence management activities of line man-
agers’ as team size increases. Similarly, inconsistencies in group composition as indicated 
by high turnover result in lower productivity. This can be explained by the lack of social 
ties and team spirit which negatively influences employees’ motivation and willingness to 
choose high effort levels. Referring to co-worker characteristics, the share of temporary 
workers in a team is negatively related to effort choice and, thus, offers support for the 
existence of shirking. The share of workers with any kind of health impairment is not 
found to influence effort choice decisions and productivity. Three main implications for 
practitioners can be derived from these results. First, managers need to invest time in de-
veloping close social ties with their subordinates. Although costly at first, productivity 
gains will arise in the long run since absence management is facilitated. Companies should 
support managers by creating appropriate conditions when it comes to organizational cul-
ture. Second, in order to avoid productivity losses that may arise from shirking behavior of 
permanently employed workers in the presence of temporary workers, firms would be well 
advised to keep the share of temporary agents at a moderate level. Third, employee turno-
ver is found to increase group absence and, hence, should be kept on a low level.  
With regard to economic determinants of employee behavior as addressed in the second 
research question, behavioral effects induced by incentives are analyzed in chapters three 
to five. Incentives may arise either from the nature of the employment relation (e.g. per-
formance pay, contract status) or from the given economic environment (e.g. unemploy-
ment situation, sickness benefits). The second empirical study of the present thesis (chapter 
three) provides mixed findings on incentives resulting from the economic environment. In 
support of personnel economic theory, findings suggest that incentives to shirk are higher 
with strict employee rights as well as with an increase in national prosperity level. Both 
effects are attributable to a feeling of job security that incentivizes employees to take the 
risk of being caught shirking since they value consequences to be negligible. Despite the 
fact that the relation between national sickness benefits and employee absence is widely 
recognized (e.g. Frick, Malo 2008), the present work fails to find support for this notion. 
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This can be explained by the fact that the company under observation levels out differ-
ences in national sickness legislation to a certain degree. Any conclusion on this issue 
would, therefore, be biased. Additionally, findings on the influence of national 
(un)employment figures on absence are inconclusive. However, it seems difficult to de-
duce implications for businesses since the economic incentives discussed are mainly poli-
cy-driven. Still, it seems to be advantageous to openly communicate the economic situa-
tion of the company in order to increase employees’ awareness of potential risks. This may 
discourage workers from shirking behavior.  
Questions three and four are closely related since both of them focus on the productivity 
effects of economic incentives in the employment relationship. Findings of chapter four 
are counterintuitive to personnel economic conceptions of incentives as positively affect-
ing productivity. Instead, the results reveal that employees display significantly less effort 
when receiving individual performance bonus pay. These findings support arguments stat-
ed in the crowding-out theory that suggests extrinsic incentives to buy off employees’ in-
trinsic motivation. In the case at hand, intrinsic and social motives such as environmental 
concerns, peer competition as well as concerns for status and reputation serve as adequate 
explanations. The most important lesson learned from this finding might be the fact that 
monetary incentives may not serve as a panacea to align the interests of principals and 
agents under all circumstances. Instead, it is highly recommended to consider the internal 
and external fit of incentive schemes and general HRM instruments that are in operation.  
In contrast to this, findings of chapter five again appear in line with the personnel econom-
ics incentive literature since employees on a temporary contract exert more effort and, 
thus, are more productive than their colleagues on permanent contracts. Yet, this produc-
tivity surplus disappears after employees are promoted to permanent contracts. This behav-
ior is attributable to the incentivizing nature of permanent employment contracts that usu-
ally come along with higher pay, better working conditions and stricter employment pro-
tection compared to temporary contracts. After having been promoted, drivers do no longer 
yearn for permanent employment and readjust their effort choice decisions. Managers 
should, therefore, consider properly designed incentives during the phase of contract con-
version. Moreover, findings suggest that a company may use temporary contracts as a 
screening instrument since temporary agents will be incentivized to be more productive 
given the prospect of being offered a permanent contract.  
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Given these findings, four main economic insights can be summarized (in line with Ich-
niowski and Shaw 2013). First, individual worker productivity is (at least partially) deter-
mined by peers. Since individuals in teams may be complements concerning their 
knowledge and skills (e.g. educational background), team performance is usually more 
than the sum of the individuals’ productivity if a team-based production function is as-
sumed. Second, in accordance with previous theoretical and empirical evidence, the work 
at hand suggests that management practices such as incentive schemes, temporary con-
tracts and teamwork influence workers’ effort choice decisions at the intensive margin. 
Thus, the introduction of any new HRM instrument may be assumed to affect individual 
worker productivity. Third, in line with previous research, empirical evidence presented 
throughout this work emphasizes managerial practices and human resource instruments to 
have a large effect upon worker productivity and, thus, companies’ baseline results. Alt-
hough not all studies of this thesis allow for clear quantitative assessments of productivity 
shifts, the overall results suggest that employees’ effort choice decisions in response to 
specific human resource practices have a substantial impact on the profitability of the 
company. Fourth, in line with the general approach of personnel economics, the results 
presented – in large parts – confirm human beings to behave as rational utility maximizers 
who aim at increasing their individual income. However, there is also evidence indicating 
that employees might behave far less incentive-oriented in decision making as presumed. 
Instead of responding to incentive payments by increasing effort as expected by economic 
theory, workers are found to reduce individual effort in response to extrinsic incentives. 
This reduces worker productivity and imposes additional costs on the employer that may 
be interpreted as hidden costs of incentives. As a result, managers need to carefully evalu-
ate the ideal combination of management practices and HRM instruments that best suits 
the current situation of the company, the industry, the employees, and the set of HRM in-
struments in practice. Often management practices are complements of one another and, 
therefore, might not develop their full potential when only used isolated (e.g. Ichniowski, 
Shaw, Prennushi 1997, Milgrom, Roberts 1990).  
Due to its broad scope with regard to research field, data and method the present work con-
tributes to personnel economics for several reasons. First, the major part of this thesis is 
built on hitherto unavailable insider data gathered at one international company and, thus, 
extends the emerging strand of insider econometric literature. Moreover, parts of this work 
are based on highly innovative GPS-based fleet management data that – to the best of the 
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author’s knowledge – has not yet been used in personnel economics research. Since avail-
ability and quality of this objective real-time data is overwhelming, its study may offer 
broad advantages in analyzing employee behavior. This thesis, therefore, makes a relevant 
claim to include this innovative and promising type of data into personnel economics. Sec-
ond, the use of objective performance measures as indicators of worker productivity de-
picts a distinct advantage over most existing research that is often based merely on subjec-
tive (self-) rated performance. This is particularly true for absenteeism research since reg-
ister absence data is often unavailable to researchers. As a consequence, most existing 
findings on absence are based on self-reported absence figures that are known to be biased 
due to underestimation with actual absence being twice as high (Johns 1994). Hence, the 
objective absence data used in chapter three depicts a clear advantage. Similarly, analyses 
in chapters four and five benefit from computerized performance evaluations that are col-
lected automatically and objectively rate performance based on predefined algorithms. In 
general, the use of high quality objective performance measures constitutes a major ad-
vantage of the dissertation at hand. It addresses weaknesses which can be found in parts of 
the existing productivity research that often rely on subjective performance measures. 
Based on objective performance data, the presented findings complement existing evi-
dence and, thus, contribute to the progress of the discussion in personnel economics. Third, 
despite the fact that incentives are often framed to be the core of personnel economics (e.g. 
Lazear 2000b) and as such are probably one of the most intensively studied fields in HRM 
research, very little is known about responses of employees to the abolition of incentives. 
To the best of the author’s knowledge, the abolition of incentives has not been studied that 
often – Freeman and Kleiner (2005) representing a rare exception. By studying employees 
who experience the abolition of an existing incentive scheme, this work may contribute to 
a better understanding of the general functioning of incentives. Eventually, this thesis con-
tributes to absence research in three ways. First, as mentioned above the use of register 
data in absence research depicts a clear advantage over most of the existing research that 
lacks access to objective absence figures from inside a company. Second, the absence data 
used in this study is advantageous in that it was compiled in different international plants 
of the same company. Hence, the data is coherently recorded using identical corporate 
standards at all plants. This allows for international comparisons without facing the com-
mon drawbacks of varying reporting methods usually associated with international absence 
data (European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions 2010). 
Third, absence here is primarily evaluated at the group level. Despite the fact that absence 
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is a social concept and absence behavior is to a large extent influenced by worker’s peers, 
personnel economic knowledge on absenteeism is to a great part based on individual-level 
data (e.g. Rentsch, Steel 2003). Chapter three addresses this gap in absence research. In 
total, the findings of this thesis contribute to the ongoing discussion of the social and eco-
nomic determinants in personnel economics by offering important insights on teamwork 
and incentives based on unique data.   
Despite its valuable contribution to personnel economics the work at hand faces some limi-
tations originating from both econometric methods and data. In general, meta-analyses 
face two particular challenges (e.g. Egger, Smith, Sterne 2001): the publication bias as 
well as the garbage-in-garbage-out issue. First, studies with positive and significant find-
ings are more likely to be published in peer-reviewed journals. As a result, meta-analyses 
that focus solely on published articles only cover significant findings and leave out contro-
versial or inconclusive results, leading to the emergence of a publication bias. Second, the 
quality of any meta-analysis is dependent on the quality of the studies reviewed. To ac-
count for this pitfall – referred to as garbage-in-garbage-out effect – only studies published 
in high-quality peer-reviewed journals are included in the meta-analysis presented in chap-
ter two. Albeit the focus on peer-reviewed articles might provoke a publication bias, this 
procedure seems to be particularly crucial to identify the most important contributions to 
the extensive literature on team diversity. Moreover, any publication bias is mitigated by 
the fact that the findings included in the meta-analysis in chapter two show positive as well 
as negative correlations.  
A common issue of insider studies is centered on its single-firm data sources. Although 
this allows for high-quality research at the micro-perspective, the generalizability of results 
is limited (Ichniowski, Shaw 2013). Moreover, this research is likely to suffer from selec-
tion bias and, therefore, it also suffers from endogeneity in the choice of workers and man-
agers as it focuses exclusively on a specific industry. Results based solely on data and in-
formation originating from the automotive industry may not be presumed to be universally 
valid and, therefore, should not serve as a blueprint for other industries without further 
investigation. A distinctive limitation to all non-experimental data – and thus to insider 
econometrics as well – is that the choice of a treatment by means of a particular manage-
ment practice is not random but instead is the result of a maximization decision taken by 
the company. 
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In conclusion, the evidence and implications discussed in this thesis provide important 
contributions to the strands of insider econometrics and personnel economics, in particular 
to the fields of incentive design and work organization in teams. With regard to the meth-
ods applied and topics studied, the work at hand concludes by pointing out promising sug-
gestions for future research. First, although having a long tradition in other scientific fields 
such as medicine, the meta-analytic approach is only slowly gaining credence in economic 
research. However, results of this thesis demonstrate that meta-analyses are a useful means 
to overcome limitations of small sample sizes and gain an overview on topics with exten-
sive, but so far inconclusive empirical evidence. In particular, topics that can be assessed 
as being “over-researched” may benefit more from meta-analyzed conclusions than from 
additional empirical findings. Second, modern times are changing the circumstances of 
firms and employees alike as complexity of cooperation and processes increases. There-
fore, economic models need to be adapted and refined by incorporating information and 
data from within companies. On this account, insider studies are a key to improving the 
quality of both theoretical models and implications for practitioners derived from research. 
Thus, further contributions to insider econometrics are highly appreciated. Third, in order 
to gain a comprehensive understanding of an economic phenomenon, it is crucial to ana-
lyze it in all its facets. For instance, in response to the well-studied field of incentive intro-
duction, this work analyses the behavioral consequences of its abolition. As a conse-
quence, the presented findings may contribute to an overall better understanding of incen-
tives. Therefore, more studies that depart from familiar paths and shed light on hitherto 
unstudied aspects of well-known subjects are needed. Fourth, as mentioned earlier, the use 
of data from GPS-based fleet management systems has proven to contribute significant 
findings to personnel economics. Thus, scholars should keep their eyes open to new and 
innovative data sources that so far have not been taken into account for scientific research. 
The digital age can be assumed to offer further “treasure chests” in terms of computerized 
data. Eventually, this dissertation emphasizes the advantageousness of the cooperation 
between academia and businesses in the context of insider econometrics. The author not 
only acknowledges the great opportunity to work with unique and otherwise unavailable 
data from inside a company but also highly appreciates the chance to discuss findings with 
internal experts in order to refine interpretations and derive more comprehensive implica-
tions. The author of this thesis, therefore, invites researchers as well as practitioners to join 
their forces in the search for valuable insights that benefit both scientific progress and 
companies’ bottom-lines.  
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Table A.1: Heterogeneity Measures Listed by Frequency of Use 
Diversity measure Blau CV Teachman s.d. Other* 
Age 4 14 2 5 3 
Gender 14 1 5 1 8 
Culture 13 1 3 - 2 
Function 14 - 5 - 3 
Tenure 2 16 - 4 1 
Education      
Background 7 - - 3 3 
Level 4 3 2 - 1 
* Other heterogeneity measures include Herfindal index, Gini index, mean,  
percentage share and authors’ own modifications. 
 
Figure A.1 : Forest Plot – Age Diversity and Overall Performance 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
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Figure A.2: Forest Plot – Gender Diversity and Overall Performance 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
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Figure A.3: Forest Plot – Culture Diversity and Overall Performance 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
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Figure A.4: Forest Plot – Tenure Diversity and Overall Performance 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
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Figure A.5: Forest Plot – Functional Background Diversity and Overall Performance 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
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Figure A.6: Forest Plot – Educational Background Diversity and Overall Performance 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
  
Appendix   
 
 
XV 
Figure A.7: Forest Plot – Education Level Diversity and Overall Performance 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
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Table A.2: Diversity-Performance Relation by Performance Measure 
Performance 
Measure 
k rz 
95% CI 
Q df I
2
 
Lower Upper 
Age        
Financial 7 -0.029 -0.069 0.011 7.66 6 21.70% 
Subjective  12 -0.046 -0.165 0.073 45.3*** 11 75.70% 
External  10 -0.074 -0.2 0.051 34.31*** 9 73.80% 
Team 3 0.052 -0.082 0.186 2.02 2 0.80% 
Effectiveness 4 -0.073 -0.264 0.118 8.81** 3 66.00% 
Gender        
Financial 8 -0.01 -0.042 0.022 7.72 7 9.30% 
Subjective  13 -0.064* -0.13 0.003 17.25 12 30.40% 
External  10 -0.078* -0.162 0.006 15.15* 9 40.60% 
Team 4 -0.022 -0.132 0.087 0.41 3 0.00% 
Effectiveness 8 -0.073 -0.201 0.054 17.15** 7 59.20% 
Culture        
Financial 9 0.045 -0.019 0.109 33.16*** 8 75.90% 
Subjective  7 -0.085 -0.236 0.066 21.63*** 6 72.30% 
External  7 -0.085 -0.236 0.066 21.63***  72.30% 
Team --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Effectiveness 4 -0.006 -0.184 0.172 7.44* 3 59.70% 
Function        
Financial 13 -0.014 -0.075 0.047 29.23*** 12 58.90% 
Subjective  5 0.052 -0.11 0.215 27.51*** 4 85.50% 
External  5 0.052 -0.11 0.215 27.51*** 4 85.50% 
Team --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Effectiveness 7 0.086 -0.075 0.246 120.32*** 6 95.00% 
Tenure        
Financial 10 -0.013 -0.102 0.077 37.27*** 9 75.80% 
Subjective  6 0.095** 0.021 0.169 6.29 5 20.50% 
External  6 0.095** 0.021 0.169 6.29 5 20.50% 
Team --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Effectiveness 8 -0.001 -0.107 0.106 57.28*** 7 87.80% 
Education        
Background        
Financial 6 0 -0.064 0.063 13.49** 5 62.90% 
Subjective  3 0.239 -0.09 0.569 12.97*** 2 84.60% 
External  3 0.239 -0.09 0.569 12.97*** 2 84.60% 
Team --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Effectiveness 1 0.09*** 0.038 0.142 0*** 0 0.00% 
        
     (continues next page) 
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Note. k = total number of correlation coefficients meta-analyzed; N = total number of teams across 
the correlations; rz = corrected population correlation (sample-size weighted based ES on Fisher’s z 
transformed correlation coefficients with significance test for ES=0; rz = standard error of the cor-
rected population correlation; 95% CI = lower and upper bound of the 95% confidence interval; Q 
= homogeneity statistics (Cochran’s Q); df = degree of freedom; I2 = percentage of between-study 
variation due to heterogeneity. Occasions of no or insufficient observations marked with ---.  
***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.1 
 
 
        
Level        
Financial 4 0.035 -0.206 0.276 16.33*** 3 81.60% 
Subjective  5 -0.038 -0.204 0.129 16.99*** 4 76.50% 
External  3 -0.132* -0.267 0.002 4.03 2 50.30% 
Team 3 -0.017 -0.383 0.35 14.63*** 2 86.30% 
Effectiveness 2 0.008 -0.275 0.29 3.62* 1 72.30% 
   
 
Table A.3: Fixed-effects Estimations on Absence Rate (IV)
+
  
  luxury sites   volume sites  
  IV-(1)   IV-(2)   IV-(3)   IV-(4)  
VARIABLES  
Plant A 
(GER) 
  
Plant B 
(UK) 
  
Plant C 
(ESP) 
  
Plant D 
(GER) 
 
Mean age (in years) -1.477 -0.529 -0.197 -0.336 0.402 -0.603 -0.735 0.0102 -0.666 1.342 0.516** -0.0372 
 (7.355) (0.356) (7.552) (3.664) (0.434) (3.641) (1.415) (0.112) (1.417) (2.003) (0.230) (2.896) 
Mean age² (in years) 0.0124 --- -0.0052 0.0101 --- 0.00945 0.0101 --- 0.00835 -0.0114 --- 0.00668 
 (0.101)  (0.104) (0.038)  (0.0411) (0.0189)  (0.0188) (0.025)  (0.0354) 
Share of males  -16.63 -12.47 -6.985 8.525 12.53 8.616 -2.601* -2.487* -2.493* -0.0704 1.430 0.00338 
(in %/100) (23.22) (18.01) (23.09) (8.605) (7.577) (8.321) (1.408) (1.398) (1.404) (5.021) (6.919) (6.917) 
Mean tenure (in years) 3.171 -4.040* -3.353 -2.738* -0.135 -1.968 -0.213 0.0111 -0.189 0.515 -0.630 1.630 
 (5.626) (1.879) (6.395) (1.332) (0.221) (1.179) (0.400) (0.129) (0.402) (1.144) (0.432) (1.653) 
Mean tenure² (in years) -0.521 --- -0.0473 0.0739* --- 0.0561 0.00931 --- 0.00740 -0.0464 --- -0.0867 
 (0.349)  (0.461) (0.037)  (0.0343) (0.0145)  (0.0148) (0.043)  (0.0611) 
Share of temporary  -6.72** -6.52** -2.61** 1.034 0.0511 2.329* n/a n/a n/a -1.397 -1.492 -1.380 
workers (in %/100) (1.911) (2.371) (0.903) (1.691) (2.297) (1.200)    (3.374) (3.392) (3.4499) 
Employment protection  n/v n/v  --- 5.707* 5.040* --- -1.647 -2.209 --- n/v n/v --- 
legislation (0=weak,…)    (2.515) (2.218)  (10.81) (10.83)     
2-Shift system (yes=1) -7.341 -8.090* -9.248 2.830** 2.683** 2.052** 2.343* 2.393* 1.763 n/v n/v n/v 
 (4.008) (3.834) (4.723) (0.974) (0.850) (0.744) (1.293) (1.286) (1.185)    
Constant 5.620 26.62 73.24 -5.480 -42.92 25.10 11.83 -3.405 15.57 -16.72 -81.02 -9.533 
 (144.1) (81.92) (114.7) (103.6) (40.28) (76.52) (35.02) (21.28) (25.37) (40.03) (153.7) (53.10) 
Observations 198 198 198 273 273 273 3,464 3,464 3,464 1,414 828 828 
R-squared 0.335 0.324 0.290 0.155 0.142 0.137 0.047 0.046 0.041 0.075 0.073 0.075 
Number of unit 6 6 6 8 8 8 104 104 104 42 42 42 
Environmental Var. YES YES --- YES YES --- YES YES --- YES YES --- 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
+ all estimations including month and weather dummies & age and tenure coefficients of variation | only main results displayed |  n/a= not available | n/v= no variance 
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Table A.4: Fixed-effects Estimations on Mean Absence Spell Duration (V)
+
 
  luxury sites   volume sites  
  V-(1)   V-(2)   V-(3)   V-(4)  
VARIABLES  
Plant A 
(GER) 
  
Plant B 
(UK) 
  
Plant C 
(ESP) 
  
Plant D 
(GER) 
 
Mean age  0.676 -0.429 -0.607 -6.752 -0.121 -6.115 -2.518 0.0349 -2.447 0.590 0.678** -2.242 
(in years) (3.048) (0.398) (2.784) (4.676) (0.508) (5.018) (2.291) (0.138) (2.290) (2.684) (0.302) (3.375) 
Mean age²  -0.0147 --- 0.00461 0.0771 --- 0.0773 0.0345 --- 0.0327 -0.00069  0.0354 
(in years) (0.0430)  (0.0395) (0.0518)  (0.0579) (0.0310)  (0.0310) (0.0329)  (0.041) 
Share of males  -20.76* -24.18* -15.98 3.859 6.602 7.593 -2.614 -2.350 -2.515 -3.559 -2.779 -3.529 
(in %/100) (10.11) (11.40) (14.87) (8.040) (8.063) (7.491) (1.864) (1.836) (1.845) (6.649) (8.869) (8.794) 
Mean tenure  -8.708 -2.374 -4.711 -0.543 0.233 -1.325 -0.306 0.129 -0.297 -0.893 -0.847 0.963 
(in years) (5.580) (1.977) (5.520) (1.393) (0.338) (1.033) (0.455) (0.139) (0.450) (1.716) (0.563) (2.504) 
Influenza activity -0.416 -0.502 -0.244 -0.174 -0.0660 0.0923 0.734 0.768 0.774* -0.129 -2.009 -2.031 
(0=no activity,…) (0.578) (0.619) (0.554) (0.596) (0.479) (0.577) (0.623) (0.624) (0.450) (0.524) (2.824) (1.539) 
Turnover  0.0547 0.0306 -0.0187 0.0227 0.0219 0.0235 -0.0601 -0.0561 -0.0478 -0.604** -0.59** -0.59** 
(arrivals & exits) (0.136) (0.134) (0.112) (0.0161) (0.0131) (0.0185) (0.0518) (0.0519) (0.0505) (0.270) (0.265) (0.256) 
Unit size  -0.0172 0.0320 -0.0169 -0.0256 -0.0804 -0.0143 0.29*** 0.28*** 0.311*** 0.209 0.435* 0.426* 
(in persons) (0.0969) (0.102) (0.116) (0.102) (0.0744) (0.113) (0.0618) (0.0636) (0.0600) (0.146) (0.245) (0.234) 
2-Shift system  -1.605 -0.963 -2.206 1.142 1.301 1.647* 4.044** 4.141** 3.414** n/a n/a n/a 
(yes=1) (2.981) (2.663) (3.303) (1.111) (0.850) (0.725) (1.758) (1.768) (1.594)    
3-Shift system  n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 2.737* 2.841** 2.329* n/v n/v n/v 
(yes=1)       (1.420) (1.431) (1.361)    
Constant 78.50 65.06 65.48* 113.3 -35.47 137.2 29.70 -20.01 41.40 8.170 74.69 44.16 
 (40.34) (46.93) (31.65) (128.6) (54.27) (113.7) (49.65) (24.45) (41.02) (52.84) (181.1) (62.32) 
Observations 198 198 198 273 273 273 3,464 3,464 3,464 1,353 812 812 
R-squared 0.213 0.198 0.178 0.151 0.142 0.124 0.046 0.044 0.044 0.049 0.065 0.067 
Number of unit 6 6 6 8 8 8 104 104 104 39 39 39 
Environmental Var. YES YES --- YES YES --- YES YES --- YES YES --- 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
+ all estimations including month and weather dummies & age and tenure coefficients of variation | only main results displayed |  n/a= not available | n/v= no variance  
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Table A.5: Fixed-effects Estimations on Absence Frequency (VI)
+
 
  luxury sites   volume sites  
  VI-(1)   VI-(2)   VI-(3)   VI-(4)  
VARIABLES  
Plant A 
(GER) 
  
Plant B 
(UK) 
  
Plant C 
(ESP) 
  
Plant D 
(GER) 
 
Mean age  -0.181 0.00743 -0.140 0.117 0.00522 0.129 -0.0132 0.00056 -0.0135 0.0198 --- 0.0466 
(in years) (0.174) (0.0098) (0.173) (0.124) (0.0091) (0.114) (0.0235) (0.0018) (0.0235) (0.0466) (0.004) (0.0616) 
Share of males  1.765* 1.962* 1.832* -0.0306 0.00402 0.0162 -0.056** -0.056** -0.05** 0.0345 0.0455 -0.0006 
(in %/100) (0.805) (0.776) (0.775) (0.332) (0.343) (0.295) (0.026) (0.0254) (0.026) (0.0807) (0.120) (0.115) 
Mean tenure  0.463** -0.0588 0.304 -0.0421 -0.0002 -0.0233 0.0021 -0.0004 0.00266 0.0481 -0.002 0.0513 
(in years) (0.138) (0.0674) (0.178) (0.0516) (0.0053) (0.0503) (0.0057) (0.0022) (0.0057) (0.0382) (0.008) (0.0412) 
Mean tenure²  -0.038** --- -0.026* 0.00120 --- 0.0007 -0.00010 --- -0.0001 -0.0018 --- -0.002 
(in years) (0.0106)  (0.013) (0.00153)  (0.0015) (0.0002)  (0.0002) (0.0014)  (0.0015) 
Turnover  -0.0038 -0.0017 0.00032 0.000206 0.00023 0.00018 0.0006 0.00059 0.00085 0.023** 0.015* 0.0169* 
(arrivals & exits) (0.0051) (0.0059) (0.005) (0.00026) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0665) (0.0652) (0.0663)  (0.06) (0.0450) 
Share of temporary  0.302** 0.319* 0.296* 0.00786 -0.0179 0.0420 n/a n/a n/a -0.012 -0.0204 0.0037 
workers (in %/100) (0.0965) (0.132) (0.126) (0.0642) (0.0855) (0.0588)    (0.064) (0.068) (0.0606) 
Unit size  0.00028 -0.0031 -0.0028 -0.00317* -0.002* -0.0030 0.00034 0.00036 0.00069 -0.0033 -0.0044 -0.0029 
(in persons) (0.0032) (0.0039) (0.004) (0.00165) (0.001) (0.0017) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0036) (0.004) (0.0036) 
Employment prot, n/v n/v --- 0.0939* 0.0722 --- -0.230 -0.231 --- n/v n/v --- 
legislation (0=weak)    (0.0403) (0.0457)  (0.205) (0.206)     
2-Shift system -0.0677 -0.114 -0.160* 0.0742* 0.0679 0.0528 0.0316* 0.0310* 0.035** n/a n/a n/a 
(yes=1) (0.0830) (0.120) (0.075) (0.0351) (0.0359) (0.0311) (0.0178) (0.0176) (0.0171)    
Constant 1.885 1.207 0.176 -2.522 -0.467 -2.420 0.241 0.0107 0.280 -0.365 -2.541 -1.052 
 (4.337) (3.444) (2.755) (3.026) (0.895) (2.336) (0.573) (0.364) (0.427) (1.067) (5.782) (1.144) 
Observations  198 198 198 273 273 273 3,460 3,460 3,460 1,350 809 809 
R-squared 0.388 0.347 0.357 0.230 0.221 0.206 0.076 0.075 0.069 0.086 0.072 0.073 
Number of unit 6 6 6 8 8 8 104 104 104 39 39 39 
Environmental Var. YES YES --- YES YES --- YES YES --- YES YES --- 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
+ all estimations including month and weather dummies & age and tenure coefficients of variation | only main results displayed |  n/a= not available | n/v= no variance 
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Figure A.8: Fuel Consumption with / without Incentives  
 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
incentives in practice 
incentives abolished 
  
 
 
Table A.6: Descriptive Statistics with and without Incentives in Practice 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
+
Excluding the first three months of the observation period due to secretly introduced incentive. 
 Incentives in Practice
+
 Incentives Abolished 
Variable mean s.d. between within mean s.d. between within 
Fuel Consumption (in l/100 km) 27.93 3.01 .32 2.99 27.77 3.04 .41 3.02 
Driving Parameters         
Average Speed (in km/h) 75.17 3.50 .33 3.48 75.62 3.07 .48 3.03 
Idling (in % of engine running time) .03 .02 .002 .02 .02 .02 .002 .02 
Coasting (in % of engine running time) .14 .05 .01 .05 .15 .05 .01 .05 
Speeding (in % of engine running time) .08 .12 .1 .12 .07 .11 .02 .10 
Brake Applications (# per 100km) 12.85 8.28 .88 8.24 11.68 6.91 1.37 6.81 
Harsh Brake Applications (# per 100km) .09 .26 .02 .26 .14 .25 .04 .25 
Harsh Accelerations (# per 100km) .06 .24 .02 .24 .08 .29 .03 .29 
Maximum Vehicle Speed (in km/h) 96.10 5.41 .56 5.38 96.36 5.67 1.07 5.59 
Driving Scores         
Anticipation (Score in %/100) .81 .15 .2 .15 .84 .15 .05 .14 
Choice Gear (Score in %/100) .98 .12 .02 .12 .97 .15 .03 .15 
Use Brakes (Score in %/100) .77 .19 .03 .19 .79 .19 .05 .19 
Hill Drive (Score in %/100) .63 .25 .02 .25 .65 .26 .06 .25 
Trip Evaluation         
Overall (1=green, 2=yellow, 3=red) 2.04 .99 .37 .92 1.73 .90 .29 .85 
Number of drivers: 37 X
X
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Table A.7: Two-Way Anova of Incentives and Driver on Fuel Consumption 
 
 
Table A.8: Findings on Fuel Consumption after Installation of Incentives
+
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Incentives (yes=1) 1.202 1.168 1.896* 1.846 2.223* 
 (.967) (.977) (.985) (1.181) (1.231) 
Tenure (in months)    .0480 .555 
    (.612) (1.019) 
Trend (in months after 
incentive introduction) 
    -.896 
(1.158) 
Constant 27.39*** 27.09*** 25.82*** 25.38*** 20.70*** 
 (.567) (.575) (.767) (5.530) (9.333) 
Vehicle Controls YES YES YES YES YES 
Date Controls YES YES YES YES YES 
Time Controls  YES YES YES YES 
Weather Controls   YES YES YES 
Driver FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 1,199 1,199 1,199 1,199 1,199 
R-squared .082 .084 .093 .093 .093 
Number of driver 31 31 31 31 31 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1 
+ 
Results of fixed-effects estimations on fuel consumption for short-term effects after the 
installation of incentives (January 2011 to August 2011, i.e. 3 months without incentives 
and 5 months with)
 
 
  
                   Total    57830.7878  6325  9.14320756   
                                                                              
                Residual    57140.5275  6252  9.13955974   
                          
        bonus_new#driver    330.581371    36  9.18281587       1.00     0.4610
                  driver    317.943075    36  8.83175208       0.97     0.5263
               bonus_new    39.4089719     1  39.4089719       4.31     0.0379
                          
                   Model    690.260327    73  9.45562092       1.03     0.3977
                                                                              
                  Source    Partial SS    df       MS           F     Prob > F
                           Root MSE      = 3.02317     Adj R-squared =  0.0004
                           Number of obs =    6326     R-squared     =  0.0119
incentives 
driver 
incentives#driver 
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Table A.9: Findings on Fuel Consumption after Abolition of Incentive
+
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Incentives (yes=1) .380** .358** .338* .964*** .148 .148 
 (.174) (.174) (.178) (.265) (.388) (.391) 
Age (in years)     -.797*** -.797*** 
     (.207) (.209) 
Tenure (in months)    .0539** .0508** .0508** 
    (.0234) (.0238) (.0239) 
Constant 27.55*** 27.21*** 26.93*** 25.27*** 60.75*** 63.69*** 
 (.769) (.755) (.806) (1.091) (9.770) (10.54) 
Vehicle Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Date Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time Controls  YES YES YES YES YES 
Weather Controls   YES YES YES YES 
Driver Controls      YES 
Driver FE YES YES YES YES YES  
Observations 3,263 3,263 3,263 3,263 3,263 3,263 
R-squared .038 .039 .040 .041 .041  
Number of driver 37 37 37 37 37 37 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1 
+
Results of fixed-effects (models 1 to 5) and random-effects (model 6) estimations on fuel 
consumption for short-term effects after the abolition of the incentives (May 2012 to Au-
gust 2013, i.e. 8 months with and without bonus each) 
 
Table A.10: Ordered Logit Estimation for Trip Evaluation
+
 
Variables Ordered Logit Regression 
Incentives (yes=1) 1.187*** 
 (.128) 
Age (in years) .196 
 (.226) 
Tenure (in months) .00132 
 (.0187) 
Vehicle Controls YES 
Date Controls YES 
Time Controls YES 
Weather Controls YES 
Driver Controls YES 
Observations 6,319 
Pseudo R-squared .1136 
+Trip Evaluation: “good”=1, “mediocre”=2, “poor”=3 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1 
+
(April 2011 to December 2013)  
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Table A.11: Baseline Results of Fixed Effects Estimation (incl. Bonus Regime) 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Temporary Contract  -.397* -.415** -.475** -.487** -.487** 
(yes=1) (.180) (.161) (.142) (.150) (.150) 
Bonus Regime (yes=1) -2.753 -1.772 .436 -1.995  
 (2.608)  (2.475) (1.617) (3.164)  
Tenure (in three-month     -.074 -.074 
intervals)    (.208) (.208) 
Age (in years)     -.604 
     (1.550) 
Date Dummies YES YES YES YES YES 
Vehicle Dummies  YES YES YES YES 
Time Dummies   YES YES YES 
Weather Dummies   YES YES YES 
Driver FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant 28.26*** 27.43*** 19.04 -4.773 39.11 
 (2.323) (2.179) (18.73) (5.389) (64.72) 
Number of observations 1,299 1,299 1,299 1,299 1,299 
Number of drivers 8 8 8 8 8 
R-squared .090 .116 .128 .128 .128 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10 
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Table A.12: Baseline Results of Fixed Effects Estimation (incl. Trend Variable) 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Temporary Contract  -.675** -.651*** -.646*** -.657** -.657** 
(yes=1) (.236) (.181) (.181) (.203) (.203) 
Trend (in month) -.147 -.137* -.140* -.139* -.139* 
 (.081) (.068) (.069) (.070) (.070) 
Trend² (in month) .00521** .00452** .00378* .00380* .00380* 
 (.00162) (.00156) (.00166) (.00171) (.00171) 
Tenure (in three-    -.057 -.057 
month intervals)    (.213) (.213) 
Age (in years)     -.101 
     (1.271) 
Date Dummies YES YES YES YES YES 
Vehicle Dummies  YES YES YES YES 
Time Dummies   YES YES YES 
Weather Dummies   YES YES YES 
Driver Fixed-Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant 25.74*** 25.83*** 21.02 19.16 22.65 
 (.991) (1.124) (12.59) (13.84) (54.67) 
Number of observations 1,299 1,299 1,299 1,299 1,299 
Number of drivers 8 8 8 8 8 
R-squared .092 .117 .130 .130 .130 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10  
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Table A.13: Ordered Logit Estimation of Driver Performance
+
 
Variables Ordered Logit 
Temporary Contract (yes=1) -1.4307*** 
 (.3528) 
Age (in years) .0138 
 (.0854) 
Tenure (in three-month intervals) -.1712 
 (.3115) 
Vehicle Dummies YES 
Date Dummies YES 
Time Dummies YES 
Weather Dummies YES 
Driver Dummies YES 
Number of observations 1,296 
Number of drivers 8 
Pseudo R-squared .2955 
+Driver Performance=Trip Evaluation: “good”=1, “mediocre”=2, “poor”=3 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10 
 
 
  
Appendix   
 
 
XXVIII 
Figure A.9: Kernel Density Plot of Fuel Consumption by Trip Evaluation 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
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